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I want to thank Alexander Brüggen, Christine Harbring, Martin Sefton,
and Hannes Rusch for reading and assessing my thesis and for patiently
answering the endless number of emails that it took to schedule the
defence.
Special thanks to Johannes Abeler for giving me the opportunity to
spent a semester at the University of Oxford. I tremendously enjoyed
i
Acknowledgments
the chance to attend lectures, seminars, and meetings with so many
brilliant people from all kinds of fields.
I’m grateful to all the members of the MPE department for providing
a great environment to pursue a PhD. Firstly, Elke Lucas for all the
support in dealing with the often opaque university administration but
even more for the shared small talk and coffee breaks between teach-
ing blocks. Sylvia Beenen, Clemens Kool, David Hoeksema for always
trying to accommodate my teaching preferences and helping out with
many administrative issues. Martin Strobel, for all the advice, help, and
discussions over the years that made you a kind of “shadow supervi-
sor” at times. I’m also grateful to Sasha Vostroknutov for all the advise
and fun evenings especially during my research master. Christian Seel
for getting me interested in contest games and for making a valiant
effort (together with Thomas Demuynck) in getting Riccardo used to
Belgian beers.
Thanks to Elias Tsakas for organising the job market training, discus-
sions about basketball, and brainstorming how to teach proofs to psy-
chology students. I’m also very grateful to Max Löffler, Matthias Wibral,
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This thesis deals with social preferences, social identity, inequality, and
contests. The common theme across the different chapters is that we
explore situations in which people fight over, or have to propose how
to distribute resources. When this process is not creating new wealth on
its own and the parties fighting over the resources have to commit effort
or funds to obtain the resources, this process is called rent-seeking. The
most common example of rent-seeking behavior is lobbying. Compa-
nies lobby governments to grant subsidies, introduce licensing to make
market entry for competitors more difficult, grant monopoly rights, or
impose tariffs on foreign imports. The money spent on such lobbying
activities is not productively used to create additional wealth but rather
to obtain special privileges and to redistribute resources. This idea was
first developed by Tullock (1967) and got its name ”rent-seeking” in
later work by Krueger (1974). When modelled as a game, it usually
takes the form of a contest in which the participants compete by invest-
ing resources to secure a prize.
The reason that economists are concerned with such activities, is that
these activities can be seen as a negative sum game, thus reducing the
overall welfare in an economy. In his book ”The Rise and Decline of
Nations” Olson (1982) identifies rent-seeking activities as a key reason
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Chapter 1. Introduction
for differences in economic growth across countries. His thesis is that
countries and states that have higher levels of rent-seeking suffer from
lower economic growth because special interest groups that seek to
maximise resources for their coalition represent frictions that limit the
ability of resources to be allocated efficiently. These frictions can take
the form of lobbying for barriers to entry, resistance to technological
change that would diminish their rent, price controls, or other protec-
tionist efforts.
In chapter 2 of this thesis, we look at the flip-side of Mancur Olson’s ar-
gument. While Olson argues that distributional conflicts over resources
reduce economic growth, we are interested how decreasing absolute
and relative growth affects distributive preferences. In a lab experiment,
we investigate the effect of absolute and relative wage decreases on in-
dividual preferences for redistribution. We find that absolute or relative
wage decreases significantly reduce the willingness of people to share
with others. Strikingly, this effect is especially pronounced for individ-
uals who have an income that is overall higher compared to the person
they are matched with.
While Chapter 2 looks at how two individuals decide to distribute re-
sources, many conflicts over resources in the field, especially high-stake
ones, are not decided by individuals but by groups of people such as
corporations, political parties, or countries. Sherif et al. (1961) showed
that putting children in groups and letting them compete over prizes
generated hostility and aggression towards the outgroup. This phe-
nomenon was further formalized by Tajfel and Turner (1970,1979,1985)
as social identity theory. They showed that rather minimal conditions,
like randomly assigning people into groups based on a coin flip, are suf-
ficient to create ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility. This research
found its way into the field of Economics with the work of Akerlof and
Kranton (2000) who show that accounting for a person’s social identity
can substantially change the predictions of economic models. In the
following years, economists have studied the effect of social identity
on social preferences, coordination, public good provision, trust, cheat-
ing, and conflict (See e.g. Aksoy & Palma, 2019; Bacine & Eckel, 2020;
Chen & Chen, 2011; Chen & Li, 2009; Chowdhury et al., 2016; Eckel &
Grossman, 2005). A popular way to get a clean estimate of the effect
2
of social identity, is to create new social identities in the experimental
laboratory. This avoids confounds that exist in the field such as self se-
lection into specific groups or group specific characteristics. Both make
it difficult to distinguish between the effect that being in ”a” group has
from the effect that selecting oneself and being into a specific group has
and make it hard to generalise the results of field studies.
But to use social identity in the lab, it would be useful to know which
methods are best suited to create social identity in the lab without intro-
ducing confounding factors and how to measure the strength of social
identity. In Chapter 3 we address this by comparing different methods
to induce social identity and different econometric approaches to mea-
sure its strength in the lab. We find that a one-shot group contest game
is successful in inducing social identity as measured by social prefer-
ences towards the in- and outgroup irrespective of the measurement
approach. However, when the strength of social identity is measured
within-subject, all methods are successful in introducing an ingroup
bias. Further analysis suggests that the within-subject measurement ap-
proach itself might have an effect on the strength of the induced social
identity and thus could confound the measurement.
Interestingly, contests are not only a good way to induce social identity,
but also likely to be consecutively influenced by the strength of social
identity itself. The theoretical model used in chapter 4 predicts that
social identity increases contributions in group contests and thus leads
to an escalation of conflict.1 As these group contests are models of
collective rent-seeking, any additional contribution to them leads to
an overall welfare loss and is thus undesirable. If being in a group
contest induces a social identity and a strong social identity results
in higher contest contributions, we potentially have a vicious circle in
which the high contributions in the contest game reinforce themselves.
However, as the possibility of exclusion and clear group boundaries are
1The model is adapted from Zaunbrecher and Riedl (2016). The corresponding ex-
periment found a large degree of overcontribution but no difference between the
treatment in which we induce identity and the normal group contest. However, the
evidence from Chapter 3 suggests that this might be a result of the group contest




an important element of social identity (see e.g. Haslam, 2004; Tajfel &
Turner, 1985), a potential remedy for this overcontribution is the change
of the group composition. When the friend of today can be the enemy
of tomorrow, and vice versa, people might be less inclined to adopt a
strong identification with their group and thus contribute less to the
contest.2
In chapter 4 we test this by letting two groups compete against each
other for a prize and by varying the degree to which migration happens
between the groups. In the control treatment, groups are fixed and no
changes to the group composition are made. In the endogenous treat-
ment, we let participants decide to switch groups after each round of
the contest and implement a subset of these decisions. In the exogenous
treatment, we exogenously determine migrations between groups by
implementing decisions from the endogenous treatment. We find that
the endogenous migration treatment leads to a significant increase in
contributions whereas the exogenous migration treatment only leads
to a marginal decrease compared to the control treatment without mi-
gration. Surprisingly, the ingroup bias in social preference that partic-
ipants show at the beginning of the experiment stays unchanged over
the course of the experiment.
One feature all chapters in this thesis have in common is that they are
lab experiments. Economists started to adopt this methodology from
social psychologists, as it allows us to study causal effects in an envi-
ronment in which we can rule out confounders that are usually found
in the field or in observational data. A drawback that is often pointed
out is that lab experiments lack external validity because students be-
have differently from other people or because the lab itself is a rather
special environment and not comparable with situations in ”real life”.
While there has been a long discussion around the generalizability from
students to the general population, the most comprehensive study of
different participant pools in the US by Snowberg and Yariv (2021) finds
that comparative statics and correlations are very similar across pools.3
2In a related argument, Tajfel and Turner (1979) note that if groups are permeable,
individuals from lower status groups will try to disassociate themselves from the
group and pursue their own ends.
3The most prominent debate about the topic was sparked by a series of articles by
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Studies that compare or link experimental and field data also consis-
tently find that experimental results generalize and explain behaviour
in the field well across a wide range of domains.4
Another way of approaching the external validity issue is to ask if there
are alternative methods that allow causal inference without the draw-
back that the results are potentially less externally valid. The ”credi-
bility revolution“ in empirical economics popularized methods to per-
form causal inference on observational data and as a result, economists
do not necessarily rely on students and lab experiment anymore to
get causal estimates of treatment effects. Under the right circumstances,
quasi experimental methods allow us to perform causal inference on ob-
servational data, mimicking the performance of an experiment without
requiring random assignment of treatments by the experimenter. As the
data comes from the field, it is often seen as more externally valid than
lab experiments without compromising on internal validity. However,
each of these quasi-experimental methods requires strong assumptions
about the underlying data of which only some are testable.
Difference-in-Differences designs relies on the assumption of parallel
trends. While it is possible to show good covariate balance and parallel
trends in the pre-treatment period, we cannot test parallel trends for
the counter-factual post-treatment periods in which the treatment did
not take place. One could assume that parallel trends pre-treatment
extrapolate to the counterfactual post-treatment period but it has been
shown that this can be insufficient to recover treatment effects from
policy experiments (e.g. Wichman & Ferraro, 2017). Even when one is
willing to make the assumption that trends are parallel, getting clean
Difference-in-Differences estimates has been shown to be less straight-
forward than was assumed just a few years ago. E.g. recent work by
Levitt and List that questioned the generalizability of lab experiments (Levitt &
List, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) and resulted in a large number of critical responses (see
e.g. Camerer, 2015; Falk & Heckman, 2009; Kessler & Vesterlund, 2015).
4See e.g. Riedl and Smeets, 2017 for the link between social preferences and social
responsible investments, Potters and Stoop, 2016 for the link between cheating in
the lab and the field, Herbst and Mas, 2015 for peer effects on work productivity in
the lab and field (Herbst and Mas 2015), Alm et al., 2015 for tax compliance in the
lab and field, Armantier and Boly, 2013 for corruption the lab and field.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Goodman-Bacon (2021) showed that when treatment timing differs be-
tween units estimates of the average treatment effects are biased and
need adjustment.5 Replicating such Difference-in-Differences studies
with the necessary adjustments, Baker et al. (2021) shows that the bias
can be large enough to reverse the direction of the treatment effect.
For instrumental variable approaches, treatment effects are estimated
for compliers—those whose behaviour is changed through the
instrument—and thus for external validity we have to make the
assumption that the treatment effect for the compliers resembles that
of other subpopulations. For internal validity, it is necessary that
the instruments are strong enough and that the instruments only
affect the outcome through the endogenous variable. However, this is
untestable and rarely plausible in situations that would be of interest
to economists or only valid in such a specific setting that it limits the
external validity. A recent study by Young (2019) has also shown that
while researchers usually wish to get a more accurate and unbiased
estimate of their treatment effect from using an instrumental variable
approach, it hardly ever is efficient enough to reject the original
ordinary least squares point estimate and thus it is debatable if a
clever instrumental variable approach provides meaningful additional
information. Similar arguments can be extended to other approaches
such as Regression Discontinuity designs.
While lab experiments sometimes struggle with external validity, alter-
native causal inference methods require conditions that are relatively
rare to achieve in the field and do not necessarily provide more exter-
nal validity than lab experiments. Especially when we want have high
control over the environment and understand underlying mechanisms,
lab experiments provide advantages that cannot be replicated in the
field. For the phenomena addressed in this thesis, they provide an opti-
mal environment, as they allow us to isolate treatment effects that are
usually confounded by other factors in the field.
5Which in 2014/15 was true for around half of Difference-in-Differences papers pub-





Declining Wages And Redistribution
Adapted from: Zaunbrecher, H. W., & Gagnon, N. (2020). Declin-
ing wages increase selfish redistribution in an environment with fixed
income inequality. GSBE Research Memoranda, (023).
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Chapter 2. Declining Wages And Redistribution
Abstract
We use a controlled laboratory experiment to study the causal impact of
income decreases on redistribution decisions, in an environment where
the income inequality that may be created with wage changes is kept
fixed. While many studies examine the effect of income inequality on
redistribution decisions, this is the first to isolate the effect of income
changes. First, we investigate the role of a decreasing wage compared
to one’s past wage (intra-personal decrease). Second, we investigate
the role of a wage that decreases relative to the wage of another per-
son (inter-personal decrease). We hypothesize that if intra-personal or
inter-personal decreases create dissatisfaction for an individual, that
person may support redistribution policies that compensates them for
the situation. Overall, we find evidence that individuals indeed behave
more selfishly when they experience decreasing wages.
10
The carriers of value or utility are changes rather
than final asset positions
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Heterogeneous income growth is a central issue of our times (Milanovic,
2016; Piketty, 2014). In the United States between 1980 and 2004, pre-
tax real incomes have increased by 121% for the richest 10%, by 42%
for the richest 10–50%, 7% for the richest 50–80%, and decreased by
25% for the poorest 20% (Piketty et al., 2018).1 At the same time, while
understanding the determinants of redistribution is a longstanding pri-
ority of economists (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009), there is surprisingly no
study that isolates the possible role of income changes. Nevertheless, a
combination of loss aversion and aversion to unequal earning trends
could make an individual seek compensation for absolute or relative
decreases in earning. Whether this is indeed the case is difficult to estab-
lish because income changes are intertwined with potential confounds,
e.g., decreasing earnings are naturally intertwined with decreasing ab-
solute incomes and changing levels of income inequality. Drawing on
the tradition of controlled laboratory experiments isolating the influ-
ence of income inequality on redistribution (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), our study offers the first evidence that
earnings decreases indeed affect redistribution decisions, even after
controlling for one’s absolute income and for income inequality.2
1Comparable pictures emerge in other countries, more moderate in Europe and more
extreme in Asia (Alvaredo et al., 2017). Some of this heterogeneity is spatial: against
the backdrop of economic growth at the national level in the United States, several
major industrial hubs experienced striking declines in average household incomes
since the 1970s, e.g., Buffalo (−23%), Cleveland (−32%), and Detroit (−35%) (Hart-
ley, 2013). Other differences in the evolution of incomes are based on education
(Goldin & Katz, 2007), gender (Blau & Kahn, 2017), and ethnicity (Bayer & Charles,
2018).
2In terms of external validity, preferences elicited in experiments correlate with polit-
ical support for redistributive policies at the societal level (e.g., Almås et al., 2020;
Epper et al., 2020; Fisman et al., 2017; Kerschbamer and Müller, 2020). Social pref-
erences elicited in experiments have also been shown to correlate with behavior
outside of those experiments in other domains, such as loan repayments (Karlan,
2005), donations and other pro-social behaviors (Baran et al., 2010; Benz & Meier,
11
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Studies have shown that individuals are especially averse to losses rel-
ative to a reference state (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Genesove
and Mayer, 2001, and Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2003) and that they dislike
decreasing wage trends (Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991). One might
be especially irate at an absolute or even relative wage decrease and
seek compensation for it—irrespective of the income inequality engen-
dered by the wage change. However, whether this is indeed the case
or not is still unknown because income changes in observational data
are intertwined with a myriad of potentially confounding factors, such
as levels of income inequality and geographical or socio-demographic
differences between those with increasing and decreasing incomes. We
therefore isolate the role of income changes on redistribution decisions
in an experiment.
We designed a laboratory experiment in which individuals complete
real-effort tasks for wages that are exogenously assigned to them.
The treatments that we implement vary the intra-personal and inter-
personal wage changes faced by two matched participants over two
periods. The wages are taxed and, after each treatment, each of the
two participants individually decides how the money deducted from
the wages of both participants is redistributed among them. We then
implement one decisions per matched pair of participants. Crucially,
we keep income inequality fixed in all treatments, only varying the
wage changes. This feature allows us to make causal inferences
between wage decreases and redistribution behavior.
Our contention that wage decreases can influence redistribution deci-
sions is rooted in the large number of studies documenting different
forms of reference dependence as well as loss aversion. Research on
reference-dependent preferences has long modeled the dislike of indi-
viduals for losses relative to an intra-personal reference state (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman,
1991). Empirical research suggests that the behavior of workers is con-
sistent with a dislike for falling behind one’s earnings goals (Camerer
2008; Franzen & Pointner, 2013), work productivity (Cohn et al., 2015), and socially-
responsible investments (Riedl & Smeets, 2017). Moreover, Snowberg and Yariv,
2021 provide evidence that students and the general population behave similarly
in qualitative terms for a range of common experimental measures.
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et al., 1997; Crawford & Meng, 2011), behind one’s expectations (Abeler
et al., 2011; Mas, 2006), and behind one’s own past income (Cohn et al.,
2015; DellaVigna et al., 2017). Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) also
report that individuals prefer increasing wage profiles to equivalent de-
creasing ones.3 Relatedly, self-reported well-being is lower when one’s
living standard decreases over time (Clark et al., 2008; Senik, 2009).
However, none of these studies analyze the impact of wage decreases
on redistribution decisions.
Moreover, inequality aversion models (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr
& Schmidt, 1999) posit that individuals dislike to have less than oth-
ers. In other words, individuals dislike to fall behind an inter-personal
reference point, i.e., falling behind others.4 This literature often stud-
ies inequality aversion in contexts where income changes and income
inequality are bundled together. For instance, Cohn et al., 2014, Breza
et al., 2017, and Dube et al., 2019 study the effect of wage inequality
on labor decisions, in a context where wage inequality appears after a
period of wage equality between workers. Similarly, Kuhn et al., 2011
analyze changes in consumption after one’s neighbor wins at a lottery.
However, these studies cannot isolate the effect of wage changes from
the effect of the income inequality that they create.
A key component of our investigation is the causal relationship that
we obtain between wage decreases and redistribution decisions, which
is provided by the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment.
This methodology provides three main advantages. First, we randomly
3The same effect has been shown for other contexts such as experiences (Ross & Si-
monson, 1991), environmental outcomes (Guyse et al., 2002), and health (Chapman,
1996).
4These models also posit that individuals dislike to have more than others, although
to a lesser extent than they dislike to have less. We focus on disadvantageous
inequality here for two reasons. First, disadvantageous inequality is assumed to be
stronger in these models and a large number of empirical studies have gathered
evidence supporting its existence. Second, our research is closely linked to research
on loss aversion, which considers that individuals are especially sensitive to losses.
The empirical evidence includes observational research (Clark & Oswald, 1996;
Luttmer, 2005; Solnick & Hemenway, 1998), natural experiments (Card et al., 2012;
Kuhn et al., 2011), field experiments (Breza et al., 2017; Cohn et al., 2014; Dube et al.,
2019) as well as laboratory experiments (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt,
1999) and experiments with the general population (Bellemare et al., 2008).
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assign wage changes, which precludes that individuals experiencing
different changes do so because of different underlying individual
characteristics. Second, crucially, we can study wage changes without
changing the overall income inequality. That is, we cleanly separate
the role of income decreases from the role of disadvantageous income
inequality. Third, our design rules out a role of expectations regarding
future wages that income changes might create, which in turn is likely
to affect redistribution decisions (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Bénabou
& Ok, 2001).
We find evidence that individuals behave more selfishly when they
experience decreasing wages. Pooling together participants who earn
more (High Earners) and participants who earn less (Low Earners),
we find that they share significantly less when they face decreasing
wages than other types of wage trends that we explore. Specifically,
High Earners share significantly less with the other participant follow-
ing an intra- or an inter-personal reduction in their wages. Low Earners
share less after a combined intra- and inter-personal decline in their
wage, although only at marginally significant levels. The effect size is
between−6% and−8%, which is quite considerable given the relatively
short time span in which the participants experience the wage decrease.
We do not find statistical differences between the effects of intra- and
inter-personal wage decreases. Given that previous studies have shown
that elicited social preferences correlate with political support for redis-
tributive policies (e.g., Almås et al., 2020; Epper et al., 2020; Fisman
et al., 2017; Kerschbamer and Müller, 2020), our results suggest that
declining absolute or relative wages could contribute to the support for
redistributive policies aiming to rectify those declines.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: First, we introduce the
experimental design. Second, we advance the hypotheses. Third, we
present the empirical analyses and the results. Fourth, we conclude by




The experiment consists of five periods. In a period, two participants
are anonymously matched. A period consists of two sub-periods in
which participants perform a real-effort task and ends with a redistri-
bution decision.
The real-effort task in every sub-period is to reduce the size of four
circles on the computer screen until they disappear. This is done by
repeatedly clicking on a circle with the mouse while it moves across the
screen. Only one circle appears at a time, and each click on it slightly
decreases its size. A new circle appears once a circle completely disap-
pears.5 Participants have four minutes to complete the task, which can
be completed easily by exerting a reasonable effort (most participants
take approximately two minutes to finish the task). They are provided
with a countdown and with a record of how many circles they have
completed so far. Figure 1 provides a screenshot of the task as experi-
enced by participants in sub-period 2. Note that, in the experiment, we
call circles “balls” and that we provide participants with the reminder
that they need to reach a “Ball Threshold” of four to indicate that they
need to make four circles disappear in order to earn the wage.
At the start of a period, participants are informed of their wage for the
first sub-period a few seconds before the first sub-period starts. Dur-
ing a period, they monitor how their own wage and the wage of their
matched partner changes over the two sub-periods. This information
is visualized through one graph exhibiting one’s own wages and the
wages of the other participant over the period up to the current sub-
period. That is, participants see the wages in the current sub-period,
and if they are in the second sub-period, they also see the wages from
the previous sub-period. In addition to providing a screenshot of the
task, Figure 2.1 also shows how participants see the wage change in
sub-period 2. The screen presents the wage information from the first
sub-period on the left part of the graph, and from the second sub-period
on the right part of the graph. Participants have an additional minute
5Participants are not paid more if they complete more than four circles. The task is a
modified version of the one developed by Cacault and Grieder (2019).
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Figure 2.1: Screenshot of task in sub-period 2 (C AT C H I N G U P treatment)
to rest in between the two sub-periods. A few seconds before the sec-
ond sub-period starts, they are informed about any wage changes that
occur between the sub-periods.
The participants are paid the two wages of a period—one for each of the
two sub-periods—only if they complete the task in both sub-periods.6
A third of each wage that they earn during the two sub-periods is taken
from them as tax and placed in a joint account. That is, the joint account
contains a third of the two wages of one participant, and a third of the
two wages of the other participant.7
6A participant is paid nothing for a period if the task in one of the two sub-periods is
not completed. However, we set the wage high enough relative to the effort required
for the task so that this only affected 2 out of 298 participants. We excluded these
participants and their matched participants because the matched participants could
see that those did not complete the task. Therefore, a total of 4 participants were
dropped for the data analysis.
7To ease the explanation for participants, we phrase the parts of the income taken
as taxes and the distribution decisions as a redistribution of taxes collected. We
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At the end of each period, the two participants individually are asked
to individually propose how to distribute the money contained in the
joint account. This is implemented through a dictator game with role
uncertainty. That is, one of the two choices is randomly chosen to count
for the implementation of the redistribution. The money in the joint ac-
count always amounts to 11 Euro. Participants can keep the entire joint
account for themselves, transfer its content to the other participant, or
chose any in-between allocation in increments of 10 cents.8 Participants
then take a two-minute break before the next period starts. They are
not informed about the choice of the other participant. At the end of
the experiment, one of the two participants’ choices from one period is
randomly chosen to count for payment.
We employ five treatments that we implement within-subject, thus each
participant participates in all five treatments over the 5 periods of the
experiments. The treatments vary the wage changes faced by partici-
pants between the first and second sub-period of a period. A participant
is always in the role of either the High Earner or the Low Earner.9 In
the first role (High Earner), a participant always experiences advanta-
geous income inequality over the period. The sum of the two wages in
a period is always 18 Euro. Similarly, the Low Earner always faces dis-
advantageous income inequality over the period—the sum of the two
wages is always 15 Euro. Crucially, this allows us to maintain the same
income inequality over the period in all treatments, such that income
inequality cannot explain any treatment differences.10
We chose a within-subject design in order to increase statistical power
(Bellemare et al., 2016). Table 1 details the wages of Low Earners and
High Earners over the two sub-periods in the five treatments. The order
collect a fix percentage of income to make it easier for participants to understand
and calculate how much was taken from them.
8Appendix 2.4 provides a screenshot showing how the redistribution decision is
presented to participants.
9Participants are not informed that they stay in their role for the experiment.
10A possible alternative design could have been to impose income equality over the
period in all treatments. However, we found it natural to create income inequality
over each period, as income inequality is common outside of the laboratory.
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Table 2.1: Treatments overview
Treatment High Earner / Low Earner





I N T R A -
P E R S O N A L







I N T R A -
P E R S O N A L







I N T R A / I N T E R -
P E R S O N A L












Wages are indicated on the vertical axis in Euro, and the two sub-
periods of a period are indicated on the horizontal axis. Income
inequality is constant over the period: incomes are 15 Euro for
the Low Earner and 18 Euro for the High Earner.
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of treatments is randomized.11 As we are interested in studying indi-
vidual responses to absolute and relative wage decreases, we designed
the following treatments varying wages changes. Note that while those
treatments do not cover the whole universe of possible wage changes,
they do provide a diverse set of them to study possible effects of de-
clining wages. Those include stable wages as well as an increasing
wage profile. In S TA B L E, the wage of each participant remains con-
stant in the two sub-periods. In I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E
and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, both participants face either
an absolute wage increase or decrease. This allows us to study the ef-
fects of intra-personal wage changes. In I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L
C H A N G E, the Low Earner experiences a wage decrease while the High-
Earner experiences a wage increase. The wage changes are therefore
both absolute and relative for the two participants. In C AT C H I N G
U P, the wage of the Low Earner increases, while the wage of the High
Earner is constant. That is, the High Earner encounters a relative wage
decrease—the Low Earner is “catching up” with the High Earner.
Before starting the experiment, the experimenter reads the instructions
aloud and participants are provided with a written copy detailing all
steps of the experiment.12 After reading the instructions, participants
complete comprehension questions, and help is provided if needed.
They also go through a practice period, which is a shorter version of
a real period, so that they become familiar with the proceedings of a
period. This practice period includes the task and the redistribution
decision, but does not count for payment. In it, each participant has the
same wage, which stays constant of the two sub-periods.
In terms of participant matching, participants are informed that they are
paired with a participant in the same laboratory session in each period.
11There are 120 possible orders (5!). We overly sample from a random subset of the
orders due to a software problem. That is, approximately 70% of the orders are
randomly drawn from a random subset of 30 orders—the subset itself is a random
selection from the 120 orders—and the remaining 30% is randomly drawn from
the 90 other orders. Conducting the data analysis separately for each of those two
sub-samples qualitatively provides the same results.
12We provide the original instructions as well as important screenshots of the experi-
ment in the Appendix.
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The experiment was designed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). It was conducted at the BEElab (Behavioural and Experimental
Economics Laboratory) of Maastricht University. Our sample consists
of 294 participants recruited over 16 sessions via the online recruitment
software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).13 The experiment lasted for about 90
minutes and participants earned 16.50 Euro on average.
2.2 Hypotheses
We posit that, if individuals face a wage decrease, they experience disu-
tility and take from others to be compensated. We also assume that
two forms of disutility are created by wage decreases. The first is intra-
personal disutility created from an absolute wage decrease because
individuals are loss averse with respect to their past wage. That is, they
take their past wage as the reference state, and deviations below this
reference point create disutility. The second is inter-personal disutil-
ity created from a relative wage decrease. Individuals take the wage
change of others as the reference state and they are loss averse with
respect to this change—a decrease relative to the wage changes of oth-
ers creates disutility. We do not explicitly model this process. Rather,
we directly test whether individuals give less or take more from others
when they experience intra- and inter-personal declining wages.
High Earners face an absolute wage decrease in I N T R A - P E R S O N A L
D E C R E A S E and a relative wage decrease in C AT C H I N G U P . In con-
trast, they experience no decrease in S TA B L E, I N T R A - P E R S O N A L
I N C R E A S E, and I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E. We there-
fore predict the following, which does not distinguish between absolute
and relative wage decrease.
Hypothesis 1. High Earners give less in I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E -
C R E A S E and C AT C H I N G U P than in S TA B L E, I N T R A - P E R S O N A L
I N C R E A S E, and I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E.
13See footnote 6 explaining that four additional participants are not counted in our
sample.
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Low Earners encounter an absolute wage decrease in I N T R A -
P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E and an absolute and relative decrease in
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E . In contrast, their wage is
constant in the S TA B L E treatment. Moreover, they experience no
wage decrease in I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E and C AT C H I N G
U P. We posit that Low Earners compensate their absolute and relative
decreasing wage by taking more from others, and therefore make the
following predictions for them.
Hypothesis 2. Low Earners give less in I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L
C H A N G E and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E than in S TA B L E,
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, and C AT C H I N G U P.
Low Earners face an absolute decrease as well as a relative wage de-
crease in I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E, and at most an ab-
solute decrease in the other treatments. Therefore, we also make the
following prediction.
Hypothesis 3. Low Earners give less in I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L
C H A N G E than in I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E, S TA B L E,
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, and C AT C H I N G U P.
Similarly, since for Low Earners there is only an absolute income de-
crease in I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E, we make the following
more precise prediction—which isolates the additional effect of relative
income decrease.
Hypothesis 4. Low Earners give less in I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L
C H A N G E than in I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E.
In addition, Hypotheses 2–4 taken together imply a specific ordering of
the treatments, namely that Low Earners give less in I N T R A / I N T E R -
P E R S O N A L C H A N G E than in I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E,
and less in I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E than in S TA B L E,
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, and C AT C H I N G U P. Thus we can
also test these hypotheses jointly.
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2.3 Results
We first provide summary statistics and then test our hypotheses. There-
after we report the results of two robustness checks: First, only consid-
ering participants who give at least once, and second, dropping those
individuals who give almost everything.
Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 presents the average amount from the 11-Euro joint account
that participants give to the other participant. We provide the data
for all participants and then for those participants whom we call non-
selfish, i.e., those who give a positive amount in at least one period. If
we look at all participants, we see that mean giving is 1.53 Euro (SD =
2.23 Euro) or 14% of the joint account. High Earners are generally a little
more generous than Low Earners. High Earners appear to be slightly
less generous in the C AT C H I N G U P and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E -
C R E A S E than in other treatments. Low Earners are less generous in
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E than in other treatments. If
we only look at the non-selfish participants, we observe the same pat-
terns.
Compared to dictator games in general, average giving in our experi-
ment is on the lower side of the spectrum found in the literature (see
meta-study by Engel (2011) and comment by Zhang and Ortmann
(2014); average giving in the dictator game is 28.3%). Some factors
present in our study have been shown to reduce generosity, namely
using a student sample, endowing recipients, repeating the game, dic-
tators earning the money that they can redistribute, and the option of
taking money from others, but it has also been shown that having de-
serving recipients who earned the money that the dictator redistributes
can increase giving. Moreover, role uncertainty about who will give
and who will receive has also been shown to increase pro-sociality in
dictator games (Iriberri & Rey-Biel, 2011).
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative distribution of the amounts given,
separately for High Earners and Low Earners. There is extensive lower-
bound censoring: Participants give nothing in 56% of the decisions (59%
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Amount given
All participants Non-selfish participants
Treatment High Earners Low Earners High Earners Low Earners
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
S TA B L E 1.62 1.49 3.05 2.46
(2.35) (2.18) (2.46) (2.34)
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L 1.57 1.48 2.96 2.45
D E C R E A S E (2.42) (2.15) (2.64) (2.31)
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L 1.63 1.45 3.07 2.40
I N C R E A S E (2.39) (2.13) (2.53) (2.30)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L 1.62 1.42 3.06 2.35
C H A N G E (2.34) (2.03) (2.44) (2.15)
C AT C H I N G U P 1.41 1.58 2.65 2.61
(2.20) (2.15) (2.42) (2.23)
N 147 147 78 89
Note: Participants could give any amount between 0 and 11 Euro from the 11-Euro joint account. The remaining
amount was credited to their own account.
for High Earners, 53% for Low Earners). Thus, the low average sharing
across treatments is strongly driven by the large number of participants
exhibiting fully selfish behavior. Moreover, participants share no more
than 1 Euro in 68% of decisions.
Hypothesis Testing
Table 3 reports non-parametric tests of each of our four hypotheses.
The upper part concerns High Earners (Hypothesis 1); the lower part
concerns Low Earners (Hypotheses 2–4). The tests that we employ are
mostly Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (WSR). We also make use of the
rank-based Page test (Page, 1963), in which the null hypothesis is that
the amount given is the same in all treatments, whereas the alternative
hypothesis is that the amount given follows a pre-specified treatment
order. When we compare sets of treatments, we compare average giving
per individual in one set of treatments with average giving per individ-
ual in the other set of treatments. Since our hypotheses are directed, we
always use one-sided tests in the predicted direction.14
14To account for censoring and to provide a parametric alternative specification, we
also conducted random-effects Tobit regressions, which employ a dummy for the
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution functions of giving
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Table 2.3: Tests of hypotheses
Change in One-sided
High Earners giving p-value
C AT C H I N G U P,
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H1 S TA B L E, −0.14 Euro 0.017
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−8.38%)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E
Low Earners
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E,
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H2 S TA B L E, −0.05 Euro 0.101
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−3.61%)
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
S TA B L E,
H3 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E, −0.08 Euro 0.052
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−5.33%)
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
H4 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E −0.06 Euro 0.484
(−4.22%)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
Joint I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E < 0.076
H2–4 S TA B L E, I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, C AT C H I N G U P
Note: Change in giving corresponds to the difference in Euro and percentage distributed to the other participant from
the 11-Euro joint account between different sets of treatments. In line with the directed nature of the hypotheses, for H1–4
we report one-sided p-values of non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (WSR). Furthermore, we report the one-sided
p-value for a joint test of H2–4. We use Page’s test for ordered alternatives which evaluates whether population means
follow a pre-specified order. For both WSR and Page tests, we average giving per individual over each of the two treatment
sets under consideration.
For High Earners we predicted in Hypothesis 1 that those experiencing
set of treatments of interest and combine the other treatments in the baseline. How-
ever, we rely on the non-parametric results for our analysis because an inspection of
the residuals of an equivalent linear regression suggests a violation of the assump-
tion that standard errors are normally distributed aside from the violation created
by the lower-bound censoring. Table 2.C.2 of the Appendix 2.C details the regres-
sion specifications for the Tobit regressions. For completeness, Appendix 2.C also
reports results from random-effects Tobit regressions where we include individual
treatment dummies and employ the S TA B L E treatment as reference group.
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the decreasing absolute or relative wage—in the treatments I N T R A -
P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E and C AT C H I N G U P—would give less to
the other participant, compared to what they give in the combined
other treatments. We find that, indeed, those High Earners whose wage
decreased over the period become less generous. As indicated in the
first row of Table 3, the effect is significant at the 5% level (WSR p-value
= 0.017). Moreover, we cannot statistically distinguish between the ef-
fects of intra- and inter-personal wage decreases on giving (I N T R A -
P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E vs. C AT C H I N G U P , WSR p-value = 0.458).
We can also analyze the effect of the two decreasing-wage treatments
separately. The reduction in giving induced by an intra-personal wage
decrease (I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E) and the reduction in giv-
ing induced by an inter-personal wage decrease (C AT C H I N G U P) rel-
ative to the treatments without any wage decreases are both significant
(WSR p-value = 0.007; WSR p-value = 0.001, respectively).
For Low Earners, we formulated three hypotheses. Hypothesis 2
states that those participants who experienced wage decreases—in the
treatments I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E and I N T R A / I N T E R -
P E R S O N A L C H A N G E—share less with the other participant, relative
to the combined other treatments. We find only weak evidence that the
combined decreasing-wage treatments reduce the amount given (WSR
p-value = 0.101). Then, Hypothesis 3 states that Low Earners who
specifically experienced the combined intra- and inter-personal wage
decrease—in treatment I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E—
become less generous than in all other treatments combined. Our tests
find support for this contention at marginal significance levels (WSR
p-value = 0.052)
Hypothesis 4—that Low Earners give less when facing the combined
intra- and inter-personal wage decrease than when facing the intra-
personal wage decrease—is not supported. That is, giving is not sig-
nificantly lower in I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E than in
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E (WSR p-value = 0.484).
Our three hypotheses regarding Low Earners (Hypotheses 2–4) can be
combined into a single extensive hypothesis, which is reported in the
last row of Table 3. We use a Page test to evaluate the null hypothesis
26
that the amount given is the same in all treatments, relative to the al-
ternative hypothesis that the amount given follows the pre-specified
treatment order. When evaluated in this manner, we find some (lim-
ited) evidence that Low Earners compensate their decreasing wage by
giving less to the other participant (p-value = 0.076). Finally, Table 2.4
shows that we find highly significant evidence of the negative effect
of decreasing wages on giving when we pool High Earners and Low
Earners together, and evaluate whether they give less when they face
decreasing absolute or relative wages (p-value = 0.007).
Table 2.4: Analysis for Low and High Earners pooled together
Change in One-sided
giving p-value
D E C R E A S I N G < O T H E R −0.10 Euro 0.007
(−6.09%)
Note: Change in giving corresponds to the difference in Euro and
percentage. The set D E C R E A S I N G contains treatments C AT C H I N G
U P and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E for High Earners, and
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L
D E C R E A S E for Low Earners. The set O T H E R contains all treatments
excluded from D E C R E A S I N G for High and Low Earners. We report
one-sided p-values of non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR).
Giving is averaged per individual over each of the two treatment sets
under consideration.
Result 1. High Earners: Participants become more selfish when facing de-
creasing wages in comparison to other wage trends. This holds both for intra-
personal wage decreases and for inter-personal wage decreases (supports Hy-
pothesis 1).
Result 2. Low Earners: (a) Participants become more selfish when facing
combined intra-personal and inter-personal decreasing wages than when fac-
ing other wage trends—at marginally significant levels (supports Hypothesis
3). (b) The combined intra- and inter-personal wage decrease treatment and
the intra-personal wage decrease treatment together only decrease giving at
near marginally significant levels (only qualitatively supports Hypothesis 2),
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although (c) the (non-)effect of intra-personal wage decreases is statistically
indistinguishable from the effect of the combined intra-personal and inter-
personal decreasing wages (does not support Hypothesis 4).
We conduct two additional analyses. First, we consider whether our re-
sults are similar when we examine only participants who give at least
once, i.e., whose behavior is not always censored. We do find very sim-
ilar results (see Appendix 2.D), which suggests that the effects are not
driven by the censored nature of the data. Second, we check that our
results are robust to dropping the rare individuals who give almost
everything during a period (i.e., 9 Euro or more out of the 11-Euro joint
account), which would result in greater earnings for the participant
they are matched with than for themselves. We do this because those
participants might have misunderstood the instructions (alternatively,
they could also simply be very generous). The results are unchanged
for High Earners, but for Low Earners only the joint test of the treat-
ment order remains significant (see Appendix 2.E). In sum, result 1
concerning High Earners hypothesis stands unaffected by both robust-
ness checks, and results 2 concerning the Low Earners hypotheses is
weakened when excluding very generous individuals.
Finally, we assess the magnitude of the effect of decreasing wages on
giving. For a simple evaluation, we employ the summary statistics con-
tained in Table 2. First, for High Earners, average giving declines from
around 1.62 Euro in the three treatments without decreasing wages
to 1.49 Euro in the two treatments with decreasing wages (I N T R A -
P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E and C AT C H I N G U P). This corresponds to
an effect size of 0.06 pooled standard deviations, but which still trans-
lates into an 8% reduction in giving. If we consider only non-selfish
High Earners, giving declines from approximately 3.06 Euro to 2.85
Euro—an effect size of 0.08 pooled standard deviations, and a 7% reduc-
tion in giving. Second, for Low Earners, average giving goes from ap-
proximately 1.51 Euro in the three treatments without decreasing wages
to 1.42 Euro in the treatment with decreasing intra- and inter-personal
wages (I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E) and 1.48 Euro in the
treatment with decreasing intra-personal wages (I N T R A - P E R S O N A L
D E C R E A S E). Consequently, the reduction caused by I N T R A / I N T E R -
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P E R S O N A L C H A N G E corresponds to an effect size of 0.04 pooled
standard deviations, and a 6% decrease. Furthermore, the picture we
obtain from considering only Low Earners who are not completely self-
ish is nearly identical.
2.4 Discussion
In this study, we conducted an experiment designed to identify how
decreases in wages causally affect redistribution behavior. We hypoth-
esized that individuals act more selfishly when they experience intra-
or inter-personal wage decreases, i.e., in absolute terms or relative to
others. We find evidence that individuals indeed share less with others
when they face decreasing wages.
We investigate the effect on High Earners as well as on Low Earners. We
find more convincing evidence that the redistributive behavior of High
Earners is affected by decreasing wages. For Low Earners, the evidence
is qualitatively in the direction predicted, but on the border of marginal
significance. Specifically, High Earners are significantly less generous
when they face a wage decrease. This occurs both in the case of an
intra-personal decrease and in the case of an inter-personal decrease.
In comparison, Low Earners share less with others when they face the
combined intra- and inter-personal wage decreases, although the effect
is only marginally significant. They are not less generous when they
only experience an intra-personal wage decrease. All in all, we find
some evidence that decreasing wages increase selfish redistribution
decisions, even though income inequality remains unchanged in our
experimental environment.
This carries several implications for the effect of inequality on redis-
tributive behavior. For instance, not taking into account the specific
effect of changes may lead to understatement of the importance of de-
creasing wages on support for public policies—e.g., for individuals who
are worse off compared to their previous situation or compared to oth-
ers. E.g. High income individuals could oppose fiscal stimulus pack-
ages that have elements of redistribution in economics downturns be-
cause they experience a decreasing income trend and thus become less
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generous. Similarly, we would expect less support for policies that aim
to close earning gaps—e.g. between men and women—from people
who are averse to relative wage decreases. More generally, our findings
highlight the important role of reference points in redistribution deci-
sions beyond static income inequality, a topic that has previously been
neglected.
An alternative mechanism that can explain our finding that High Earn-
ers become less generous after facing decreasing wages is suggested
by the literature on avoidance behavior in charitable giving (Andreoni
et al., 2017; Dana et al., 2007; Grossman & Van Der Weele, 2017). That is,
it is possible that Higher Earners in the experiment use their wage de-
crease as an excuse to justify being less generous while still maintaining
a positive self-image. However, by the same argument, they could also
use the wage increase by the Low Earner in the Intra-Personal Increase
treatment as excuse to give less, which is not what we observe.
In addition, we note that the wage decreases that participants encounter
in the laboratory are very short lived and the wage differences small
compared to the time frame and scale over which wage changes occur
in the economy. In this sense, it appears quite remarkable that even
with small wage differences and relatively short time periods, we are
able to find significant differences in redistribution decisions. As such,
the small effect sizes that we measure are likely to be lower bounds on
the effects of income trends on redistribution.
The main objective for future research on the topic could be be to inves-
tigate if increasing the duration and the wage differences indeed results
in larger effects. For instance, one could conduct an experiment with a
duration of several weeks or even months. As such, our study should
be seen as first step for that type of studies. As additional avenues for
future studies on the topic, one could also vary the identity of the refer-
ence group as several diverging income trends concern specific societal
groups, such as ethnic minority and majority groups. That would al-
low one to study whether individuals react more strongly to relative
wage decreases when the other person is an individual sharing their so-
cial identity or if the other person belongs to an opposing or outgroup.
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Furthermore, we only investigate the effect of decreasing wages on re-
distributive preferences when the redistribution is zero sum. But many
fights over resources are arguably wasteful rent-seeking activities, so
that studying the effect of wage decreases in more complex settings






Welcome to this economic experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. In the experiment, your
decisions and the decisions of other participants will determine how much money you earn. You will
be paid in cash at the end of the session, provided that you follow the rules. If you do not follow the
rules, you will not be paid. You are forbidden from using your phone and from communicating with
other participants at any time during the session. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to
raise your hand to ask the experimenter for help.
The session lasts for up to 90 minutes. You need to stay until the end to be paid. To complete the task
in this experiment, you are also required to be able to click many times with a computer mouse (e.g.,
you need to have no injuries to your arms and fingers).
General Instructions
There are 5 periods, each lasting 8 minutes. Each period, you are matched with 1 anonymous other
person. This can be any participant in the session. All participants work on the exact same task.
Each period consists of 2 sub-periods of 4 minutes. In each sub-period, you are asked to complete
a task to earn a wage. You need to complete the task in each of the 2 sub-periods in a period to earn
the 2 wages for the period. Over the 2 sub-periods, you observe your wage and the wage of the other
participant. Your wage and the wage of the other participant may vary over the 2 sub-periods, but the
task stays the same.
In each of the 2 sub-periods, a tax is deducted from your wage and the wage of the other participant
for this period. The tax is 1/3 of the wage. You are left with the after-tax wages (wage minus tax). At
the end of the period, the taxes that are taken from you and the other participant over the 2 sub-periods
are joined together into the Total Tax Collected.
At the end of each of the 5 periods, you decide how to distribute the Total Tax Collected between you
and the other participant. The other participant also decides how to distribute the Total Tax Col-
lected. The decisions are anonymous. Either your distribution or the distribution of the other participant
is randomly chosen to count for payment. If you do not complete the task for 1 of the 2 sub-periods for a
period, then you do not earn anything in this period and you cannot choose a distribution in this period.
The tax taken from the other participant is returned to him or her and there are no distribution decisions.
Until the end of the experiment, you do not receive feedback regarding what distribution the other par-
ticipant chooses, and the other participant is not told what distribution you choose. Only at the end of
the experiment, 1 of the 5 periods is randomly chosen to count for payment by the computer.
You are paid the following two parts for the chosen period. First, you are paid the 2 after-tax wages you
earned in that period. Second, either your distribution of the Total Tax Collected or the distribution
of the other participant you were matched with for this period is randomly chosen to be paid.
You need to answer a few comprehension questions and go through a Practice period before you start
the experiment. In the next two sections, you are given more details regarding specific components of
1
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2.A Instructions
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the experiment, and examples of how your wage and the wage of the other participant are presented
during the experiment. Finally, a timeline summarizing the different steps is presented at the end of
these instructions.
Details
Other Participant: The other participant is real and always works on the exact same task as you.
He or she is someone else in the session. At the start of each period, you are matched with a participant
for this period. That is, you are matched with the same participant for the 2 sub-periods of this period.
Periods: There are 5 periods, each lasting 8 minutes. Between every period, you have a 2-minute break
to relax.
Sub-periods: Within every period, there are 2 sub-periods of 4 minutes each.
Task: The task is always exactly the same for every participant in every sub-period. It is a simple
task that can be completed by exerting a reasonable effort. The task is to repeatedly click on a ball that
appears on your computer screen. Every time you click on the ball, it decreases in size until it disap-
pears. Click on the ball, and wait for it to move until you click again. If you click multiple times before
it moves, the ball does not disappear faster. The minimum number of balls that need to disappear (Balls
Threshold) in each sub-period to earn your wage is 4 balls. You need to reach this Ball Threshold in
each of the 2 sub-periods of a period to earn the 2 wages for the period. This means that if you complete
the task in only one of the 2 sub-periods of a period, you do not earn any of the 2 wages for the period.
If you want, you can make more than 4 balls disappear, but this will not change your wage. That is,
you cannot increase your wage by working more than meeting the Balls Threshold.
Wage and Tax: In a period, you earn two wages for completing the task: one wage in each of the two
sub-periods. The wage may not be the same in the first sub-period and the second sub-period. If you
do not complete the task in each of the 2 sub-periods, you are not paid at all for this period. That
is, you neither earn the wage of the first sub-period nor the wage of the second sub-period. In each
sub-period, a tax of 1/3 is removed from your wage and from the wage of the other participant. The tax
always amounts to 1/3 of the wage, both for you and the other participant. You are left with the after-tax
wage (wage minus tax).
Total Tax Collected: Taxes collected from you and from the other participant in the 2 sub-periods are
added at the end of the period into the Total Tax Collected.
Distribution: At the end of each period, you choose how to distribute the money in the Total Tax Col-
lected between yourself and the other participant. The other participant also decides how to distribute
the Total Tax Collected. Either your distribution or the distribution chosen by the other participant is
randomly chosen for payment, for the period randomly selected to be paid out. If you do not complete
the task in sub-period 1 or 2 of a period, you cannot choose a distribution. In this case, the tax taken
from the other participant is returned to him or her, and there are no distribution decisions. Similarly, if
the other participant does not complete the task in one or both of the 2 sub-periods, you and the other
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participant do not make a distribution choice, and the tax collected on your wages is returned to you.
The distribution decisions are anonymous and you are not informed about any of them before the end of
the session.
Payment: At the end of the session, the computer randomly selects 1 period for payment. There are
2 parts to your payment, provided that you have completed the task in the 2 sub-periods of the chosen
period. First, you receive your after-tax wage for each of the 2 sub-periods. Second, your distribution
or the distribution of the other participant you were matched with in this period is randomly chosen and
paid out. The randomly selected distribution is the only one you are informed about during the experi-
ment. If you do not complete the task in each the 2 sub-periods of this period, you are paid nothing.
Comprehension Questions: You are asked a few comprehension questions before the experiment starts
to make sure that you understand the instructions. If you do not understand a comprehension question,
please ask the experimenter for help by raising your hand.
Practice Period: During the Practice period, you try the task and become familiar with the experiment,
including the distribution decision. The practice period is shorter than the regular periods, and does
not count for payment. The experiment starts after the practice period.
Questions: If anything is unclear, please do not hesitate to raise your hand to ask the experimenter.
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Examples
The following are three examples of how your wage and the wage of the other participant you are
matched with for a period are indicated in each of the 2 sub-periods of a period.
Example 1: You are matched with a participant for the period. In sub-period 1, your wage is 3 EUR
and the wage of the other participant is 4.5 EUR:




Example 2: You are matched with a participant for the period. In sub-period 1, your wage is 12 EUR
and the wage of the other participant is 13.5 EUR:
Then, in sub-period 2, your wage decreases to 3 EUR and the other participant’s wage decreases to 4.5
EUR:
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Example 3: You are matched with a participant for the period. In sub-period 1, your wage is 6 EUR
and the wage of the other participant is also 6 EUR:




















































We call participants one by one at the end of the session to pay them. Please stay seated in your cubicle
while you wait.
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2.B Screenshots
Figure 2.B.1: Screenshot of redistribution stage (C AT C H I N G U P treatment)
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2.C Random-Effects Tobit regressions
Table 2.C.1: Tests of hypotheses
One-sided
High Earners p-value
C AT C H I N G U P,
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H1 S TA B L E, 0.054
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E,
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E
Low Earners
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E,
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H2 S TA B L E, 0.180
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E,
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
S TA B L E,
H3 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E, 0.055
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E,
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
H4 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E 0.146
Note: We employ a parametric random-effects Tobit regression, which includes
four period dummies to account for decreasing generosity over the course of the
experiment. In line with our directed hypotheses, we present one-sided p-values.
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Table 2.C.2: Random-effects Tobit regressions
High Earner, giving Low Earner, giving
Treatment (1) (2) Treatment (3) (4) (5)
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L −0.305 I N T E R - P E R S O N A L −0.104
D E C R E A S E & (0.190) D E C R E A S E & (0.114)
C AT C H I N G U P I N T R A / I N T E R -
P E R S O N A L C H A N G E
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L −0.171 I N T E R - P E R S O N A L
D E C R E A S E (0.239) D E C R E A S E
C AT C H I N G U P −0.438∗ C AT C H I N G U P
(0.240)
I N T R A / I N T E R - I N T R A / I N T E R - −0.222 −0.220
P E R S O N A L C H A N G E P E R S O N A L C H A N G E (0.139) (0.209)
Constant −0.919∗ −0.925∗ Constant 0.194 0.211 0.311
(0.523) (0.523) (0.399) (0.398) (0.464)
Baseline Baseline
Treatment(s) Treatment(s)
S TA B L E X X S TA B L E X X
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N T R A - P E R S O N A L X X
D E C R E A S E D E C R E A S E
I N T R A / I N T E R - X X I N T R A / I N T E R -
P E R S O N A L C H A N G E P E R S O N A L C H A N G E
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L X X I N T R A - P E R S O N A L X X
I N C R E A S E I N C R E A S E
C AT C H I N G U P C AT C H I N G U P X X
Time Period Dummies X X X X X
χ2 > 0 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.128
N 735 735 735 735 294
Standard errors in parentheses. Unlike when we test the directed hypotheses, we use two-sided p-values here for simplicity: ∗
p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table 2.C.3: Random-effects Tobit regressions with individual treatments
Giving
Treatment High Earner Low Earner
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E −0.171 0.057
(0.293) (0.175)
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E 0.107 −0.117
(0.289) (0.176)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E −0.114 −0.176
(0.289) (0.175)




Baseline Treatment S TA B L E S TA B L E
Time Period Dummies X X
χ2 > 0 0.010 <0.01
N 735 735
Standard errors in parentheses. Unlike when we test the directed hypotheses, we use
two-sided p-values here for simplicity: ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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2.D Non-Selfish—individuals giving at least once
Table 2.D.1: Tests of hypotheses, individuals giving at least once
Change in One-sided
High Earners giving p-value
C AT C H I N G U P,
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H1 S TA B L E, −0.256 Euro 0.010
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−8.38%)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E
Low Earners
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E,
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H2 S TA B L E, −0.090 Euro 0.132
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−3.61%)
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
S TA B L E,
H3 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E, −0.132 Euro 0.068
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−5.33%)
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
H4 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E −0.103 Euro 0.483
(−4.22%)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
Joint I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E < 0.033
H2–4 S TA B L E, I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, C AT C H I N G U P
Note: Change in giving corresponds to the difference in Euro and percentage distributed to the other participant from
the 11-Euro joint account between different sets of treatments. In line with the directed nature of our hypotheses, for H1–4
we report one-sided p-values of non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (WSR). Furthermore, we report the one-sided
p-value for a joint test of H2–4. We use Page’s test for ordered alternatives which evaluates whether population means
follow a pre-specified order. For both WSR and Page tests, we average giving per individual over each of the two treatment
sets under consideration.
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Table 2.D.2: Analysis for Low and High Earners pooled together,
individuals giving at least once
Change in One-sided
giving p-value
D E C R E A S I N G < O T H E R −0.17 Euro 0.011
(−6.09%)
Note: Change in giving corresponds to the difference in Euro and
percentage. The set D E C R E A S I N G contains treatments C AT C H I N G
U P and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E for High Earners, and
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L
D E C R E A S E for Low Earners. The set O T H E R contains all treatments
excluded from D E C R E A S I N G for High and Low Earners. We report
one-sided p-values of non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR).
Giving is averaged per individual over each of the two treatment sets
under consideration.
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2.E Non-Altruists—individuals giving less than 9
Euro
Table 2.E.1: Tests of hypotheses, individuals giving less than 9 Euro
Change in One-sided
High Earners giving p-value
C AT C H I N G U P,
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H1 S TA B L E, −0.15 Euro 0.030
I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−9.79%)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E
Low Earners
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E,
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E <
H2 S TA B L E, −0.04 Euro 0.254
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−2.61%)
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
S TA B L E,
H3 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E, −0.04 Euro 0.134
I N T R A - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, (−1.90%)
C AT C H I N G U P
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
H4 I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E −0.03 Euro 0.841
(−1.93%)
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E <
Joint I N T E R - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E < 0.038
S TA B L E, I N T E R - P E R S O N A L I N C R E A S E, C AT C H I N G U P
Note: In line with the directed nature of our hypotheses, for H1-4 and the pooled analysis we report one-sided p-values
of non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (WSR) which evaluates whether two population mean ranks differ in the
case of repeated measurements. Furthermore, we report the one-sided p-value for a joint test of H2–4 for which we use
Page’s test for ordered alternatives which evaluates whether population means follow a prespecified order.
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Table 2.E.2: Analysis for Low and High Earners pooled together,
individuals giving less than 9 Euro
Change in One-sided
giving p-value
D E C R E A S I N G < O T H E R −0.09 Euro 0.018
(−6.09%)
Note: Change in giving corresponds to the difference in Euro and
percentage. The set D E C R E A S I N G contains treatments C AT C H I N G
U P and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L D E C R E A S E for High Earners, and
I N T R A / I N T E R - P E R S O N A L C H A N G E and I N T R A - P E R S O N A L
D E C R E A S E for Low Earners. The set O T H E R contains all treatments
excluded from D E C R E A S I N G for High and Low Earners. We report
one-sided p-values of non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSR).






Social Identity and Social
Preferences in the Lab
Adapted from: Zaunbrecher, H. W., Williams, T., & Riedl, A. (2021b).
Social identity in the lab: A horse race between methods. Working Pa-
per.
51
Chapter 3. Social Identity and Social Preferences in the Lab
Abstract
Social identity affects the economic behavior of individuals and groups.
However, studying the effect of social identity remains difficult. It is
often not possible to directly observe or manipulate social identity in
natural settings, which makes causal inference challenging. An alterna-
tive approach is to create new social identities experimentally in the lab.
In this paper, we propose to use social value orientation tests as manipu-
lation checks for social identity experiments and explore social identity
from two perspectives: First, we consider alternative methods to induce
social identity. Second, we explore different ways to econometrically
measure the strength of social identity. We find that inducing social
identity through a task-irrelevant contest game is effective regardless
of measurement approach, while other methods typically fail to have
an effect. However, we also find that any of the investigated induction
methods effectively generates an ingroup bias when measured within-
subject which appears to be driven by salience effects.
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3.1 Introduction
Social identity, the part of the self that is derived from one’s member-
ship of a group, is an important explanatory factor in individual as
well as intergroup behaviour. It has become increasingly important in
election- and marketing campaigns, and in the analysis of economic
decision making.1 Studying the role of social identity in the field of-
ten comes with endogeneity issues: People belong to multiple social
groups, each having their own set of social norms and interactions
with other groups, and not all are easily observable. Thus, identify-
ing whether an effect comes from being in ”a group” or if the effect
is unique to the group studied is only possible through repeated repli-
cation with different groups and interactions. Due to these difficulties,
creating and manipulating new identities in the laboratory has been a
popular way to study social identities. However, only about a third of
lab studies that aim to investigate identity-based discrimination find
a significant ingroup bias (Lane, 2016). If this is due to the absence of
an effect of social identity or due to a failure to successfully induce or
manipulate social identity in the lab is often unclear, as most of the
studies lack an incentivized manipulation check. In this study, we pro-
pose to use social value orientation (SVO) tests as simple manipulation
check for social identity studies in the lab. The measure we use is the
slider measure developed by Murphy et al. (2011). Compared to other
social preference and social value orientation measures, it has the ad-
vantage of providing a high resolution and test-retest reliability while
also requiring relatively few decisions. Furthermore, we test a variety of
methods and check which one is most successful in inducing identity in
the lab and how ”successful” can best be measured econometrically.
Starting with the seminal paper by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) that
formalized the theory of Tajfel and Turner, 1979 and introduced it to
economics, many studies have shown that social identity shapes our
preferences, beliefs, and how we interact with each other. Experiments
have shown that social identity creates an ingroup bias and a positive
effect on coordination and cooperation in dictator and two-player re-
sponse games (Chen & Li, 2009), voting over redistribution (Klor &
1For a contemporary overview of the literature, see Charness and Chen (2020).
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Shayo, 2010), public good games (Eckel & Grossman, 2005), minimum-
effort games (Chen & Chen, 2011), and beliefs about intelligence Ca-
cault and Grieder, 2019. In more competitive settings, salient group
identities increase the choice of an aggressive stance in the battle of the
sexes and lead to more defections in the prisoners dilemma game (Char-
ness et al., 2007) but results from individual and group contest games
are mixed (Cason et al., 2012; Chakravarty et al., 2016; Chowdhury et al.,
2016; Mago et al., 2016; Zaunbrecher & Riedl, 2016). Researchers have
used the lab to study social identities because careful experimental de-
sign can avoid the endogeneity and selection issues that exist in the
field. With control over the available information, social identities can
be made salient (Benjamin, Choi, et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014; Kranton
et al., 2020) or new identities can be created (e.g. Charness et al., 2007;
Chen & Li, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2005; Kranton et al., 2020).
Using existing identities in the lab often comes with similar problems
as studying identity in the field. Because the experimenter does not
control the identity formation process, subjects are not randomly allo-
cated into their natural identities and thus the effect of being in a group
cannot be separated from the specific characteristics of the natural iden-
tity made salient in the lab.2 The alternative, creating new identities in
the lab, is usually achieved through variations of the ”Minimal group
paradigm” developed by Tajfel (1970). Therein, subjects are randomly
allocated into groups or quasi-randomly allocated based on an unre-
lated criterion, such us picture preferences. Since the identity formation
is random, any effect observed of being in such groups can be attributed
to being in a group itself rather than to specific group characteristics.
However, recent studies cast doubt on the robustness of some of the re-
sults that have been obtained in social identity studies in the lab. While
Chen and Li (2009) and Müller (2019) show a systematic effect of iden-
tity on social preferences, Guala and Filippin (2016) presents evidence
that this effect is not well behaved and rather unsystematic.3 Similarly,
2A notable exception to this are experiments that exploit a naturally occurring ran-
dom allocation into groups such as random allocation into army platoons (Goette
et al., 2006) or dorms (Bacine & Eckel, 2020; Banuri et al., 2012).
3Guala and Filippin (2016) show this using a larger set of modified dictator games
that includes both negative and positive costs of giving. Furthermore, they show
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Camerer et al. (2016) could not replicate the effect of social identity on
coordination that was reported in Chen and Chen (2011), however a
response by Chen et al. (2020) suggests that this failed replication was
a result of minor deviations from the original experimental protocol.
In a comprehensive meta-analysis of economic experiments that study
discrimination between groups, either preexisting or newly created in
the lab, Lane (2016) finds that 61% of the studies fail to produce a sig-
nificant discriminatory effect. Because most of the analyzed studies do
not include an incentivized manipulation check, it is unclear if this is
due to a failure to induce a social identity or the absence of an effect of
social identity on the variable of interest.
The conflicting results and failures to replicate existing findings both
highlight the need for a better understanding of what methods can
successfully be used to induce social identity and how ”successful” can
be measured quantitatively.4
While very minimal methods such as random allocation into two
groups might not be enough to induce social identity, more elaborate
methods have the potential to introduce confounding factors into the
research design. For example, inducing a group identity through a
problem solving task that allows participants to communicate could
result in significant treatment effects that are not driven by the common
identity, but by communication specific effects.
Similarly, we would like to measure the strength of the social identity
in a way that provides us with a precise estimate but also does not
introduce confounding factors. A within-subject design that uses mul-
tiple measurements for each participant has the advantage that each
subject serves as their own control group and thus we can calculate
ingroup bias on an individual level. This results in higher statistical
power but might bias behavior by telegraphing the research questions
that even sign reversals can be achieved if the complexity of the dictator games is
slightly increased by adding strictly dominated choice options.
4Gächter et al. (2015) showed that an ‘Inclusion of other in self’ task is a powerful tool
to measure social relationships, however this task is designed for preexisting social
relationships, making it less useful in circumstances in which identity is induced
by the experimenter.
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or introducing other unintended behaviour. For instance, if subjects sus-
pect that the experiment is about group discrimination, it could lead to
an increased bias due to an experimenter demand effect or lower bias
due to social norms and image concerns. Moreover, repeating the same
measurement while only varying information about group affiliations
could in itself affect social identity by making the group identity more
salient.
Ideally we would like to find the minimal method that successfully in-
duces social identity and measure it to assure that the induction was
successful, without the measurement affecting the social identity itself.
In this paper, we compare different methods to create social identities
in the lab as well as different econometric approaches to measure the
induced social identity. We ran an experiment in which we first elicited
participants’ baseline social preferences using a social value orienta-
tion test (SVO) that was conducted online one week before the lab ex-
periment. Second, participants took part in one of five social identity
treatments in the laboratory. These treatments were (1) simple cate-
gorization into two groups (minimal group paradigm); (2) problem
solving and communication; (3) group real effort task; (4) endogenous
identity creation task; and (5) group contest. After the treatment, the
participants completed three SVOs, one with respect to a member of the
ingroup, one with respect to a member of the outgroup, and one with re-
spect to someone who belonged to neither in- nor outgroup. From these
SVOs, we determine the strength of the social identity by the strength
of the ingroup bias that participants show in their social preferences. As
the order of the three SVOs was randomized and counterbalanced, our
design does not only allow us to compare the different treatments but
also to compare different between-subject, within-group (comparing
SVO decisions within a group), and within-subject measures for social
identity.
We find that only the group contest consistently induces an ingroup
bias. All other methods only exhibit a significant effect in the within-
subject analysis. An analysis of potential order effects on the pooled
data reveals that subjects that have to make a decision towards an in-
group person first do not chose significantly different allocations than
subjects that have to make a decision towards an outgroup person first.
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It is only in the subsequent decisions, when it is more salient that they
have to make decisions towards ingroup AND outgroup members, that
subjects treat these members differently.5 This suggests that the choice
of between- or within subject design interacts with the treatment in
ways that could potentially confound the analysis of social identity ef-
fects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
experimental design and procedures. Section 3.3 introduces the differ-
ent measurement approaches used. Section 3.4 reports the empirical
results, and Section 3.5 provides a discussion.
3.2 Experimental Methods
We have two primary goals. First, we want to determine which, if any,
methods of inducing social identity in the lab will significantly affect
social preferences. Second, we want to find out if different measurement
designs (e.g., within- and between-subject) yield similar results.
In section 3.2.1, we describe the overall sequence of events in the ex-
periment. Section 3.2.2 explains the matching and procedures. This is
followed by a detailed description of our measure of social preferences
in section 3.2.3, and the different methods of inducing social identity in
section 3.2.4.
3.2.1 Sequence of Events
The experiment has two parts which are summarized in Figure 3.2.1.
In part A, subjects completed the SVO online in order to elicit base-
line social preferences. This test was performed one week before the
lab experiment to minimize choice inertia due to anchoring. In part B,
subjects took part in a lab experiment during which a social identity
was induced. Subjects then immediately completed the SVO with three
5Qualitatively, this does not only hold for the pooled treatments but also for each
individual treatment.
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different people. Subjects were informed that the other person was ei-
ther (i) a member of their group, (ii) a member of the other group, or
(iii) another randomly selected person in the lab who neither belongs
to their own nor the other group. Subjects therefore knew the group
membership of the other person with whom they were interacting with
but did not know the person’s identity. The order of theses SVO tests
was randomized and counterbalanced across subjects. This part ended
with a short questionnaire. All subjects completed both parts A and
B.
Figure 3.2.1: Sequence of Events During the Experiment
Part A: Baseline SVO
Part A was conducted using Qualtrics (2005). Subjects that signed up for
the experiment received a link to a Qualtrics experiment that contained
the six primary items of the SVO slider measure developed by Murphy
et al. (2011). The instructions informed subjects that they would make
a series of allocation decisions between themselves and a random other
student. After completing the survey, they received a unique code that
they had to bring to the laboratory to participate in Part B.
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Part B: Lab Experiment
Part B was conducted using the experiment software z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) at the BEElab of Maastricht University. Subjects had to
enter the code they received in the online experiment. Subjects took
part in one of the five treatments that only varied in the social identity
induction method applied. After the social identity induction, subjects
did three rounds of SVO-tests.6 Subjects completed one SVO test with
respect to a person that was not part of the own or the other group
(random), one with respect to an own group member (ingroup) and
one with respect to a member of the other group (outgroup). The order
of the tests was randomized within a group such that in any round of
SVO tests, one group member performed an ingroup, one performed
an outgroup, and one performed a random test. This allowed us to
study potential order effects and to compare different econometric
approaches to measure the strength of social identity. Subjects knew
that they would do the test three times and that they would receive
some additional information about their match but were not explicitly
told beforehand that they did the decisions with respect to an outgroup,
ingroup and random person. At the end of the experiment, subjects
had to fill out a short questionnaire that included questions about
group closeness, risk attitudes and demographics.
3.2.2 Matching and Procedures
All payment took place at the end of the lab session in part B. For the
payment, each subject was matched with different other subjects in each
part of the experiment. In both parts it was randomly determined which
of the two was the allocator and which was the receiver. For part A, one
of the SVO decisions of the allocator was chosen and the respective
payoffs were implemented for allocator and receiver. For part B, the
identity of the matched subject determined if an outgroup, ingroup or
random decision was relevant for payout. If the matched subject was
from the ingroup, one of the dictators ingroup decisions was randomly
6The z-tree implementation of the tests is partly based on the manual from Crosetto
et al. (2012).
59
Chapter 3. Social Identity and Social Preferences in the Lab
selected and the respective payouts implemented for allocator and re-
ceiver. The procedure for an outgroup and a random match followed
analogously. Subjects did at no point get information whom they were
matched with. This was done to rule out heterogeneity in second order
beliefs as explanation for differences between the different treatments.7
They only got information whether they were allocator or receiver and
the respective payment at the end of the experiment. The remuneration
scheme was explained in both parts of the experiment. Furthermore, it
was made clear that a potential receiver never made a decision towards
the dictator. This was implemented to avoid unintended effects of an-
ticipated reciprocity (Iriberri & Rey-Biel, 2013). In some of the identity
induction treatments participants could earn additional money. These
payoffs were paid out together with the other payments at the end of
the experiment
Instructions were provided on-screen during each of the parts.8 To
allow matching of the Part A and Part B results, subjects received a
code in Part A which they had to bring to the lab for Part B. They were
also informed that they would only be paid out if they participate in
all parts of the experiment. Subjects were invited via ORSEE (Greiner,
2015). Subjects could earn tokens and coins which were exchanged
75 Euro cent = 10 tokens = 100 coins. In total, we ran 17 sessions
with average earnings of 12.20 Euros. The duration of the experiment
was around 45 minutes with slight variations between treatments. 204
subjects participated in the experiments.
3.2.3 Measuring Social Preferences
The concept of social value orientation is used in the social sciences as
well as biology to describe how a person distributes resources between
herself and others. Various schemes are used to classify individuals
into one of four categories: Individualistic, Competitive, Prosocial, and
7Ockenfels and Werner (2014) have shown that second order beliefs can be an impor-
tant mediator in social identity experiments.
8See Appendix 3.A.
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Altruistic. In economic terms, individualistic and altruistic people sim-
ply maximize the material payoffs of themselves or others, respectively.
Here, we use use the SVO slider measure developed by Murphy et al.
(2011) to measure social preferences. Similar to Andreoni and Miller
(2002), the slider measure elicits social preferences with modified dic-
tator games that vary in budget constraint and relative cost of giving.
Table 3.2.1 shows the budget sets and relative price of giving of the six
modified dictator games that are used to elicit the social value orien-
tation. There are six budget sets in total, and each budget set contains
nine evenly spaced options so that the options are a linear combination
of the two endpoints. Option 1 and 9 are the start and endpoints of
the respective budget constraint in the self-other allocation space. For
each budget set, subjects have to chose one of the allocations between
themselves and the other. For example, in the first budget set, subjects
always get 85 tokens themselves but can vary the amount of tokens
given to the other between 85 and 15 tokens. In this case, giving is cost-
less. In the second budget set, the price of giving is negative. Thus, the
payoffs for both players increase along the budget set, from 85 tokens
for the oneself and 15 for the other to 100 tokens for oneself and 50
for the other. Budget sets 3 to 6 are characterized by different positive
prices of giving, thus allocating more resources to the other comes at a
cost of tokens for oneself.
While still often used categorical, already very early studies showed
that social value orientation is continuous and can be conceptualized
geometrically as a circle in the self-other allocation space (Griesinger
& Livingston, 1973; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). The SVO measure
we use was developed by Murphy et al. (2011) to measure social pref-
erences with higher resolution and statistical power than the previous
elicitation methods of social value orientation and has been shown to
provide very high test-retest reliability (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014;
Murphy et al., 2011). Figure 3.2.2 shows the six budget constraints of
the SVO slider measure in the self-other allocation space. The angle θ
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Table 3.2.1: SVO Budget Sets
Budget Option 1 Option 9 Relative price of giving
Set (πself , πother) (πself , πother) –(∆πself/∆πother )
1 (85, 85) (85, 15) 0
2 (85, 15) (100, 50) -0.43
3 (50, 100) (85, 85) 2.33
4 (50, 100) (85, 15) 0.41
5 (100, 50) (50, 100) 1.00
6 (100, 50) (85, 85) 0.43
Note: The budget sets represent the six items of the SVO slider measure. Option 1
and Option 9 represent the start and endpoint of a budget constraint in the self-other
allocation space. Subjects have to chose a point on the budget constraint that is a
linear combination of Option 1 and 9 for each budget set. The relative price of giving
represents the tradeoff between own payoff and payoff of the other person for each
of the budget sets. E.g. for budget set 3, increasing the payoff to self by one token
decreases the payoff to the other by 0.43 tokens.
where Āo is the average allocation of payoffs to the other, Ās is the av-
erage allocation for the self, and subtracting the radius 50 centers the
starting point of the angle within the circle. This SVO angle is higher if
more prosocial choices are made and can turn negative if very compet-
itive options are chosen across the budget sets.
3.2.4 Inducing Social Identity
We used five different methods that have been used in the literature to
induce social identity. A simple categorization into groups by randomly
assigned color (”Minimal”), a problem-solving task with communica-
tion (”Klee and Kandinsky”), group competition (”Group Contest”),
endogenously created identity (”Flag”), and a real effort task (”Real
Effort”).
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Note: The six budget constraints represent the six items of the SVO slider measure.
The angle θ is the parameter that is calculated from the six points that subjects chose
on the six budget constraints. The four endpoints of the budget sets on the circle are
the idealized allocation decisions that perfectly competitive, individualistic, prosocial
or altruistic persons would make.
Figure 3.2.2: SVO Budget Sets and SVO Angle in the Self-Other Payoff Space
Minimal
Subjects were assigned to groups of three which were labeled as ei-
ther the Red, Blue, Green, or Yellow group. The colors were assigned
randomly without replacement such that each group ends up with a dif-
ferent colour. Subjects were informed about their group membership
and associated colour. This information was also given at the begin-
ning of all other treatments. This is a variant of the ”Minimal Group
Paradigm” developed by Tajfel (1970).
Klee and Kandinsky
In this treatment, each subject was given five minutes to individually
review five pairs of paintings by Wassily Kandinsky and Paul Klee.9
9The paintings are the same as in Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011):
Gebirgsbildung, 1924, by Klee; Subdued Glow, 1928, by Kandinsky; Dreamy Im-
provisation, 1913, by Kandinsky; Warning of the Ships, 1917, by Klee; Dry-Cool
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In addition to the description on the screen, subjects also got a print-
out of the pictures that indicated which artist painted which painting.
After the 5 minute period subjects were shown two more paintings.
They had 5 minutes to determine for each painting if it was painted
by either Klee or Kandinsky.10 They could make use of the printout to
compare the two new paintings with paintings that they reviewed be-
fore. Furthermore, subjects were allowed to communicate within their
group via a chat program. The decision input could only be made af-
ter the five minutes were over. Each correct answer earned ten tokens.
Participants were not informed about the result of this stage until the
end of the experiment. This treatment was adapted from Chen and Li
(2009) and Chen and Chen (2011). As they discuss in their studies, us-
ing the Klee and Kandinsky task with random assignment into groups
is strictly preferable to the original version of the task in which subjects
are assigned to groups based on their painting preferences, as those
preferences can potentially correlate with observable or non-observable
characteristics. Furthermore, subjects could get the impression that the
experimenter does them a favor in assigning them based on their pref-
erences which could trigger experimenter demand effects (Chen & Li,
2009).
Group Contest
Subjects received an endowment of 100 coins and decided how much
of the endowment they wanted to invest in a one-shot contest game.
Endowment that was not invested was added to their private account.
In the contest game, investments of group members of group A are
labeled ai where A = {1, 2, 3} and i∈A, analogously for investments
of group B. The winning probability pA is the probability of group A
to win the contest over group B and is calculated by dividing all in-
vestments of group A by the sum of all investments by both groups:
Garden, 1921, by Klee; Landscape with Red Splashes I, 1913, by Kandinsky; Gentle
Ascent, 1934, by Kandinsky; A Hoffmannesque Tale, 1921, by Klee; Development
in Brown, 1933, by Kandinsky; The Vase, 1938, by Klee.












. If no one invests the proba-
bility of winning is 12 . Thus it is guaranteed that one group wins the
contest. The contest prize is z = 300 coins and is equally split among
all group members of the winning group. Each member of the winning
group thus gets an individual payoff of 300/3 = 100 coins. Each unit of
investment is equivalent to a lottery ticket and at the end of the round
one ticket is drawn from the investment pool of lottery tickets to decide
who won the contest. Thus, holding constant the other group’s invest-
ment, the more investments are made by a group, the higher the chance
to win the contest. Subjects did not get any feedback and were not in-
formed about the outcome of the game or the investments of the others
until the end of the experiment. This is similar to a one shot version of
the group contest played in Abbink et al. (2010).
Flag
Subjects found envelopes with colored paper at their desk and were
asked to cut the paper into any shape they wanted. The color was iden-
tical to their group color such that each group got different colored
papers. The shapes of each group were collected and assembled into a
group flag by the experimenter. The assembled group flags were pho-
tographed and the pictures uploaded to be displayed in the following
SVO stages. The flag of the other group was represented by the group
color only to avoid potential effects of the design of the opponents flag
on behavior and thus on the independence of observations between
groups. This treatment was adapted from Cacault and Grieder, 2019.
Real Effort
Subjects had to do a task in which they had to click on a circle on the
computer screen to reduce its size. The color of the circle coincided
with the color of the other group. Each click by a group member could
contribute to the reduction of the circle. After the task, subjects did a
similar task but this time the task was to increase the size of the circle.
The color of the circle in this stage coincided with the own groups color.
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As an additional feature, the circle was now moving around the screen.
The members of the group with the smallest circle in the first game,
and the group with the largest circle in the second game each received
ten tokens as reward. If the same group won at both of the games, its
individuals received twenty tokens. Subjects were not informed about
the outcome of these games before the end of the experiment. This
treatment was adapted from Cacault and Grieder, 2019.
3.3 Measurement Approaches and Econometrics
We want to measure the success of social identity induction by esti-
mating if subjects show an ingroup bias. This means that they behave
more prosocially towards an ingroup member then to a random other
person or someone from an outgroup after they completed the treat-
ment. There are multiple ways to implement this, all with their own
advantages and drawbacks.
For instance, many experiments on social identity use a between-
subjects design, which is easy to use and reduces chances of
experimenter demand effects. In this case, one could elicit the SVO
towards the ingroup from one subset of the sample and the SVO
towards the outgroup and random other groups from other subsets
and investigate if on average, subjects show an ingroup bias. However,
this means that each individual only provides one observation and
there is usually no correction for baseline differences in subjects’ social
value orientation. As the effects of social identity induced in the lab are
likely to be rather small, any effect might be hidden in the statistical
noise unless individual heterogeneity in social value orientation is
small or the sample size is very large.
If a baseline measure of social value orientation is taken before the lab
experiment, it is potentially possible to improve on the simple between-
subject measure by adjusting ingroup and outgroup SVO measures by
the Baseline SVO. The object of comparison after the social identity in-
duction is then no longer the SVO level but the change compared to
the Baseline SVO which controls for individual differences in the Base-
line SVO play. This is essentially a Difference-in-Differences analysis.
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In practice, this approach is more costly as it includes an additional
measurement and requires to anonymously track subjects across two
sessions to match the data. Attrition, Data integrity, anonymity of sub-
jects, and the additional financial costs and resources to conduct more
than one session per subject may become serious issues.
Another issue with both aforementioned approaches is that there might
be group contingent effects. While this is unlikely to be an issue for the
original minimal group paradigm where group members don’t inter-
act during the creation of the social identity, it might become an issue
with techniques that use communication, interaction, or allow group
members influence on the identity creation itself. The problem itself
is similar to individual heterogeneity in social value orientation. If the
heterogeneity in SVO between groups is large compared to the differ-
ences in SVO caused by the social identity induction, any effect might
be hidden in the statistical noise unless the sample size is large enough.
If the only issue is group contingent effects, it is possible to solve this by
estimating the ingroup bias on group level. For this, the different group
members conduct ingroup, outgroup, and random SVOs and ingroup
bias on group level is measured by comparing the group members that
did the ingroup SVO with those that performed random or outgroup
SVOs. While this provides a within-group measure of social identity, it
has the drawback that it reduces the effective sample size and that it
does not control for individual heterogeneity.
If a Baseline SVO is available, it is possible to control for both, group
and individual heterogeneity. For this, the SVOs of the group members
in the within-group measure are adjusted for the Baseline SVO. This
still has the drawbacks of reducing the effective sample size and the
additional costs of measuring and linking the Baseline SVO with the
laboratory data, but it should at the same time deal effectively with
individual and group-level heterogeneity in social value orientation.
Finally, one can also consider a within-subjects design. The primary
benefits of the within-subject design are increased statistical power and
that it will reduce the noise present in a between-subjects design, as
every subject serves as her own control group. At the same time, the
repetition of the SVO with respect to subjects of different groups might
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make the group differences more salient and could thus act as an ad-
ditional factor strengthening social identity. This salience of the group
information might then create experimenter demand effects. If subjects
get the idea that the experiment is about ingroup bias it could cause
them to intentionally engage in biased behavior or, if it activates social
norms and self-image concerns regarding discriminatory behaviour,
could reduce the ingroup bias displayed in the experiment. We random-
ized and counterbalanced the order in which subjects do the different
SVOs in our experiment, therefore we can estimate measures for all of
the described approaches. For the between-subject and within-group
measures, we only use the data from the first round SVO that subjects
do in Part B, the lab part of the experiment. The standard errors are clus-
tered on group level to account for potential interdependence created
by the social identity induction. 11
In the rest of this section, we describe the five statistical approaches
that we use to measure the strength of social identity in more detail. We
suppress subscripts whenever possible for the sake of clarity.
3.3.1 Between-subjects measure
Here, we use data only from the first round of Part B in the experiment,
ignoring the remaining two rounds as well as the baseline SVO mea-
surement from part A. We use the following regression specification:
θi,1 = β0 + [βIn × δIn,1] + [βOut × δOut,1] + εi (3.1)
where θi,1 is individual i’s SVO score in round 1, δIn,1 and δOut,1 are
dummy variables identifying whether the person was interacting with
a member of their in-group or out-group in round 1, and β0 serves as a
between-subjects baseline when interacting with a randomly selected
other person in round 1.
11Cameron and Miller (2015) discuss that having few clusters can result in over-
rejection of the null hypothesis. As the number of clusters is relatively small in our
experiment, we used the wild cluster bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron
and Miller (2015) to check if this is a problem in our dataset. We found minor dif-
ferences in p-values but no differences in significance levels and thus report the
non-bootstrapped standard errors and p-values.
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For valid social identity induction, we expect two conditions to hold
βIn > 0 and βIn > βOut. The first condition, βIn > 0, simply means
that an individual is more generous on average to an in-group member
than to a random person. The second condition, βIn > βOut, means that
an individual is more generous to in-group members than out-group
members.
3.3.2 Between-subjects measure with Baseline SVO Adjustment
While the between-subjects design is commonly used, its biggest short-
coming is that real effects may disappear in statistical noise due to indi-
vidual heterogeneity in baseline SVO disposition. To address this short-
coming, we can use each subject’s SVO from Part A as a within-subject
correction. Although we are still examining effects between subjects,
we are now examining the changes in SVO due to social identity rather
than SVO levels towards members of the different groups. As we are in-
deed more interested in the changes that social identity causes in SVO
than in the differences in SVO levels, this measure appears more appro-
priate. This is essentially a Difference-in-Differences analysis in which
we calculate the first difference on the left hand side of the regression
equation. We use the following regression specification:
θi,1 − θi,0 = β0 + [βIn × δIn,1] + [βOut × δOut,1] + εi (3.2)
where θi,1 is individual i’s SVO score in round 1, θi,0 is i’s baseline SVO
in Part A, δIn,1 and δOut,1 are dummy variables indicating whether the
person was interacting with a member of their in-group or out-group in
round 1, and β0 serves as a between-subjects baseline when interacting
with a randomly selected other person in round 1. The conditions for
valid social identity induction are analogue to the Between-subjects
Design.
3.3.3 Within-group measure
Since each member of a given group interacts with a different type of
counterpart in the first round of Part B, we can use the difference in
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SVO between the in-group interaction and random or out-group inter-
action within a group as a within-group measure of the effect of social
identity. This makes the group the independent unit of observation.
Econometrically, this is achieved by including group fixed effects in the
regression specifications:
θi,1 = β0 + cg + [βIn × δi,In,1] + [βOut × δi,Out,1] + εi (3.3)
where the θi,1 is the individual SVO in round 1 of Part B, δi,In,1 and
δi,Out,1 are dummy variables indicating whether the group member
was interacting with a member of their in-group or out-group in round
1, and cg are the group specific fixed effects. The decision with respect to
someone who was not part of the in- or outgroup serves as baseline.
For valid social identity induction we expect βIn > 0 and βIn > βOut to
hold, meaning that that participants are more generous towards their
ingroup than to the random- or outgroup.
3.3.4 Within-group measure with Baseline SVO Adjustment
For this measure we combine the approach of the within-group mea-
sure with the Baseline SVO adjustment from the between-subjects mea-
sure. Which results in the following specification:
[θi,1 − θi,0] = β0 + cg + [βIn × δi,In,1] + [βOut × δi,Out,1] + εi (3.4)
Compared to the within-groups design, everyhting stays the same
except that we now account for the baseline SVO θi,0 by subtracting it
from each group member’s first round SVO. For valid social identity
induction we expect βIn > 0 and βIn > βOut to hold, meaning that
that participants are more generous towards their ingroup than to the
random- or outgroup.
The approaches up until now only used information of round 1 of Part
B and of Part A when adjusting for Baseline SVO. Next we fully utilize
the repeated measure for each individual.
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3.3.5 Within-subject Design
Here, we look at the within-subject differences between interactions
with an in-group, random, and out-group member. We can do this for
all subjects, as every subject made all of these decisions in Part B. Recall,
also, that the type of counterpart was randomized and counterbalanced
across subjects, which should average out potential confounds arising
from the order of the decisions. The within-subject measure is estimated
using a fixed-effects model, with the individual as cross-sectional and
the round as time dimension.
θi,t = β0 + [αi × ci] + [βIn × δi,In,t] + [βOut × δi,Out,t] + εi,t (3.5)
where θi,t is individual i’s SVO score in round t, δi,In,t and δi,Out,t are
dummy variables identifying whether the person was interacting with
a member of their in-group or out-group in round t, and ci is an indi-
vidual specific fixed effect. The inclusion of the fixed effects term in this
regression has the same function as the Baseline SVO adjustments in
the other approaches, namely controlling for the heterogeneity between
subjects that is not caused by the social identity induction. As before,
we expect βIn > βOut and βIn > 0 to hold if a social identity was suc-
cessfully induced, implying that subjects are more prosocial towards
their own group when compared to the out- or random group. In addi-
tion, we also ran a specification in which we included controls for the
decision order to see if the order in which subjects made the three SVO
decisions with respect to ingroup, outgroup, and random group has an
effect on the ingroup bias.
3.4 Results
Table 3.4.1 presents a qualitative overview of the main results for the
different research designs and social identity induction techniques we
evaluate. The contest treatment is the only induction method that con-
sistently satisfies the requirements for social identity induction. For the
between-subjects and within-group measures, this treatment contest
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treatment is the only treatment that satisfies the conditions for effec-
tive social identity induction, which are that βIn is both positive and
larger than βOut. However, only the comparison to the outgroup is
reaching at least marginally significant in 4 out of the 5 treatment. The
within-subject measure is the only one in which all treatments satisfy
the requirement for social identity induction. All treatments introduce
a (marginally) significant ingroup bias in comparison with the out- and
random group. Furthermore, we show that treatment effects are very
heterogeneous with respect to initial social value orientation which
means that measuring an individual’s baseline social value orientation
and correcting for it in a between-subjects or difference-in-differences
design does not necessarily increase precision of the estimates.
Table 3.4.1: Overview of main results
Design Property Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real effort
Between-subjects In > Rand Y Y Y Y –
In > Out Y Y Y** – –
Between-subjects, In > Rand – Y Y Y –
baseline adjusted In > Out Y – Y* – –
Within-group In > Rand – Y Y Y –
In > Out Y – Y* – –
Within-group In > Rand – Y Y Y –
baseline adjusted In > Out – – Y – –
Within-subject In > Rand Y*** Y*** Y** Y** Y*
In > Out Y** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***
Note: Y marks the instances in which the treatments successfully induced social iden-
tity based on the specified property. P-value below significance level: * p < 0.10 **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In the following, we first present summary statistics of the the differ-
ent SVO measures. Next we compare the different treatments with
the between-subject, adjusted between-subject, within-group, adjusted
within-group and within-subject measures using parametric tests. Then
we analyze the role that the order of the social preference elicitations




Figure 3.4.1 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the four dif-
ferent SVO-measurements that are taken during the experiment from
all 204 participants across all treatments. About 80% of all subjects’
SVO angles fall in the range of 7.82 and 37.48, where 7.82 represents
the benchmark for perfectly consistent individualists, who always max-
imize their own payoff. 37.48 represents the benchmark for a consistent
inequality minimizing subject and values above 37.09 represent sub-
jects that are consistent welfare maximizers.12 Thus the decision space
that subjects actually use only spans over approximately 30 degrees.13
Compared to the the baseline-SVO that subjects do a week before the
lab sessions, subjects are more prosocial in the ingroup decisions in the
lab with the average SVO towards the ingroup being 24.34 and the av-
erage SVO towards a random other in the baseline being 21.56.14 The
outgroup and random SVOs in the lab are very similarly distributed,
both classifying approximately 10% more participants as consistent
individualistic than in the baseline or the ingroup-SVO which is rep-
resented by the spike around 7.8 in Figure 3.4.1. There is hardly any
difference between the mean of the random and outgroup decisions,
19.89 and 19.17 respectively.15 Comparing the baseline-SVO with the
Random decision in the lab reveals that while both decisions are made
with respect to a random other person, the lab decisions tend to be less
prosocial.16 The ingroup decisions are more prosocial than both, the
outgroup and the random decisions in the lab.17
12As we did not use the secondary SVO-items, we cannot fully disentangle welfare
maximizing and inequality minimizing behavior
13The possible range is -16.26 to 61.39. The range we observe in our experiment is quite
similar to Murphy et al. (2011) but subjects in the original experiment are somewhat
more prosocial and thus the range in which most people fall is somewhat larger.
14Wilcoxon signed-rank test with H0: Baseline=Ingroup, p = 0.031
15Wilcoxon signed rank test with H0: Random=Outgroup, p = 0.080
16But this difference is not significantly different at 5% significance level (Wilcoxon
signed rank test with H0: Random=Baseline, p = 0.094).
17Wilcoxon signed rank tests with H0: In=Out,p < 0.001; H0: In=Rand, p < 0.001.
Additional summary statistics concerning subject characteristics can be found in
Appendix 3.B.
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Figure 3.4.1: SVO Cumulative Distribution Functions
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3.4.2 Between-Subject
To identify the between-subject treatment effect we run OLS regres-
sions with the social value orientation angle as dependent variable and
dummies for the decision type on the first round data from the lab ex-
periment. The dummy for the SVO decision that is made with respect
to a random person serves as baseline and standard errors are clustered
by group. The results in Table 3.4.2 show that while the Minimal, Klee,
Contest, and Flag treatments induce a positive difference between the
SVO decision towards an ingroup member and a random person, none
of these differences reaches statistical significance. The contest game is
the only treatment to induce a significant positive difference between
ingroup and outgroup decisions (p=0.021). In the Flag and the Real
Effort treatment, subjects are more prosocial to the outgroup relativ to





Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real Effort
In 1.213 6.316 5.603 9.415 −1.859
(5.840) (4.986) (6.792) (5.612) (5.199)
Out −6.778 5.908 −4.602 11.225** 2.404
(6.139) (4.070) (8.398) (3.891) (6.393)
Constant 23.966*** 21.615*** 22.925*** 14.987*** 19.943***
(3.675) (2.967) (4.825) (3.593) (3.750)
N 36 48 36 36 48
F-test In=Out 0.182 0.931 0.021** 0.746 0.390
Note: Between-subjects and same round (round 1). SVO decisions towards the random group
serve as reference group. Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. * p < 0.10 **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
75
Chapter 3. Social Identity and Social Preferences in the Lab
3.4.3 Between-Subject Adjusted For Baseline SVO
Subtracting the baseline-SVO measure taken before the lab sessions
from each first round SVO provides us with a between subject compar-
ison of treatment effects (Table 3.4.3). None of the treatments produces
a significant difference between an ingroup and a random person, with
only the Klee, Flag, and Contest treatment producing a positive coeffi-
cient of the ingroup variable. Only the Minimal and Contest treatment
create a positive ingroup bias between the ingroup and the outgroup
but only the effect for the Contest is marginally significant (p=0.071).
While we expected this procedure to eliminate some of the noise by
adjusting for the individuals’ different baseline social value orientation,
the increase in standard errors indicates that adjusting for the baseline
SVO actually added noise to the analysis.
Table 3.4.3: Between-subject adjusted for Baseline SVO
Treatment effect adjusted for baseline
(between-subjects)
(SV Oi,1 - SV Oi,0)
Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real Effort
In −2.303 7.005 4.710 7.685 −4.081
(8.198) (5.126) (6.254) (7.803) (7.460)
Out −3.119 8.179 −11.561 8.350 11.306
(6.892) (6.712) (10.61) (6.875) (7.115)
Constant 2.799 −0.278 5.676 −8.252* −3.703
(5.551) (3.606) (5.832) (3.960) (3.925)
N 36 48 36 36 48
F-test In=Out 0.894 0.864 0.071* 0.920 <0.001***
Note: Between-subjects with baseline adjustment (the baseline adjustment is within subject),
same round (round 1 compared to baseline). Subscript 1 (0) refers to the first-round of the lab
session (online session). SVO decisions towards the random group serve as reference group.
Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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3.4.4 Within-Group
Instead of accounting for correlation on group level through cluster-
ing, we can also create a within-group measure to assess the treatment
effect. To do this, we include group-level fixed effects, which controls
for between-group variation and gives us the within-group treatment
effect of the social identity induction methods. The results in Table 3.4.4
show that all except for the Real Effort treatment induce a positive in-
group bias compared to the random but all are insignificant. When
compared to the outgroup, the Minimal, Klee, and Contest treatment
create an ingroup bias but only the effect of the Contest treatment is





Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real Effort
In 1.213 6.316 5.603 9.415 −1.859
(7.153) (6.106) (8.318) (6.873) (6.367)
Out −6.778 5.908 −4.602 11.225* 2.404
(7.519) (4.985) (10.29) (4.765) (7.829)
Control 33.574*** 27.951*** 24.300** 21.321*** 27.886***
(4.323) (3.196) (6.038) (3.252) (4.331)
N 36 48 36 36 48
F-test In=Out 0.269 0.944 0.052* 0.792 0.481
Fixed effects Group Group Group Group Group
Note: Within-group and same round (round 1) with group level fixed effects. SVO decisions towards
the random group serve as reference group. Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. *
p<0.10 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
18As contest contributions could trigger a sunk cost effect for the SVO decisions and
drive subjects to discriminate more, as they already committed to the conflict be-
tween the groups, we also tested if contest contributions affect the degree to which
subjects discriminate. This does not turn out to be the case. For the analysis see
Appendix 3.C.
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3.4.5 Within Group Adjusted For Baseline SVO
Similarly to the between subject measures, we can adjust the within-
group measure with a within-subject correction for differences in the
Baseline SVO. This provides a difference-in-differences measure, com-
paring the difference between baseline and first round measure of one
group member with the difference of baseline and first round measure
of another member of the same group. This measure has the advantage
of eliminating noise from individual as well as group level heterogene-
ity. Table 3.4.5 shows that, against our expectation, making the within-
group measure a difference-in-differences measure is not beneficial for
the precision of the measurement as standard errors generally increase
compared to the within-group measure. Only the Klee, Contest, and
Flag treatment induce a ingroup bias compared to the random group
but none of the differences is significant. The difference between the
ingroup and outgroup decision in the Contest treatment is now even
higher at 16.3, but due to the increase in the error terms, not significant
at conventional levels (p=0.131). The only other treatment with a posi-
tive ingroup bias compared to the outgroup is the minimal treatment,
but the difference is not significant. All other treatments show a nega-
tive effect with the mean effect of the Real Effort treatment being -15.4
and significant at 1% significance level.
3.4.6 Within-Subject
Considering all three lab rounds, we can analyze the strength of the
social identity on an individual level and construct a within-subject
measure. Table 3.4.6 shows that all of the treatments induce a positive
ingroup bias compared to the random group and thus are successful in
inducing social identity. The effects are at least marginally signficant in
all treatments. The difference between the ingroup decisions and the
outgroup decisions are also positive in all treatments and except for the
Minimal treatment, the p-values are all below a 1% significance level.
The ingroup bias compared to the outgroup in the Minimal treatment
is significant at p = 0.015.
The mean difference between ingroup SVO and random or outgroup
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Table 3.4.5: Within-Group adjusted for Baseline SVO
Treatment effect adjusted for baseline
(Within-Group)
(SV Oi,1 - SV Oi,Base)
Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real Effort
In −2.303 7.005 4.710 7.685 −4.081
(10.04) (6.278) (7.660) (9.557) (9.136)
Out −3.119 8.179 −11.561 8.350 11.306
(8.440) (8.221) (13.00) (8.420) (8.714)
Constant 11.655 7.670 22.642** −6.607 12.070
(5.682) (4.028) (6.285) (5.397) (5.781)
N 36 48 36 36 48
F-test In=Out 0.913 0.889 0.131 0.934 <0.002***
Fixed effects Group Group Group Group Group
Note: Within-Group with baseline adjustment (the baseline adjustment is within subject), same
round (round 1 compared to baseline). SVO decisions towards the random group serve as reference
group. Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
SVO varies between treatments from 2.387 to 6.698. Given that most
subjects have a social value orientation between 7.82 and 37.48, this
effect size amounts to 8-22% of the used decision space.
The findings from the different social identity measures can be sum-
marized as follows. The approaches that are based on between-subject
or within-group measures are relatively noisy, even when additional
means such as correcting for initial social value orientation or for group
level effects are used. In those circumstances, only the Contest treat-
ment reliably induced an ingroup bias but this was only statistically
significant with some measures and only when the comparison was
made with the outgroup. Using an within-subject approach resulted in
a significant ingroup bias in all treatments and compared to both, the
outgroup and the random group.
Result 1. Only the Contest treatment creates an ingroup bias when compared
to random and outgroup across all econometric approaches and thus succeeds
in inducing social identity. However, this effect is only significant for com-
parisons to both–random and outgroup–in the within-subject treatment and
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Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real Effort
In 4.261*** 5.411*** 5.495** 5.067** 2.387*
(0.937) (1.340) (2.148) (1.860) (1.140)
Out 0.686 −1.287* −0.0769 −0.279 −2.021*
(1.209) (0.645) (2.094) (1.533) (0.971)
Constant 18.790*** 23.177*** 18.702*** 19.170*** 18.865***
(0.591) (0.492) (1.362) (1.022) (0.547)
N 108 144 144 108 108
F-test In=Out 0.015** <0.001*** <0.001*** 0.004*** 0.005***
Fixed effects Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind. Ind.
Note: Within-subjects with individual fixed effects. SVO decisions towards the random group
serve as reference group. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
for the outgroup comparisons in the (adjusted) Between-subjects, and Within-
group treatments.
Result 2. All treatments successfully induce social identity when measured
within-subject.
3.4.7 Further analysis of within-subject data
We further analyze the within-subject measure by regressing the in-
group bias on additional data we collected for the individual partici-
pant. We use demographic controls, risk aversion and perceived close-
ness to the own group from the post-experiment questionnaire, dum-
mies for the treatments and order in which the SVOs were taken, and
run regressions on the within-subject difference between ingroup and
outgroup SVO. Table 3.4.7 reports the results from four regressions
with standard errors clustered by group and the minimal treatment as
reference group. In (1) we only regress the treatment dummies on the
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Table 3.4.7: OLS Analysis of Within-Subject Measure
(SV Oi,In - SV Oi,Out)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Klee 3.124 3.124 0.252
(0.103) (0.102) (0.888)
Contest 1.997 1.997 0.657
(0.224) (0.225) (0.693)
Flag 1.772 1.772 −0.104
(0.347) (0.339) (0.962)
Real Effort 0.833 0.833 0.805
(0.640) (0.637) (0.650)
InRandOut −4.574* −4.574* −4.525*
(0.065) (0.063) (0.092)
OutInRand −8.020*** −8.020*** −6.410**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.020)
OutRandIn −7.092*** −7.092** −6.667**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
RandInOut −1.920 −1.920 −2.190
(0.569) (0.573) (0.500)




Closeness to Group 1.182***
(0.001)
Constant 3.575*** 8.985**** 7.389*** 2.925
(0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.469)
N 204 204 204 204
Other Controls (Survey) No No No Yes
Note: Within-subject. Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. The Minimal and In-
OutRand dummies are omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity and are thus the reference group.
Coefficients for the survey variables are reported in the Appendix. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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In-Out Difference and find no significant difference between treatments.
Regression (2) includes the order dummies but not the treatments. In-
RandOut is the dummy for the participants that did the ingroup deci-
sions first, the random decision second, and the outgroup decision last.
The other orders are named analogously with InOutRand being the
reference group. Compared to the reference order InOutRand, all other
orders produce a lower ingroup bias. We find that the orders that start
with the outgroup decision have a highly negative coefficient and are
significant at 1% level, suggesting a much lower ingroup bias (p=0.002,
p=0.010). The size of the effect is higher than the average treatment
effect found in Table 3.4.6. Regressing both the treatment and the order
dummies on the within-subject measure does not change the statistical
significance of the order effects (specification (3)). Regression (4) addi-
tionally includes the Baseline-SVO, self-reported closeness to the own
group, and additional demographic controls from the post-experiment
questionnaire. Differences between treatments are still insignificant af-
ter controlling for other variables and baseline social value orientation
has no effect on the measure. Closeness to the own group as indicated
on a 1-10 likert scale after the experiment significantly correlates with
the measure (p=0.001), which provides a useful robustness check for
our use of ingroup bias as a proxy for social identity. The order of the
social value orientation tests still affects the measure considerably, with
orders that start with the outgroup decision reducing the difference
between ingroup and outgroup SVO by over 6 degrees. These negative
order effects are significant at a 5% level (p-values: 0.020, 0.011). None
of the other controls were significant.19
We additionally analyzed the order effects by pooling the data across
treatments and comparing the different SVO decisions by round in
which they were taken. In Table 3.4.8 we show the difference in so-
cial value orientation towards ingroup, outgroup, and random person
by round aggregated over all treatments. All SVO measures in a row
are taken in the same round whereas all SVO measures in a column
share the same decision type. As each individual only performs one
SVO test per round and each type of SVO test exactly once, compar-
19An overview of the questionnaire and the respective summary statistics is provided
in Appendix 3.B.
82
isons within a column or within a row are always between-subjects and
analysed with Kruskal-Wallis tests. The difference between decisions
is not statistically significant in the first round but turns significant
in the following rounds (Round 1: In=Out=Rand, p=0.226; Round 2:
In=Out=Rand, p=0.008; Round 3: In=Out=Rand, p=0.016).20 This indi-
cates that in the first round, subjects do not make use of the information
about group membership or at least do not let it affect their decision and
only start to discriminate between the in- and outgroup in the follow-
ing rounds. While it does not matter in which round the ingroup and
the random decision are taken (In: Round1=Round2=Round3, p=0.929;
Rand: Round1=Round2=Round3, p=0.686), it does matter for the out-
group decision as the SVO in the first round is significantly higher than
in later rounds (Out: Round1=Round2=Round3, p=0.022).21 The order
effects for the outgroup decision could be a result of different costs of
discrimination: For subjects that made the random or ingroup decision
first, it is relatively cheap to start to discriminate in the second and third
round, as giving less money to the other person is also payoff maximiz-
ing for themselves in most of the modified dictator games. However,
for subjects that start with outgroup decisions, discriminating in later
rounds is materially costly as they can only discriminate between the
outgroup and ingroup by giving more to the ingroup in the subsequent
decisions, which in most cases comes with a decrease in own payoff.
Result 3. If the first SVO decision is towards an outgroup member, there
there is no subsequent discrimination between groups .
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
We already know from specification (4) in Table 3.4.7 that there is no
significant correlation between the Baseline-SVO and ingroup bias and
20There is also no difference between the first round decisions in the lab and the
baseline SVO taken one week in advance (Wilcoxon signed-rank test In=Online,
p=0.423; Out=Online, p=0.258; Rand=Online, p=0.437).
21A breakdown by treatment can be found in Appendix 3.D
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Table 3.4.8: Mean SVO by Order and Decision Type
Round In Out Rand p-value
1 24.611 22.626 20.698 0.226
2 23.893 15.767 20.176 0.008***
3 24.523 19.122 18.801 0.016**
p-value 0.929 0.022** 0.686
Note: Kruskal-Wallis test: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
thus no systematic heterogenous treatment effect based on baseline so-
cial value orientation. However, to investigate why controlling for the
Baseline-SVO failed to reduce the statistical noise in the Within-group
measure, we map the baseline-SVO against the within-subject ingroup
bias (In-Out Difference). Figure 3.4.2 shows that there is much hetero-
geneity in the baseline-SVO as well as in the degree to which subjects
discriminate between in- and outgroup. There is a high concentration of
subjects along two imaginary axes representing consistent individualis-
tic behavior ( 7.8◦) in the baseline-SVO and no discrimination between
in- and outgroup in the lab SVOs (0 on the vertical axis). The data also
shows considerable clustering of observations at the point where sub-
jects are consistent individualists and do not discriminate. The high
heterogeneity helps explain why accounting for the baseline-SVO in
the adjusted between-subjects and diff-in-diff designs does not result
in a more precise estimate. Ideally, we would like to see that the in-
duced ingroup bias is always in a similar range no matter what the
Baseline-SVO is. In that case, once we control for individual differences
in baseline social value orientation, we would would get relatively pre-
cise estimates of the ingroup bias also with the Within-group measure.
However, as the ingroup bias given any specific social value orientation
is rather dispersed as without a clear trend, it can actually increase the
variance if differences in the size of the social identity treatment effect
are larger than the differences in social value orientation.
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Note: Jitter was added to improve visibility of mass points.
Figure 3.4.2: Scatter Plot of Baseline-SVO Decision and Within-Subject In-Out
Difference
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nation between in- and outgroup.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We have shown that only the Contest treatment is successful in in-
ducing social identity with all of the different between-subject and
within-group measures. However, this effect is not statistical signifi-
cant for the baseline adjusted Within-group measure and only reaches
statistical significance for the ingroup-outgroup—not for the ingroup-
random—comparisons in the other cases. Accounting for the baseline-
SVO of participants does neither improve the between-subject nor the
within-group measure. The good performance of the contest treatment
is consistent with results from studies in economics (e.g. Eckel & Gross-
man, 2005) and social psychology (e.g. Sherif et al., 1961), showing that
between-group competitive settings can lead to favorable views and
behavior towards the ingroup. Paradoxically, the real-effort task, which
also contained a competitive component, does not lead to a successful
inducement of social identity.
When the within-measure is considered, all social identity manipula-
tions are significant and the commonly used Klee and Kandinsky task
is most successful in inducing identity. The difference between the treat-
ments is insignificant. While this could be seen as an encouraging sign
that it does not matter which method is used, this result needs to be
qualified. The anatomy of the order effects suggests that subjects treat
the first decision they make in the lab as an independent social value
orientation test and only discriminate between the groups once the fo-
cus on discrimination between in- and outgroup becomes salient in
the second round. The order effects for the outgroup decision could
then be a result of the different costs of discrimination: Being ingroup
biased is costlier if they acted very prosocial in the first round towards
an outgroup or random group member and only become aware of the
ingroup-outgroup nature of the experiment in the later rounds.
This suggests that results of within-subject designs that study the effect
of social identity might be more affected by the contrasting nature of
the within-subject design than by the induced social identity. This is
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problematic as the tool of measurement becomes a social identity ma-
nipulation in itself, which can potentially lead to an overestimation of
the true effect of social identity and a misidentification of the mecha-
nism through which social identity affects behavior.22
Furthermore, the results also provide evidence in contrast to Aaldering
et al. (2013) who find evidence that prosocial agents drive intergroup
conflict, as we do not find that discrimination between the in- and out-
group is correlated with subjects’ baseline social value orientation.
A potential shortcoming of our study is its reliance on social value
orientation as proxy for studying social identity. While this follows
the literature that models social identity through social preferences (e.g.
Chen & Chen, 2011; Chen & Li, 2009), it is still debated if this is the right
mechanism to study. Work by Müller (2019) indicates that the effect of
social identity on social preferences follows well-behaved social prefer-
ence utility functions which provides support for the social preference
approach. However, this work also stands in contrast to the findings
by Guala and Filippin (2016) who provide evidence that the effects are
unsystematic and not robust to slight changes to the framing. They use
a wider range of mini dictator games than previous studies—including
both negative and positive tradeoffs between self and other—and in-
crease the complexity by adding dominated choice options. They report
that social identity effects are not consistent across all types of mini dic-
tator games and can even be reversed by adding strictly dominated
choice options. The order effects in our own data indicate that salience
is an important mediator in creating behavioral differences between
in- and outgroup in the laboratory which supports Guala and Filippin
(2016) who proposed that social identity is a heuristic that depends on
cognitive salience and not a well-behaved preference.
Overall, there seems to be great heterogeneity in discrimination behav-
ior and researchers face a trade-off when choosing how to design an
experiment to study it. In a between-subject setup the data can be noisy
and salience of discrimination possibilities low. In a within-subject set-
ting, it does not matter which method is chosen, as all cause subjects to
22Pedroni et al. (2017) have recently shown that a similar problem persists in the
context of risk elicitation methods.
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discriminate between in- and outgroup, but this appears to be largely
driven by a salience effects. Combined with the findings by the meta
study by Lane (2016) that induced or artificial identities produce more
discrimination than real identities, this seems to suggest that making
in- and outgroup differences in the lab very salient will generate the
desired social identity but might end up providing a upper and not a
lower bound for situations outside of the lab. The alternative of using
natural groups has its own shortcomings in that findings for natural
groups are more likely to reflect the dynamics between those specific




3.A.1 Part A: Online SVO
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General Instructions  
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read these instructions 
carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will 
come to your cubicle to answer your question in private. 
Talking or using mobile phones or any other electronic devices is strictly prohibited. Mobile 
phones and other electronic devices should be left in the waiting room or switched off. If you are 
found violating these rules, you will both forfeit any earnings from this experiment, and may be 
excluded from future experiments as well.  
This is an experiment in decision-making. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
decisions you make, on the decisions other people make and random events. You will never be 
asked to reveal your identity to anyone during or after the course of the experiment or after. 
Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to keep your decisions 
private, do not reveal your choices to any other participant. Everyone will be paid in private. 
 
Your total earnings from this experiment will be the sum of your payoffs in this experiment and 
your payoff from the online part. 
 
Your earnings are given in (coins and) tokens. At the end of the experiment you will be paid in 
cash based on the exchange rate (100 coins = ) 75 Euro cent = 10 tokens. 
 
Please do not communicate with each other during the experiment unless asked to do so. If you 
have a question, feel free to raise your hand, and an experimenter will come to help you.  
 
For the course of the experiment you will be a member of a group. There are 3 people in each 
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3.A.2 Part B: General Instructions (Adjustments in Contest
treatment in parentheses)
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group. Your group assignment will remain the same throughout the experiment. That is, if you 
were assigned to the BLUE group, you will be in the BLUE group for the rest of the experiment. 
Your group will be matched with an other group during the experiment. If you are in the RED 
group, the other group will be the BLUE group and vice versa. If you are in the YELLOW group, 
the other group is the GREEN group and vice versa. 
 





In this part, the other members of your group and yourself will construct the flag that will 
represent you throughout the experiment. For this purpose, each of you will be in charge of 
decorating one part of the flag using colored paper (each group has a different color). In other 
words, the flag of your group will be composed of a representative element of each one of you.  
On your table you will find a pair of scissors and an envelope containing colored paper.  Please 
cut out a shape from the coloured paper. You are free to cut out any shape you want, but you 
are not allowed to cut out words, nor are you allowed to write on the shape. The shape must be 
composed of a single element (you are not allowed cut out two separate shapes).  
When you finish, write your place number on the back of the shape and put it inside the envelope.  
After 5 minutes, the envelopes containing the shapes will be collected. The shapes will then be 
pasted on the flag. You will see what the flag of your group looks like in the next part of the 
experiment.  





You and the other members of your group will see a very big circle in the middle of your screen. 
The members of the other group will see a circle of the same size on their screens. The aim of the 
game is to reduce the size of the circle. To reduce the size of the circle you just have to click on 
it. Every click of a member of your group reduces the size of the circle. The game is over after 30 
seconds. The group that finishes with the smallest circle, wins the game, and each member of 
the winning group earns a reward of 10 tokens. The members of the losing group do not earn 
anything. In case of a tie, the computer will toss a coin to determine which group earns the 
reward.  
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In the next game, you and the other members of your group will see a small circle in the middle 
of your screen. The members of the other group will see a circle of the same size on their screens. 
The aim of the game is to enlarge the circle. To enlarge the circle you just have to click on it. Every 
click of a member of your group enlarges the circle. You will notice that the circle will move 
around the screen. You will have to carefully target the moving circle to be able to enlarge it. The 
game is over after 30 seconds. The group that finishes with the largest circle, wins the game, and 
each member of the winning group earns a reward of 10 tokens. The members of the losing group 
do not earn anything. In case of a tie, the computer will toss a coin to determine which group 
earns the reward.  
You will be informed of your earnings in this part at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Klee and Kandinsky 
 
In this part everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings by two artists. You will get information 
about the title and artist for each painting. You will have 5 minutes to study these paintings. Then 
you have another 5 minutes to analyse two additional paintings. You may get help from other 
members of your group and help other members in your group while analysing the pictures. After 
the five minutes you are asked which artist painted which of the two additional paintings. Each 
correct answer will bring you 10 additional tokens. Details will be provided during the 
experiment. 
 




In this part of the experiment your group and one of the other groups are competing for a prize 
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in the following way: At the beginning you will receive 100 coins. Then you can use these coins 
to buy lottery tickets for your group. Any token you invest gives one lottery ticket your group. 
Any token you do not invest in lottery tickets will remain in your private coin account. Likewise, 
your group members can buy tickets for your group and the members of the other group can buy 
tickets for their group in exactly the same way.  
As soon as everybody has chosen how many tickets to buy, a lottery will determine whether your 
group or the other group wins a prize of 300 coins. All bought tickets are put in a “virtual” urn. 
One of the bought tickets will be randomly drawn as the winning ticket. Each ticket has the same 
chance to be drawn. Hence, the more tickets your group buys, the higher is your  group’s chance 
of winning the prize.  
Examples: If your group and the other group buy the same amount of tickets then the chance of 
winning the prize is 50:50. This is also the case if none of the groups buy any tickets. If your group 
buys three times as many tickets as the other group, then also your group’s chance is three times 
as high as that of the other group. If only one of the groups buys tickets then this group wins the 
prize with certainty.  
If neither you nor the other players buy a ticket, then the prize is randomly allocated to one of 
the players with equal chances.  
After the winning group is determined the prize of 300 coins is equally shared between the 
members of the winning group and added to the private coins accounts. As your group consists 
of 3 members, everyone in the winning group gets 100 coins.  
Earnings of a member of the winning group: 100 – bought lottery tickets + 100 
Earnings of a member of the losing group:    100 – bought lottery tickets  
You will receive information on how much you earned at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment starts with a trial period in which you will be asked to fill in some questions in 
order to check your understanding of the experiment and to give you the opportunity to get 
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acquainted with the setup. Tokens earned in this trial period will not be paid off. 
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Instructions for Part 2 
 
In this part you will be asked to make decisions in 3 rounds, and in each round you will make 
6 decisions.  Your decisions will affect the earnings of both you and another person, whom 
we refer to as “the Other.”  All decisions will remain anonymous and confidential.  You will 
not get to know the identity of the Other nor will the Other (or anybody else) get to know 
your identity. You will however, get information on the group membership of the Other. 
 In one of the rounds, the Other will be a member of your own group. 
 
 In one of the rounds, the Other will be a member of the other group. 
 
 In one of the rounds, the Other is another participant in the lab who is neither from your 
group nor from the other group. 
The order of rounds as well as the order of the 6 decisions within each round will be 





In each decision situation you will allocate tokens between you and the Other. Each decision 
situation will have 9 options. Here is an arbitrary example of a decision situation: 
 
   
You will make your choice by clicking on the one allocation you prefer most. Each allocation 
may have different earnings consequences for you and/or the Other.  In the example above, 
you would be making allocation decisions between your and another member of your own 
group during this round. In this example the word “own” is in red. In the actual decision 
situations the color of the word “own” will be the same as your own group’s color in Part 
1.  In this example decision situation, if  the leftmost allocation would be selected, you 
would earn 90 tokens and the Other would earn 100 tokens. If the rightmost allocation 
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would be  selected, you would earn 100 tokens and the Other would earn 90 tokens. 
Similarly for the allocations in-between. 
After an allocation is selected the earnings for you and the other will appear at the bottom 
of the screen as shown in the example screen below.: 
 
 When you are satisfied with your selected allocation you will need to confirm your decision 
by clicking on the “OK button” in the bottom-right corner of the screen (not shown). 
Thereafter, you will be asked for a final confirmation of your decision before you move on to 
the next decision situation. 
Payment 
 
After all participants have finished making all of their decisions, the computer will determine 
the payment for each participant using the following procedure, which has four steps. 
[Step 1] The computer will randomly assign half of the participants in the lab to be paid as 
“deciders” and the other half to be paid as “receivers.” 
 
[Step 2] Each decider is matched with exactly one receiver. 
 
[Step 3] The round relevant for the payment is determined. This will depend on whether the 
receiver is from the own, the other or neither from the own group nor the other 
group of the decider. 
 
[Step 4] One of the decider’s six decisions from that round will be randomly selected by the 
computer.  The decider’s tokens are determined by the amount “You receive,” and 
the receiver’s tokens are determined by the amount “Other receives.” 
The matching procedure guarantees that each participant receives money from one – and 
only one – decision.  Please notice that in no decision situation the receiver towards whom 
you make an allocation decision will be the decider of an allocation decision towards you.  
 
All participants will be paid in cash based on the exchange rate 




When making your decision you will not know your role relevant for payment (decider or 
receiver) nor will you know the decision situation that counts for payment. Therefore, you 
should view each decision situation as equally important and consider each of your choice 
as the one that counts for payment to you and the other.     
Further, your choice in one decision situation does not affect any other decision situation; 
therefore you should consider each decision situation independent of each other.     
Finally, there are no right or wrong answers. We are solely interested in your choices.     
Comprehension Questions     
 
You will now be asked to answer some comprehension questions about how your decisions 
affect your earnings and earnings of others.   After you have completed the comprehension 
questions, please wait for the experiment to continue.  
 If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and one of the experimenters will come 
to you to answer your question in private.  
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3.B Randomization check
To make sure that potential treatment effects are not driven by unbal-
anced characteristics of our sample, we compare the responses to the
baseline SVO and the questionnaire asked after the experiment across
treatments. We test for differences between the treatments with Kruskal-
Wallis tests with Holm-Sidak correction to adjust for multiple compar-
isons. Table 3.B.1 reports the summary statistics. The average baseline
social value orientation ranges from 19.87 in the contest treatment to
24.77 in the flag treatment with all averages being close the bound-
ary between the individualistic and prosocial value orientation cate-
gories. Differences across treatments are not significant (p=0.486). The
mean age is between 21 and 22 years and very similar in all treatments
(p=0.474). The percentage of female subjects ranged from 50 % (Flag
treatment) to 72% (Contest treatment) but differences between treat-
ments are not significant (p=0.362). The average number of siblings
that subjects’ report is about 1.5 (p=0.986). The percentage of Dutch
students is lowest in the Minimal treatment with 11% and highest in
the Real Effort treatment with 23% (p=0.440). The number of German
students varies from 17% in the contest treatment to 53% in the Flag
treatment (p=0.028). The ratio of Economics and Business students is
between 42% in the contest and 78% in the Flag treatment (p=0.037).
Most of the students that participated were bachelor students with only
about 20% being master students participating in the different treat-
ments (p=0.865). The English phrasing of the German Socio Economic
Panel questionnaire question for general risk was used to measure risk
attitude (Dohmen et al., 2011). The question is ”How do you see your-
self: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or
do you try to avoid taking risks?” and subjects answer on a 1 to 10
scale where 1 is ”not at all willing to take risks” and 10 is ”very willing
to take risks”. The means in all of the treatments are very close to the
middle of the scale such that the students in the sample do not seem
to be particular risk averse or risk seeking and treatment differences
are not significant (p=0.443). In a similar fashion, subjects were asked if
they preferred working in a team or working alone. The mean response
is very close to the middle of the scale and not very different between
treatments (p=0.484). About two-thirds of the subjects indicated that
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they participate or participated in teamsports, with slightly less people
having participated in teamsports in the contest treatment (p=0.135). To
measure closeness to their group, subjects were asked to answer to rate
how closely they felt attached to their group on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1
is ”Not closely at all” and 10 is ”Very closely”. Students felt closest to
their teammates in the Klee treatment, with a mean closeness of 5, and
least close in the real effort treatment with an average closeness of 2.7
(p<0.001). The only significant pairwise comparisons in demographics
are between the Contest and the Flag with respect to the number of
Economics (p=0.010) and German (p=0.007) students. Closeness to the
own group is significantly different between the Klee task and the Real
Effort task (p=0.002) but this is an additional measure of the strength
of social identity and thus not one of the variables that we intended
to randomize on. While the significant differences between the Con-
test and the Flag treatment are undesirable, we would expect to find
some significant differences solely based on the fact that we compare
the treatments on a large number of demographic variables. We do not
find that being German or being an Economics or Business student has
any effect on the strength of the induced social identity in the within-
subject measure regression and therefore conclude that the random
assignment of subjects to treatments was successful.
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Table 3.B.1: Summary statistics for controls
Variables All Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real Effort
Baseline 21.56 21.12 20.91 19.87 24.77 21.42
(12.83) (13.61) (12.30) (12.85) (10.94) (14.09)
Age 21.47 22.17 21.62 21.25 21.33 21.06
(2.28) (2.78) (2.38) (2.08) (2.31) (1.78)
Female 0.61 0.53 0.58 0.72 0.50 0.69
(0.49) (0.51) (0.50) (0.45) (0.51) (0.47)
Siblings 1.46 1.42 1.40 1.56 1.53 1.44
(1.04) (1.05) (0.96) (1.21) (0.97) (1.05)
Dutch 0.18 0.11 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.23
(0.39) (0.32) (0.41) (0.42) (0.32) (0.42)
German 0.37 0.33 0.38 0.17 0.53 0.42
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.38) (0.51) (0.50)
Economics 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.42 0.78 0.52
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.42) (0.50)
Master 0.23 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.23
(0.42) (0.44) (0.39) (0.40) (0.45) (0.42)
Risk 5.84 5.92 5.75 6.36 5.42 5.81
(2.28) (2.47) (2.20) (2.24) (2.22) (2.31)
Teamwork 5.58 5.31 5.31 6.14 5.44 5.75
(2.34) (2.51) (2.24) (2.79) (1.87) (2.26)
Teamsports 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.47 0.67 0.75
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.51) (0.48) (0.44)
Closeness 3.83 3.00 5.08 3.97 4.25 2.77
(2.81) (2.52) (2.76) (2.93) (2.80) (2.46)
N 204 36 48 36 36 48
Note: Mean with standard deviation in parenthesis.
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3.C Contest Contributions and In-Out Difference
It could be argued that the contest induces more In-Out difference be-
cause the subjects already committed resources to the conflict with the
other group. This commitment to the conflict in combination with the
sunk cost fallacy could than increase the behavioural difference be-
tween giving to the ingroup and giving to the outgroup. We would
thus expect that higher contest contributions result in stronger discrim-
ination between in- and outgroup. Regression (1) in Table 3.C.1 reports
results from an OLS regression with the within-subject measure as de-
pendent variables and the contest contributions as independent vari-
able. Contest contributions have a negative coefficient and thus reduce
the degree to which subjects discriminate between in- and outgroup.
However, the coefficient is not significant which also does not change
when we account for subjects’ baseline social value orientation in re-
gression (2). Thus the contest contributions of an individual do not
seem to affect the degree to which it is willing to discriminate between
in- and outgroup.
Table 3.C.1: OLS analysis of In-Out Difference
(SV Oi,In - SV Oi,Out)
(1) (2)







Note: Within-subject. Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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3.D Order Effects by Treatment
To break the order effect down by treatment, we compare the within-
subject measure (In-Out Difference) across treatments and order. Fig-
ure 3.D.1 shows the boxplots of the different In-Out differences for the
different orders. When the first decision is an outgroup decisions as
is the case in orders 3 and 4, the difference between ingroup and out-
group SVO has a median of 0 and a mean closer to zero than in the other























Minimal Klee Contest Flag Real Effort








Figure 3.D.1: Within-subject In-Out Difference by Treatment and Order





Adapted from: Zaunbrecher, H. W., Heine, F., & Riedl, A. (2021a).
Conflict and migration: Mobility and social identity in group contests.
Working Paper.
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Chapter 4. Conflict and Migration
Abstract
Group contests have been used to study conflict between countries,
R&D competitions, sports competition and lobbying. Usually, it is as-
sumed that individuals belong to one group and that this group mem-
bership will remain unchanged. However, in practice, soldiers can de-
fect, employees switch employers and athletes switch teams. In a lab ex-
periment, we introduce intergroup mobility to a group contest and test
how this affects contest contributions. We find that endogenous (vol-
untary) migration increases contest contributions, whereas exogenous
migration (displacement) has a negative but only marginally signifi-
cant effect relative to a baseline without intergroup mobility. Ingroup
bias persists throughout the experiment in all treatments and does not
decrease in the migration treatments. In the endogenous migration




“Ita amicum habeas, posse ut facile fieri hunc inimicum putes.”
Treat your friend as if he might become an enemy
– Publilius Syrus (1st century BC), Sententiae
“Ex inimico cogita fieri posse amicum”
Consider that you may make a friend of an enemy
– Seneca (1st century AD), Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium
The European nations have waged war against each other for most of
history. However, recently the European Union won the Nobel Peace
Prize for overcoming the division between East and West, and ethni-
cally based national conflicts (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2016).
Part of its non-negotiable fundamental principles are open borders
and free movement (BBC, 2016) and some politicians credit freedom
of movement with achieving this peace (Sodha, 2016). Umberto Eco
states that the academic exchange program ERASMUS created the first
generation of true European citizens and proposes to develop similar
programs for all citizens to promote greater understanding amongst
cultures (Riotta, 2012).
Studying the effect that migration and free movement have on conflict
with field data is often difficult because dynamic interactions of migra-
tion and conflict are common, e.g. emigration caused by conflict.1 In the
lab however, we can create a highly controlled environment in which
we can exogenously vary migration and thus can study the causal link
between migration and conflict directly. In this study, we ran a lab
experiment in which two groups competed against each other for a
prize in a group contest and varied the migration possibilities between
groups.
1See e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004 for a discussion of the link between diaspo-
ras/emigration and the risk of civil war.
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Economists have used group contests to model conflict between coun-
tries, R&D competitions, sports competition and lobbying. In the con-
test game based on Tullock (1980) and Katz et al. (1990), groups com-
pete against each other for a prize. In the Nash equilibrium, groups in-
vest resources into the conflict to increase the winning probability even
though the investment itself is lost and any positive investment reduces
overall welfare. While the equilibrium contest investments are already
wasteful in the theoretical model, participants in experiments usually
spend even more resources on the conflict than what is expected from a
rational individualistic agent (Dechenaux et al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2018).
The explanations for this waste of resources include amongst others joy
of winning, relative payoff maximisation, and impulsivity (Sheremeta,
2013). However, as these explanations apply to individual contests as
well, they do not explain why contributions in group contests tend to be
even higher than in individual contests (see e.g. Abbink et al., 2010).
An explanation for overbidding that is specific to group settings is so-
cial identity. Zaunbrecher and Riedl (2016) show that adopting the so-
cial identity model from Chen and Li (2009) and Chen and Chen (2011)
to the group contest implies higher contest contributions for groups
with a strong identity than for those without. Zaunbrecher et al. (2021b)
show that the group contest setting itself already induces a strong group
identity which would thus induce a higher waste of resources. Cason
et al. (2012) find that communication results in higher contest contri-
butions and suggest that this might be the result of communication
strengthening group identity. Similarly, Chowdhury et al. (2016) have
shown the escalating effect of primed natural identities on group con-
tests.
Most of this research on group contests has been done with fixed groups.
However, in naturally occurring group contests it often possible or even
common to move between groups. For instance, employees change em-
ployer or teams within a firm, citizens emigrate to other countries, and
athletes change clubs, all of which leads to less rigid group boundaries
than are usually used in the lab. Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggest that
having less rigid group boundaries could result in dissociation from
the group and more selfish behaviour and Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
stress the importance of exlcusion as a mechanism in social identifica-
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tion. Thus having more permeable boundaries could result in lower
identification with the group.
Evidence from public good games suggests that changing group com-
position can lead to a decrease in cooperation (e.g. Grund et al., 2015,
2018). Conversely, the literature on endogenous groups suggests that
letting participants choose the group they play with can lead to more
efficient outcomes, especially if entry to the group can be restricted (e.g.
Ahn et al., 2009; Charness & Yang, 2014; Chen, 2017; Riedl et al., 2016).
But to our knowledge there have been no studies that investigate the
difference between fixed and changing teams in group contests. There
is some theoretical and experimental literature on coalition formation
and contests, where it has been shown that endogenous coalition for-
mation can increase conflict (Bloch, 2012; Herbst et al., 2015; Smith et al.,
2012), however the focus of those studies lies on the group formation
process, coalition stability, and self selection into groups rather than
migration between different groups and group conflict.
We run a lab experiment with three treatments in which eight partic-
ipants repeatedly compete against each other in two groups to win a
prize. In the control treatment, groups remain unchanged for the whole
experiment. In the endogenous (voluntary) migration treatment, par-
ticipants can decide to leave their group after each round. Per pair of
competing groups two ”stay or leave” decisions are randomly selected
to be implemented. In the exogenous (displacement) treatment, we
implement migration decisions from the endogenous treatment. This
guarantees the same game paths in terms of group sizes in the endoge-
nous and exogenous migration treatment. To shed light on the potential
mechanisms at work, we measure social value orientation towards the
ingroup and the outgroup before and after the contest. Furthermore,
we elicit beliefs about the average individual contribution of the own
group and the other group in each round. Because migration has the
effect that the enemy of today can be a friend tomorrow and vice versa,
we hypothesise that allowing migration weakens group identity. In
terms of a social preferences model of social identity, this means that
participants put less weight on the payoffs of their current group mem-
bers which in turn decreases their contest contributions. Furthermore,
migration between the groups could increase the weight participants
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put on the payoff of the opposing groups’ players, treating enemies
of today as potential friends of tomorrow which may also lead to a
decrease in contributions.
However, in the endogenous treatment, migration decisions also con-
tain a signalling value. While it is still true that there is uncertainty
about the future composition of the own and other group which could
decrease contributions, this might be counteracted by asymmetric so-
cial identity effects. A migration taking place signals to the group that
receives a new member that they are more desirable than the opponent,
potentially strengthening social identity and increasing contributions.
To the group that lost a member it sends a signal that they are not
desirable, potentially weakening social identity and decreasing contri-
butions. The overall effect of the migrations could thus be ambiguous.
The exogenous treatment allows us to abstract from these alternative
explanations and allows us to isolate the effect of migration on contest
contributions. We find that contest contributions are higher in the en-
dogenous (voluntary) migration treatment than in the control treatment
but this effect is only significant once we control for both group size
and previous contributions. Comparing only the two migration treat-
ments shows that contributions are significantly lower in the exogenous
migration (displacement) treatment. When we consider actually imple-
mented migrations, we find heterogeneous effects. Migrations in the
exogenous treatment result in increasing contributions but the oppo-
site happens in the treatment with endogenous migration. Despite the
changing group compositions that the migrations engender, we do not
observe that ingroup bias—as measured by social value orientation—
changes between the start and end of the contest and does also not differ
between treatments. An exploratory analysis of the migration decision
in the endogenous treatment suggests that participants’ prospects of
winning are the strongest driver of the migration decision.
The implications of our findings depend on the context to which the
model is applied. From the perspective of a social planner, the results
suggest that migration does little to alleviate conflict between groups
and endogenous migration might even further escalate conflict. For
sports teams, companies, and perhaps even countries however, these
results suggest that migration does not decrease identification with
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the own group and does not decrease the competitiveness of the own
group.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, we intro-
duce our experimental design. Second, we discuss our predictions and
hypotheses. Third, we present the empirical analysis of the experimen-
tal data. Fourth, we provide a discussion of our findings.
4.2 Experimental Design
The experiment has three stages. At the beginning of stage one, par-
ticipants are randomly matched into groups of four and perform two
social preference elicitations with respect to an ingroup and an out-
group member. In the second stage, they compete in a group contest for
15 rounds. Depending on the treatment, they are either in fixed groups,
have the possibility to migrate, or might be forced to migrate during the
contest. In the third stage, they perform two additional social preference
elicitations with respect to an ingroup and an outgroup member and
fill in a short questionnaire. In the following, we introduce the social
value orientation test used to elicit social preferences and the structure
of the contest game, before we elaborate on the different treatments and
the procedures.
4.2.1 Social Value Orientation
Before and after the group contest, participants perform two social
value orientation (SVO) tests, one with respect to an ingroup mem-
ber and one with respect to an outgroup member. The SVO tests are
based on the slider measure developed by Murphy et al. (2011) and
are an efficient and parametric implementation of the SVO ring mea-
sure previously conceptualised by Griesinger and Livingston (1973)
and Liebrand and McClintock (1988). The test itself consists of six mod-
ified dictator games in which participants divide money between them-
selves and another person. The six budget sets of the dictator games
vary the cost of giving, such that giving money to the other participant
is either costly, free, or profitable for the giver. Table 4.2.1 shows the
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end points of the budget sets and the associated relative price of giving.
The end points represent pure altruistic, prosocial, individualistic, and
competitive preferences, respectively.
Table 4.2.1: SVO Budget Sets
Budget Option 1 Option 9 Relative price of giving
Set (πself , πother) (πself , πother) –(∆πself/∆πother)
1 (85, 85) (85, 15) 0
2 (85, 15) (100, 50) -0.43
3 (50, 100) (85, 85) 2.33
4 (50, 100) (85, 15) 0.41
5 (100, 50) (50, 100) 1.00
6 (100, 50) (85, 85) 0.43
Note: The budget sets represent the six items of the SVO slider measure. Option
1 and Option 9 represent the start and endpoint of a budget constraint in the self-
other allocation space. Participants choose a point on the budget constraint that is a
linear combination of Option 1 and 9 for each budget set. The relative price of giving
represents the trade-off between own payoff and payoff of the other person for each
of the budget sets. E.g. for budget set 3, increasing the payoff to the other by one unit
decreases the own payoff by 2.33 units.
The allocation decisions are then aggregated into the social value ori-





, where Āo is the average
allocation to the other person and Ās is the average allocation to the self.
50 is subtracted from both averages to center the angle within the SVO
ring in the self-other allocation space. This provides us with a contin-
uous measure of social preferences (Figure 4.2.1). From the difference
between the own group and other group SVO we construct the ingroup
bias which is our measure for the strength of social identity.
4.2.2 Group contest
The contest game between two groups A and B implemented in the
experiment is structured in the following way: Each player receives an
endowment of e = 120 and decides independently and simultaneously
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Note: The six budget constraints represent the six items of the SVO slider measure.
The angle θ is the parameter that is calculated from the six points that players chose
on the six budget constraints. The four points on the circle are the idealised allocation
decisions that perfectly competitive, individualistic, prosocial or altruistic persons
respectively would make. The theoretically possible SVO range resulting from the six
budget sets is −16.26◦ to 61.39◦.
Figure 4.2.1: SVO Budget Sets and SVO Angle in the Self-Other Payoff Space
with the other players how much of the endowment to invest in the
contest game. Endowment that is not invested is added to the player’s
private account. Investments of members of group A are labelled ai
where i ∈ A, investments of group B are defined analogously. Group
sizes are labelled NA and NB and are equal to 4 for both groups in the
Control but can vary in the migration treatments with the restriction
that NA + NB = 8. In the following we explain the game from the
perspective of someone from groupA, the expected payoff for someone
from group B can be derived analogously. For group A the probability
of winning the contest is given by the total investments of group A














If nobody invests, the probability of winning is 12 . Each unit of invest-
ment can be interpreted as a lottery ticket and after investments are
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made, one ticket is drawn from the investment pool of lottery tickets to
decide which group wins the contest. Thus, the more investments are
made by a group, the higher the chance to win the contest. The contest
prize is z = 1, 920 and is equally split amongst all group members of
the winning group. Thus, if Group A is the winning group, every group
member in A gets an individual payoff of z/NA = 1, 920/NA. The ex-
pected payoff of a player g ∈ A who invests ag is thus the endowment
plus the expected individual payoff of winning the contest minus the






















The group contest game is repeated for 15 rounds. In addition to con-
tribution decisions, we elicit players’ expectations about the average
contribution in their own group and in the other group after they made
their contribution decision. At the beginning of each round, players
receive information about their group composition. After each round,
players are informed about their own contribution, which group won,
how much their own and the other group invested, and what the prob-
ability of winning the contest was for their group.
Control Treatment
In the control treatment, group sizes are fixed at size 4 and the group
composition stays unchanged throughout the experiment. Therefore,
participants compete with the same group members in all 15 rounds of
the contest.
Endogenous Migration Treatment
The endogenous migration treatment is identical to the control treat-
ment except for that after each round, each player is presented with
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the choice to remain in their group or to move to the other group (i.e.,
to migrate). In each round, two of these decisions per group-pair are
randomly chosen to be implemented.
If the player whose decision is selected, intends to migrate, this player
will be transferred to the other group. If the player does not intend
to migrate, she will remain in her group. Thus, at the end of a round,
one of the following three situations could emerge: two migrations, one
migration, or no migration.
To avoid confounds caused by group size effects, the probability for
the own decision to be implemented is independent from the group
size. Alternative setups would not guarantee this. For instance, one ran-
dom decision per group instead of two random decisions per matched
group-pair could be implemented. In that case, however, changes in
group size would affect the probability that the own decision gets im-
plemented. Similarly, we decided against randomly choosing two mi-
grations instead of migration decisions as the probability that the own
decision is executed would then depend on other players’ migration
decisions. One could also implement all migration decisions but this
could result in situations in which all players migrate and thus the
groups just switch sides but still have the same teammates.
Exogenous Migration Treatment
If players can freely choose to migrate, the migration decision can be
interpreted as a signal that one group is rated higher than another.
This can potentially change the strength of social identity in both
groups, weakening the identity in the group that is loosing a player
and strengthening the group that receives an additional player. To
disentangle if it is migration itself that drives behaviour or if it is the
intention and signal value, we implement the migration decision exoge-
nously in the exogenous migration treatment. Instead of letting players
decide if they want to change groups or not, the migration pattern
of each pair of groups from the Endogenous Migration treatment is
implemented exogenously. This means that group sizes will develop
in the same way as in the endogenous treatment, which creates a
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comparable path dependency as in the main migration treatment but
without the potential selection effects.
4.2.3 Payment and Procedures
At the end of the experiment, one of the 15 contest rounds is randomly
selected and paid out. Additionally, participants receive a payment
from the SVO tests as follows: Players are randomly matched with
another player from their group-pair and it is determined if the SVO
before or after the contest counts. One of the players in each match is
chosen to be the dictator and the other one is the receiver. The matched
players’ group memberships will determine whether one of the dic-
tator’s ingroup or outgroup decisions will be paid out. Then, one of
the six decisions of the dictator will be picked at random for payment.
Players get the information which round was selected, how much they
earned in that round, how much they earned from the social value ori-
entation tests and how much they will get paid out in total.
The experiment was conducted at the CentERlab of Tilburg University
in September and November 2017 and took about 90 minutes.2 There
were a total of 15 sessions, and treatments were partly randomised
within session.3 The tokens earned in the experiment were exchanged
at a rate of 20 tokens = 1 Euro. In total we recruited 240 participants,
80 per treatment, who earned an average of 17.43 Euro (20.54 Dollars
at 28th September exchange rate). This resulted in 10 group-pairs per
treatment, our independent unit of observation. The experiment was
programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
2Instructions can be found in Appendix 4.A.
3Because of varying show-up rates and the exogenous treatment requiring data from
previous endogenous migration sessions, most sessions were run with two of the
three treatments. See Appendix 4.B for an overview of the different sessions.
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4.3 Theoretical Framework, Equilibrium Benchmark,
and Predictions
Assuming risk-neutral preferences and common knowledge of ratio-
nality, the contest game has multiple equilibria at the individual player
level, but a unique equilibrium at the group level. In line with the lit-
erature (see e.g. Konrad, 2009) we focus on the group level equilib-












for contributions of group B where NA and NB
are the group sizes of groups A and B. As the number of players in
our game is 8 and thus NB = 8 − NA and z = 1, 920 this results in∑
i∈A
ai = NB · 30 and
∑
j∈B
bj = NA · 30. Table 4.3.1 shows the equilibrium
benchmarks for each possible group size in the experiment.
Table 4.3.1: Individual Prize, Equilibrium Contribution, and Expected Payoffs
by Group Size
Group Individual Equilibrium Group Expected Expected
Size Prize Contribution Group Payoff Individual Payoff
1 1920 120 1270 1270
2 960 180 1500 750
3 640 150 1410 470
4 480 120 1320 330
5 384 90 1230 246
6 320 60 1140 190
7 274 61 1429 204
8 240 1 2879 360
Note: Numbers are rounded to integers. For the equilibrium contributions and expected payoffs,
the group size of the other group is always 8 minus group size, as the number of players in our
experiment is fixed at 8. Thus a group of 1 always competes against a group of 7, and so forth.
The case in which both groups have a size of four is equivalent to the
control treatment. The sum of equilibrium group contributions over
both groups is 240 and the same for group sizes 2 to 6. For a group size
of 1, the contribution is a corner solution as groups without an endow-
ment constraint would invest 210 tokens. In this case, it is optimal to
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contribute the full endowment of 120, whereas the opposing group of
size 7 best responds by contributing 61 tokens.4 For a group size of 8,
the other group is empty and a contribution of one guarantees winning
the contest. If the group of 8 would not contribute at all, they only had
a 50% chance of winning the prize as the prize could in principle still
be assigned to the empty group. As the payoff structure incentivises
migration towards the smaller group in all but the largest groups, it
was unlikely that there would be many instances in which we observe
groups of 7 or 8.5
In order to account for social identity in the model, we follow Zaun-
brecher and Riedl (2016) and adopt the utility function of the form:
ug(a) = α · πg + (1− α) · πA\g, where πg is the payoff of player g, πA\g
is the average payoff of player g’s other group members and α is the
weight on own payoffs that depends on the strength of social identity
(in the utility function for a player from group B it is β). When applied
to the contest game, this translates into the following payoff function









































Zaunbrecher and Riedl (2016) show that in equilibrium, group contri-
butions for players of Group A decrease in α, the weight put on own
payoffs.6 Figure 4.3.1 illustrates the predictions of this model for differ-
ent group sizes and social preference parameters.7 For α and β equal
4While we could have increased the endowment to avoid this corner solution, we
decided against this, as doing so would have made the contest prize much less
important for the overall payoff.
5In fact, we hardly encounter any groups larger than 6 in the experiment. To address
the issue of group size, we employ group size controls in our data analysis.
6See Appendix 4.C for the derivation of this result.
7Group sizes of 0 and 8 are not shown as there is no opposing group.
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to 1, the predictions are exactly the same as in the previous table. How-
ever, with decreasing α and β, and thus increasing weight put on the
payoffs of others in the own group, equilibrium group contributions
increase for all group sizes except for the instances in which we have
a corner solution. However, even in the cases where we have a corner
solution, contributions on group-pair level increase. This is because the
small group, whose contributions do not increase beyond their endow-
ment with decreasing α and β, faces a larger group which can increase
its contribution without the endowment becoming a binding constraint.
For example, in the case where group A with α = 0.5 and group size of
1 faces a group B with β = 0.5 and a group size of 7, group A will only
contribute 120 as it is constraint by its endowment. However, group B,
which would only contribute 61 if- it consisted of selfish individuals,
will now best respond by contributing 136.57. The only exception to this
is a case in which a small group of participants with social preferences—
an α or β below 1—faces a group of purely selfish players—α or β equal
to 1. This also holds if one of the social preferences parameters is de-
creased while the other is kept constant. Put differently, the more an
individual cares about the own group, the more she contributes to the
contest.8
Similar to Chen and Li (2009), Chen and Chen (2011), and Zaunbrecher
and Riedl (2016) we associate changes in social identity with changes
in α. In social psychology (Wetherell, 1996) and identity economics (Ak-
erlof & Kranton, 2000), rigid group boundaries and exclusion are an
important feature of a strong identity. Previous findings in economic
experiments confirm this and find better performance in groups with
stronger group cohesion (Chen et al., 2014; Eckel & Grossman, 2005)
and lower cooperation if an outsider joins the group (Grund et al., 2018),
8A more complex model of social identity and ingroup-outgroup behaviour, could
include weights on the own payoff, the payoff of the own group, and the payoff
of the other group. However, as the payoffs of the two groups are inversely linked
through the contest success functions, putting more weight on the other group has
the same effect as decreasing the weight on the own group’s payoffs and vice versa.
Appendix 4.D provides equilibrium predictions for such a model. As including an
additional weight on the other group’s payoff does make the model considerably
less tractable and requires many additional assumptions, we chose to stick with the
more parsimonious model presented here.
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α = 1, β = 1
α = 0.75, β = 1
α = 0.5, β = 1
(b) Social preferences of group B fixed
Figure 4.3.1: Equilibrium predictions by group size
or if group entry is easily possible (Ahn et al., 2011). Introducing mi-
gration in a group contest setting should thus weaken identification
with the own group. In our model, this would imply that relative to
fixed groups, α—the weight on the own payoff—increases while equi-
librium contributions go down. Thus we hypothesise that introducing
migration into the group contest decreases group contributions.
Main Hypothesis. The average group contribution in the migration treat-
ments is lower than in the control treatment.
Furthermore, we have multiple sub-hypotheses regarding the channels
through which we expect a decrease in contributions. The existence
of migration could lead to less identification with the own group as
the ‘friend’ of today can be the ‘enemy’ of tomorrow and vice versa.
Thus, players should have a weaker social identity and be less proso-
cial towards their own group. As a consequence of the lower identi-
fication with the own group, group contribution would thus also be
lower. As this is a result of the possibility to migrate, lower ingroup bias,
lower prosociality towards the ingroup, and lower group contributions
should already be observable in the first round.
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Sub-Hypothesis 1. Ingroup bias, SVO towards ingroup, and group contri-
butions are lower at the beginning of the migration treatments than at the
beginning of the control treatment.
Moreover, in treatments with the possibility of migration, we expect the
ingroup bias, prosociality towards the own group, and consequently
the contest investment to further decrease between the start and the
end of the experiment due to group boundaries being fluid and initial
social identity being eroded through group member turnover. Thus,
we should see a decline in ingroup bias and SVO towards the ingroup
between the beginning and end of the migration treatments and a cor-
responding decrease in contributions throughout the experiment.
Sub-Hypothesis 2. Ingroup bias, SVO towards ingroup, and group contri-
butions are higher at the beginning of the migration treatments than at the
end and the change is significantly different from the control treatment.
The mechanism we hypothesize is independent of the actual decision to
migrate, so we would expect it to affect participants in the exogenous
and endogenous migration treatment in a similar fashion. However,
there are many reasons why behaviour in the Migration treatment with
endogenous migration decision could be different. Players could sort
into high and low contributing groups based on their own contribution
preference, migration decisions could be interpreted as a signal about
the status of the groups, or players are unsatisfied with their group and
migrate to be able to ‘punish’ them. Thus, the Exogenous Migration
treatment allows us to cleanly identify the effect of migration, indepen-
dent of potential confounds that more natural endogenous decisions
do introduce.
4.4 Results
We first provide descriptive statistics and analyse the group-pair level
data for which we derive the main hypothesis. In the subsequent anal-
ysis we investigate the role of ingroup bias and SVO, and drivers of the
decision to migrate.
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4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Non-Parametric Analysis
Figure 4.4.1 presents the average group contributions over time per
treatment together with the average group contributions predicted by
the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium without social preferences.9 There is
considerable overcontribution in all treatments and none of the treat-
ments converges towards the Nash Equilibrium. Contributions start
off at a similar level but diverge around period 3. The contributions
in the Exogenous Migration treatment drop below the contributions
in the Control treatment whereas the contributions in the Endogenous
Migration treatment rise above it. If we only consider independent
observations—average contributions over time and group-pair—we
observe that mean group contributions are higher in the endogenous
(Mean = 221.08; Std. = 50.69; N = 10) and lower in the exogenous migra-
tion (Mean = 181.27; Std. = 63.86; N = 10) than in the control treatment
(Mean = 198.60; Std. = 33.15; N = 10). Comparing the contributions in
the different treatments does not reveal significant differences between
the treatments (p = 0.33, Kruskal-Wallis test). Contributions in the first
round also do not differ significantly (p = 0.875, Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 1: There is no significant difference in average group contributions
across the three treatments
One possible explanation for this result could be a lack of migrations.
By contrast, Figure 4.4.2 shows that this is unlikely to be the case. All
groups start as groups of four but already in period three, only a minor-
ity of groups are groups of four. Given the strong incentives to migrate
to smaller groups, it is not surprising that only a few groups of size six
and larger (and 2 or lower) are observed. In total, 36.9% of group-pairs
in the migration treatments are groups of 4, 43.6% are groups of 5 and
3, 14.1% are groups of 6 and 2, 4.7% are groups of 1 and 7, and 0.7%
are groups of 8. Even though these differences in group sizes should
not affect the average equilibrium group contributions in a group-pair
according to the risk-neutral theoretical benchmark, the coincidence of
9This Nash equilibrium holds for groups of size 2–6. For the other group sizes, pre-
dicted average group contributions would actually be lower because of corner

































Figure 4.4.1: Development of group contributions over time and by treatment
diverging group sizes and diverging contributions after period 3 sug-
gests that this could still be an important factor.10 As averaging over
time and group-pair reduces the statistical power considerably, we also
conduct regression analysis in which we can control for different group
sizes and time-serial dependency.
4.4.2 Treatment Comparison – Group-pair Regression with
Controls
Table 4.4.1 reports the results of random-effects regressions in which
we cluster the standard errors on group-pair level (30 clusters) and
use the average group contributions in a group-pair in each period
as dependent variable. The control treatment without migrations is
always the reference group.
10As described in the discussion of the theoretical predictions, with group sizes of 1-7
and 0-8, we would actually expect lower contributions. However, these only make
up a very small number of observations.
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Figure 4.4.2: Development of group size over time
Table 4.4.1: Random-effects regressions of average group contributions aver-
aged at group-pair level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg.Group Avg.Group Avg.Group Avg.Group Avg.Group Avg.Group
contributiont contributiont contributiont contributiont contributiont contributiont
Endo 22.48 25.94 7.47 13.52* 20.88*** 18.46**
(18.52) (19.81) (5.99) (7.36) (8.01) (7.33)
Exo −17.33 −13.87 −6.84 −1.07 −11.17* −12.92**
(22.00) (21.33) (6.61) (7.26) (6.65) (5.99)
Avggroupcontributionst−1 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.72***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
#Migrationst 17.60** 9.64
(7.54) (7.95)
#Migrationst × Endo −27.50*** −27.18***
(8.56) (10.50)
Constant 198.6 *** 198.6 *** 54.78*** 56.13*** 59.02*** 56.64***
(10.14) (10.18) (8.84) (9.39) (8.78) (8.36)
Group size controls No Yes No Yes Yes No
N 450 420 450 420 420 420
Overall R− squared 0.056 0.121 0.538 0.604 0.615 0.549
Standard errors clustered by group pair in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Using only the migration treatment dummies Endo and Exo as inde-
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pendent variables in Regression (1) does neither show significant dif-
ferences between the migration treatments and the control (p-value =
0.225 for the Endogenous treatment and p-value = 0.431 for the Ex-
ogenous treatment), nor significant differences between the migration
treatments.11 Reducing the noise by including group size controls in Re-
gression (2) and accounting for potential dynamics captured by adding
lagged group-pair contributions (Avggroupcontributionst−1) in Regres-
sion (3) separately also does not improve the significance levels of the
treatment dummies. Accounting for both, dynamics and group size
differences, in Regression (4), the difference between the endogenous
migration treatment and the control treatment as well as the differ-
ence between the migration treatments becomes significant at 10% level
(p-value = 0.066, F-test with Exo = Endo p-value = 0.059).
While this effect could be due to the migrations themselves, controlling
for the number of migrations (#Migrationst, #Migrationst × Endo)
that occurred between period t-1 and t in the exogenous and the endoge-
nous migration treatments actually increases the treatment effects and
turns the negative coefficient of the Exogenous Migration treatment
dummy significant at the 10% level and the positive difference of the
Endogenous Migration treatment significant at 5% level (Regression
(5)).12 The number of migrations has a positive effect in the exogenous
treatment (p-value = 0.02) but a negative effect on contributions in
the Endogenous Migration treatment (p-value < 0.001). This partly
mitigates the respective positive and negative effects of the treatments
themselves.13 A possible interpretation of these seemingly contradict-
ing findings relates to the change in the reference group here. By adding
the number of migrations in the migration treatments as variables, the
coefficients of the treatment dummies for the Endogenous and Exoge-
nous Migration treatment now only refer to the effects of the treatments
in the case where no migrations take place. If no migrations take place
11p-value = 0.11, F -test with restriction Exo = Endo
12The average number of migrations in the migration treatments is 0.57 per round or
1 migration every 1.75 periods. Migrations have a subscript t here, because while
the migrations decisions are made in t-1, the actual migrations only take place at
the start of the new period t.
13A graphical representation of this interaction effect can be found in Appendix 4.E.
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in the Endogenous Migration treatment, it could be an indicator that
participants were satisfied with their group contributions and had in-
tention to leave. As higher contributions result in higher chances of
winning, this is more likely to occur when contributions are high. On
the other hand, if participants decide to migrate, this might be an in-
dicator that participants are not satisfied with the (low) contributions
of their group and are thus more willing to leave. This effect is in line
with our Sub-Hypothesis 2. In the Exogenous Migration treatment, par-
ticipants cannot decide to migrate but are exogenously displaced. Here,
the threat of potential migration could suppress contributions, which
was the hypothesised mechanism for Sub-Hypothesis 1. However, if
contributions are low, the exogenous shock to the group composition
caused by the displacement could be seen as possibility to restart coop-
eration within the group, and thus increase contributions.14
To account for potential endogeneity issues resulting from including
both the number of migrations and group size changes that are a direct
result of these migrations, we also run this regression without group
size dummies (Regression (6)). In this specification, the number of mi-
grations has no significant effect on contributions anymore in the ex-
ogenous treatment but the other results are robust.15 Although our hy-
potheses are about group-level contribution, we can also run these re-
gressions on individual contributions and control for additional factors
such as beliefs, individual migration decisions, or demographics. This
replicates our findings on group-pair level with the exception that the
exogenous migration treatment dummy is not marginally significant
anymore. This is probably caused by the individual migration deci-
sion and group size changes picking up some of the negative treatment
effect in the exogenous migration treatment (see Regression (16a) in
Appendix 4.I).16
14Such an effect can be observed in public good games (Andreoni, 1988; Brandts et al.,
2016; Croson, 1996).
15In Appendix 4.F we also ran the regressions without the control treatment, only
comparing the migration treatments. Similarly to the results reported here, contri-
bution levels are significantly higher in the Endogenous Migration treatment in the
regressions with controls.
16An additional exploratory analysis of beliefs can be found in Appendix 4.H.
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Result 2: (a)When controlling for group size and lagged contributions, av-
erage group contributions in the Endogenous Migration treatment are
significantly higher than in the Control treatment and marginally sig-
nificantly lower in the Exogenous Migration treatment. (Supports Hy-
pothesis 1 for the Exogenous treatment)
(b) Implemented migrations have a heterogeneous effect on contribu-
tions: They increase contributions in the Exogenous Migration treat-
ment, whereas they decrease contributions in the Endogenous Migra-
tion treatment relative to groups without migrations (supports Sub-
Hypothesis 2 for the Endogenous treatment).
4.4.3 The Role of SVO and Ingroup Bias
Figure 4.4.3 shows the ingroup bias—the difference between ingroup
and outgroup SVO—and the social value orientations towards ingroup
and outgroup at the start and the end of the experiment. As predicted
by Sub-Hypothesis 1 and shown in Figure 4.4.3a, ingroup bias is lower
in the migration treatments at the start of the experiment. However,
this difference is only marginally significant (p-value = 0.097, Kruskal-
Wallis test, N=240). The ingroup bias stays relatively stable and only
decreases slightly for the participants in the Control treatment. There
are also no significant differences in ingroup bias between the differ-
ent treatments at the end of the experiment (p-value = 0.287, Kruskal-
Wallis Test, N=26)17. Comparing the change in ingroup bias between
the treatments also does not yield significant results (p-value = 0.987,
Kruskal-Wallis Test, N=26).
Result 3: At the start of the experiment, ingroup bias is lower in the migra-
tion treatments than in the control treatment (supports Sub-Hypothesis
17The difference in number of observations between the ingroup bias at the start and
the end has two reasons. First, while there was no interaction between players at the
start of the experiment and thus their SVO choices can be treated as independent,
this is not the case anymore at the end of the experiment. Therefore, we average
the ingroup bias at the end of the experiment over the players in a group-pair.
Furthermore, the differences in group sizes resulted in some cases in which players
did not make an ingroup decisions—because they were the only player left in the
group—and other cases in which there was no outgroup left and thus no outgroup
SVO decision.
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1). However, this difference is only marginally significant and the bias



















































(b) SVOs before and after contest, by treatment
Figure 4.4.3: Development of social preferences
Figure 4.4.3b shows that social value orientation towards the ingroup
hardly differs between treatments at the start of the experiment
(p-value = 0.847, Kruskal-Wallis Test, N=240). Social value orientation
towards the outgroup is higher in the migration treatments than in the
control treatment at the start of the experiment, but this difference is not
statistically significant (p-value = 0.164, Kruskal-Wallis Test, N=240).
Over the course of the experiment, social value orientation towards
both in- and outgroup decreases in the migration treatments. For the
endogenous treatment, only the drop in outgroup SVO is significant
at 5% level (p-value = 0.035, Sign test, N=8). For the exogenous
treatment neither of the two decreases in social value orientation is
statistically significant (p-value = 0.144 and p-value = 0.363, Sign
test, N=8). In the control treatment, social value orientation towards
the outgroup stays constant but social value orientation towards the
ingroup drops between the start and end of the contest. However,
this drop in social value orientation towards the ingroup is not
significant (p-value = 0.109, Sign test, N=8). Comparing the social
value orientation changes across treatments does not show significant
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differences (Ingroup: p-value = 0.346, Kruskal-Wallis Test, N=26;
Outgroup: p-value = 0.294, Kruskal-Wallis Test, N=26).18 Thus we find
no support for our Sub-Hypothesis 2 that ingroup bias and social value
orientation towards the ingroup would decrease over the course of the
experiment.
Result 4: (a)Social value orientation towards the ingroup does not differ
between treatments at the start of the experiment (does not support Sub-
Hypothesis 1) and does not decrease significantly over the course of the
experiment (does not support Sub-Hypothesis 2). Differences between
the treatments are not significant.
(b) Social value orientation towards the outgroup does not differ between
treatments at the start of the experiment but does decrease significantly
over the course of the experiment in the endogenous migration treatment.
Differences between the treatments are not significant.
4.4.4 What drives Migration Decisions
In Table 4.4.2 we present the results of an analysis of the individual deci-
sion to leave in the Endogenous migration treatment. Players make this
decision at the end of each period, after having received information
about contributions and outcome of the contest. As the decision to leave
is a binary variable, we use a Probit model and include factors that we
suspect to correlate with the decision to leave. These are on the one
hand variables that describe the relation between the groups such as ab-
solute (Group contribute (excl.self)t, Other group contributet) and rel-
ative contributions of the groups (Own group more than other groupt),
size of the own group (Group Size 1 : 7t), group size changes
(Group increaset, Group decreaset), migrations that occurred at the
start of the round (#Migrationst), and winning the round (Wint).
On the other hand there are also factors that describe the relation-
ship of the individual player with their group such as ingroup bias
(Ingroup BiasStart), own contributions (Contributet), or contributing
18An additional analysis of factors influencing changes in ingroup bias is provided in
Appendix 4.G. None of the independent variables reaches statistical significance at
conventional levels.
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more than the group average (Self more than own groupt) that
could influence the decision to migrate. We find that participants’
decision to migrate is mostly driven by the desire to win. While
higher contributions of the own group than the other group (-13.1%,
p-value < 0.001), and winning the contest (-13.8%, p-value = 0.001)
all greatly reduce the probability that an individual decides to leave,
contributions by the other group increase the probability (0.1% per
contributed token, p-value < 0.001). Own contributions also decrease
the probability that a person decides to leave their group (-0.1% per
contributed token, p-value = 0.029). This could be the result of the
sunk cost fallacy—participants are staying in their group because they
already invested a lot on its behalf. Thus, if participants contributed a
lot, their group contributed more than the other group, and won the
contest, they are very unlikely to leave. However, the more the other
group contributes, the more likely it becomes that participants leave.
The breakdown of the group sizes reveals that the participants under-
stood the incentives and generaly choose to leave larger groups. Being
in a group of size six or seven increases the probability to leave by
19.3% and 28.5%, respectively (p-value = 0.01 and p-value < 0.001).
However, groups of two also increased participants desire to leave by
21.8% (p-value = 0.096). This last result is somewhat surprising, as ex-
pected payoffs are much higher for smaller groups. This might indicate
an unwillingness to contribute a high proportion of one’s own endow-
ment to the contest as the equilibrium predictions suggest that a group
of two should invest 75% of their total endowment into the contest. Re-
cent changes in group size, implemented migration decisions, or initial
ingroup bias all did not affect the propensity to leave the group.
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Group contribute (excl.self)t −0.001
(0.001)
Other group contributet 0.001***
(0.001)
Self more than own groupt −0.005
(0.065)
Own group more than other groupt −0.131***
(0.034)
Group Size 1t −0.036
(0.285)
Group Size 2t 0.218*
(0.121)
Group Size 3t 0.032
(0.048)
Group Size 5t 0.069
(0.067)
Group Size 6t 0.193**
(0.078)













Standard errors clustered by group pair in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we present a lab experiment to identify if and how the pos-
sibility to migrate and actual migration between groups affects contest
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contributions in a group contest game. We hypothesised that migration
would decrease contributions due to a decrease in identification with
the own group as measured by social preferences. By contrast, we find
that contributions increase if participants can freely choose between
switching groups or staying, but only after controlling for group size
differences and previous contributions. In another treatment with ex-
ogenously determined migration, contribution levels are marginally
lower than in the control without migration. Social identification with
the own group, as measured by the ingroup bias in the social prefer-
ence tests, stays unchanged throughout the experiment in all of the
treatments.
Our study adds to the literature on group contests as it is to our knowl-
edge the first study that is not conducted with fixed groups. We find
that allowing for migration between the groups does little in alleviating
the rampant overcontribution that is typical for experimental contest
games (Sheremeta, 2018). If anything, and in line with previous findings
on endogenous groups and coalition formation in contests (Bloch, 2012;
Herbst et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2012), we find that allowing free move-
ment may aggravate the overcontribution. Interestingly, if migration
does take place in the endogenous migration treatment, contributions
decrease in the following round, suggesting that at least in the very
short term, we observe the hypothesised decrease in contributions due
to migration. Still, this effect is not large enough to offset overall higher
contributions in the endogenous migration treatment and goes in the
opposite direction for the exogenous treatment, which cannot be ex-
plained by our hypotheses. One possible interpretation is, that if groups
are allowed to form endogenously, migrations are an indication that
participants are unhappy in their group. The analysis of the decision to
migrate suggests that participants mainly leave their group to improve
chances of winning and thus if migrations take place, they are likely to
coincide with low contribution levels. In this case, migrations could act
as a disciplining device, ensuring higher contributions by acting as a
looming threat that people might leave the group if contributions are
not high enough. In the Exogenous Migration treatment, participants
do not get a choice to migrate but might get exogenously moved to
an other group. If contributions are low, this exogenous shock to the
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group composition could be seen as opportunity to restart cooperation
within the group. In public good games, restarting has been shown to
increase cooperation at least in the short term (Brandts et al., 2016), thus
a similar effect could be occurring here.
Our study also adds to the literature on group identity. We observe
that groups do not need to have rigid boundaries, to maintain a social
identity, as we observe a persistent ingroup bias in all of the treatments.
Even in cases in which the group composition got completely shuffled
did the ingroup bias not change. Thus, the ingroup bias that relatively
minimal groups produce, does not seem to be dependent on the specific
composition of the group or the permanence of membership.
For a social planner who wants to minimise the wasteful rent-seeking
between groups, our experiment has bad news. We find that migration
does little to alleviate the waste of resources that is common in contest
games and rent-seeking situations. In contrast, allowing contestants
to freely migrate between groups does even seem to have an escalat-
ing effect. For countries, sports teams, or companies however, these
result suggest that migration does not decrease competitiveness of the
own group. Furthermore, the identification with the own team does
not suffer from having turnover amongst the group members. Thus,
sports fans and company managers should not be overly concerned
with “Mercenary” employees that aim to maximise their own earnings
and often switch jobs or teams, as, in our setting, we find no evidence
that changing composition of the own team has detrimental effects on
team performance.
A limitation of our study is that our setup only involves two groups
and thus players can only migrate to the opposing team in the conflict.
Extending this to a richer setting with more groups, of which not all are
involved in the conflict could provide interesting insights into conflict
investment and self selection in a more dynamic group conflict setting.
Furthermore, the groups in the experiment are small and thus every
single migration constitutes are large change in the size and compo-
sition of the group. Using larger groups would allow to make group
size and composition changes more gradual. It would also be instruc-
tive to use an extensive social identity manipulation—or to use natural
135
Chapter 4. Conflict and Migration
groups—in the group contest to start the contest with more meaningful
groups and to investigate if the effect of migration is more pronounced








Welcome and thank you for participating in this decision-making experiment. Please read these 
instructions carefully. If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and 
one of the experimenters will come to you to answer your question in private.	
In this experiment you can earn money. The amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
decisions you make, on the decisions other participants make and on random events. Your identity 
will never be revealed to anyone during or after the experiment. Nor will you receive any information 
about other participants’ identity. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In 
order to keep your decisions private, do not reveal your choices to any other participant during or after 
the experiment. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of today’s session.	
This experiment consists of two parts and your total earnings will be the sum of your earnings in both 
parts.	
Throughout the experiment, your earnings will be counted in tokens. At the end of the experiment you 
will be paid in cash using the exchange rate	
10 tokens = €0.50 	
	
The experiment consists of a number of independent tasks, which are described in detail below. At the 
end of the experiment you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire.	
In the experiment there are no right or wrong choices. We are solely interested in your decisions.	
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Groups	
For the duration of the experiment you will be matched with other participants into two groups. One 
group will be called the RED group and the other group will be called the BLUE group. At any point 
in time during the experiment you will be a member of either the RED group or the BLUE group.	
You and the other participants you are matched with will be identified with unique anonymous 
symbols. The experiment consists of several rounds. The symbols will appear in an overview screen at 







In this part you will be asked to make decisions in 2 rounds, and in each round you will face 6 
decision situations. Your choices in these decision situations will affect the earnings of both you 
and another participant, whom we refer to as “the Other”. All decisions will remain anonymous and 
confidential. You will not get to know the identity of the Other nor will the Other (or anybody else) 
get to know your identity. You will however, get information on the group membership of the Other.	
 
• In the first round, the Other will be a member of your own group.	
 
• In the second round, the Other will be a member of the other group.	
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The order of the 6 decision situations within each round will be determined randomly by the 
computer.	




In each decision situation you will allocate tokens between you and the Other. Each decision situation 
will have 9 options. Here is an arbitrary example of a decision situation:	
  
 
You should choose the allocation you prefer most. Each allocation may lead to different earnings for 
you and/or the Other. In the example above, you would be making allocation decisions between you 
and another member of your own group during this round. In this example the word “own” is in blue. 
In the actual decision situations, the colour of the word “own” will be the same as the colour of 
the group you belong to in this part.	
In the example decision situation, if you would choose the leftmost allocation, you would earn 45 
tokens and the Other would earn 50 tokens. If you would choose the rightmost allocation, you would 
earn 50 tokens and the Other would earn 45 tokens. The earnings for you and the Other from 
allocations in-between are derived similarly.	
You select an allocation by clicking on the corresponding button with the mouse. After an allocation 
is selected, the earnings for you and the other will appear at the bottom of the screen	
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When you are satisfied with your selected allocation you will need to confirm your choice by clicking 
on the “OK” button at the bottom of the screen. 	
Payment Part 1	
	
After all participants have made all their decisions in the experiment, the computer will determine 
each participant’s earnings in this part using the following procedure.	
 
[Step 1] It is randomly determined if the decisions in this part or the decisions in a similar part  
taking place at the end of the experiment are paid out.	
[Step 2] The computer will randomly assign half of the participants to be paid as “active” 
participant and the other half to be paid as “passive” participant.	
[Step 3] Each active participant is paired with exactly one passive participant. Therefore, as 
active participant, you will be either paired with someone from your own group or 
someone from the other group. In the first case only decisions towards your own 
group will be relevant for your earnings. In the latter case only decisions towards the 
other group will be relevant for your earnings. 	
[Step 4] For each pair of active and passive participants, one of the active participant’s six 
decisions will be randomly selected by the computer. The active participant receives 
the “You receive” amount of tokens and the passive participant receives the “Other 
receives” amount of tokens.	
	
Important!	
The used procedure guarantees that each active participant is paired with one – and only one – passive 
participant and vice versa.	
When making your decision you will not know whether you will be an active or a passive participant 
in the earnings determination nor will you know the decision situation that counts for your and the 
Other’s earnings. Therefore, you should view each decision situation as equally important and 
consider each of your choices as the one that determines your and the Other’s earnings.	
Your choice in one decision situation does not affect any other decision situation. Therefore, you 
should consider each decision situation independent of each other.	
Nobody will be informed about your decisions. Likewise you will not receive any information of 






You will now be asked to answer some comprehension questions about how your decisions affect 
your earnings and earnings of others. After you have correctly answered the comprehension questions, 
please wait for the experiment to continue.	
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Part 2	
This part consists of 15 rounds. In each round the red and the blue group are competing for a prize in 
the following way: Each group member will be endowed with 120 tokens which are put in the 
member’s private account. This will be called “Initial Endowment”. Each member can use these 
tokens to buy lottery tickets for the own group. Each token buys one lottery ticket. Any token 
not used for buying lottery tickets will remain in the member’s private account. Each member can 
buy tickets only for his or her own group. All decisions are made simultaneously and anonymously.	
The lottery tickets purchasing decision screen is shown in the example below:		
	 
 
After you have decided how many tickets to buy, you will be asked for your best estimate of the 
average amount of tickets bought by the other group members of your own group and the average 
amount of tickets bought by the members of the other group.	
After all members in both groups have made their decisions, a lottery will determine whether your 
group or the other group wins a prize of 1920 tokens. For this, all bought tickets are put in a 
“virtual” urn and one of these tickets will be randomly drawn as the winning ticket. If the ticket drawn 
is from a member of your own group your group will win the prize. If the ticket drawn is from a 
member of the other group the other group will win the prize. Each ticket in the urn has the same 
chance to be drawn.	
In other words, if you and the other group members of your own group buy in total X tickets, and the 
group members of the other group buy in total Y tickets, then the chance that your group wins is given 
by  and the chance that the other group wins is .	
Hence, the group which buys more tickets has a higher chance of winning the prize than the 
group which buys less tickets.	
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Note: If your group and the other group buy the same total amount of tickets, then the chance of 
winning the prize is 50:50. This is also the case if none of the groups buys any tickets. If your group 
buys K-times as many tickets as the other group, then also your group’s chance is K-times as high as 
that of the other group. If only one of the groups buys tickets, then this group wins the prize with 
certainty.	
After the winning group is determined, the prize of 1920 tokens is shared equally among the 
members of the winning group and added to the private accounts. For a group of 4, this means that 
the individual prize for each member of the winning group is 480 tokens. The individual prize is 
displayed on the screen when you make your purchasing decision.	
Thus, the earnings of a member of the winning and the losing group, respectively, are calculated as 
follows:	
Earnings of a member of the winning group: 120 – bought lottery tickets + 480	
Earnings of a member of the losing group:  120 – bought lottery tickets	
At the end of each round you get information about your earnings, your own group’s total amount of 
tickets bought, the other group’s total amount of tickets bought, the winning chances given these total 
amounts of tickets bought and which group won the prize.	
The next screen shows an example of a screen at the end of a round for a member of the winning 
group (the screen for a member of the losing group looks similar):	
	  
 
[Baseline: Your own group is the same as your own group in Part 1. Likewise, the other group is the 
same as the other group in Part 1. You and all other members of your group will remain members of 
your own group throughout all 15 rounds. The same holds for the members of the other group.]	
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[Endogenous Migration: In Round 1 of this part your own group is the same as your own group in 
Part 1. Likewise, in Round 1 of this part the other group is the same as the other group in Part 1. At 
the end of Round 1 and each subsequent round (except for the last Round 15), you will have to 
decide if you want to stay in your current own group or want to switch to the other group as 
illustrated in the picture below:	
. 
Each other group member of your current own group and each group member of the current other 
group also decides whether they want to stay in their respective current own groups or want switch to 
the other group.	
After all 8 participants in your current own and other group have made their staying or switching 
decisions, the following procedure will determine which actual switches (if any) between groups will 
take place:	
2 out of the in total 8 “stay” or “switch” decisions of all members of your and the other group are 
randomly selected and actually implemented. The other 6 not selected decisions will be counted as 
“stay” decisions. In each round, each of the 8 “stay” or “switch” decisions has equal chance to be one 
of the 2 actually implemented decisions.	
As of Round 2, at the beginning of each round you will be informed about if you have stayed with 
your group or have switched to the group as well as your group membership (red or blue) in that 
round. Any group changes that took place will be visible in the overview screen. The symbols of the 
players that switched groups will have moved to their new group and an arrow will indicate the 
change.	
Depending on the actually implemented “stay” and “switch” decisions, the group sizes (number of 
members in a group) of the two groups can change between rounds. The total prize the winning 
group receives stays the same irrespective of the size of the group. This means that individual 
earnings from winning the prize will change with the size of the group. 	
The table below shows what the individual share of the prize will be for each possible group size, in 




0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
Individual	
Prize	
0	 1920	 960	 640	 480	 384	 320	 274.3	 240	
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Note: The group size is the number of all members; that is, if the size of your own group is 1 you 
would be the only member of this group.	
The individual prize of a member in the losing group is 0, irrespective of the group size.	
Example: In Round 1 both groups have 4 members and the group size of each group is thus 4. 
Therefore, each member of the winning group will earn 480 tokens. If after Round 1, for example, one 
person switches to the other group, one group will have 3 members and the other group will have 5 
members. Each member of the group of 3 will receive 640 tokens in case this group wins, whereas 
each member of the group of 5 will receive 384 tokens if this group wins. Note that larger groups 
have more tokens in total and thus can potentially also buy more lottery tickets than smaller groups.]	
[Exogenous Migration: In Round 1 of this part your own group is the same as your own group in Part  
1. Likewise, in Round 1 of this part the other group is the same as the other group in Part 1. After 
Round 1 in each round the group membership of up to two participants may change. This 
happens independently of your or anyone else’s decisions in this experiment.	
As of Round 2, at the beginning of each round you will be informed about if you have stayed with 
your group or have switched to the other group as well as your group membership (red or blue) in that 
round. Any group changes that took place will be visible in the overview screen. The symbols of the 
players that switched groups will have moved to their new group and an arrow will indicate the 
change.	
Depending on whether or not participants have switched groups, the group sizes (number of members 
in a group) of the two groups can change between rounds. The total prize the winning group 
receives stays the same irrespective of the size of the group. This means that individual earnings 
from winning the prize will change with the size of the group.	
The table below shows what the individual share of the prize will be for each possible group size, in 
case this group wins the prize.	
Group 
Size	
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
Individual	
Prize	
0	 1920	 960	 640	 480	 384	 320	 274.3	 240	
	
Note: The group size is the number of all members; that is, if the size of your own group is 1 you 
would be the only member of this group.	
The individual prize of a member in the losing group is 0, irrespective of the group size.	
Example: In Round 1 both groups have 4 members and the group size is thus 4. Therefore, each 
member of the winning group will receive 480 tokens. If after Round 1, for example, one person 
switches to the other group, one group will have 3 members and the other group will have 5 members. 
Each member of the group of 3 will receive 640 tokens in case this group wins, whereas each member 
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of the group of 5 will receive 384 tokens if this group wins. Note that larger groups have more tokens 
in total and thus can potentially also buy more lottery tickets than smaller groups.]	
Your symbol and the overview screen, showing which symbols belong to each group, will be shown 
at the beginning of each round. 	
Earnings in Part 2:	
This part has 15 rounds. At the end of the experiment one of these rounds will be randomly selected to 
be paid out. Each round is equally likely to be paid out. Therefore, when making your decisions, you 
should view each round as the one relevant for your earnings.	
You will receive information on how much you earned at the end of the experiment.	
Comprehension Questions	
You will now be asked to answer some comprehension questions about Part 2. Tokens earned in these 
comprehension questions, will not be paid out. After you have correctly answered the comprehension 
questions, please wait for the experiment to continue with Part 1.	
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4.B Session overview
Table 4.B.1: Independent observations (group-pairs) per session
Session Control Endogenous Exogenous
1 1 1 0
2 0 2 0
3 2 1 0
4 0 2 0
5 0 0 1
6 0 1 0
7 0 2 1
8 0 1 1
9 1 0 1
10 1 0 1
11 1 0 2
12 0 0 1
13 1 0 1
14 0 0 1
15 3 0 0
Note: As the exogenous migration treatment re-
quired data from previous endogenous migration
treatments, we only started running sessions with
the exogenous treatment on the second day of ex-
periments.
4.C Equilibrium Strategies and Social Identity
The following sections present theoretical predictions and equilibrium
strategies. The game is first analyzed without considering social prefer-
ences. Then an extension to incorporate social identity and comparative
statics are provided.
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4.C.1 Equilibrium Strategy without social preferences
To derive the Nash equilibrium for group contributions, the first order







































)2 · zNA − 1 = 0


























bj ∈ ]0, NA ∗ 120]
NA is strictly positive, the contributions of group A are between 0 and
NA ∗ 120, thus the function is concave and the extremum a maximum







bj = 0 cannot be a maximum as it is always optimal
to at least invest the minimal positive amount possible when the other
group plays 0 as this guarantees winning the prize.
19Every individual has an endowment of 120 and thus the maximum group A can
contribute is NA ∗ 120
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)2 · zNB − 1 = 0 (4.2)
Substituting equation (4.1) into equation (4.2) gives:√∑
j∈B


























































20This function actually has two solutions, but the second solution always implies a
negative investment from player g, violating the boundary conditions
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This result is based on the fact that the members of each team have
identical valuations and constant marginal costs of investments and
does not require further symmetry assumptions (Abbink et al., 2010;
Konrad, 2009). Furthermore, this result does not imply a unique solu-
tion in individual contributions as there exist infinitely many equilibria
in individual contributions such that they sum up to the expression on
the right hand side.
However this model does not account for other regarding preferences
and especially social identity.
4.C.2 Equilibrium strategies with social preferences
In order to account for social identity in the model we closely follow
the work of Charness and Rabin (2002), Chen and Li (2009) and Chen
and Chen (2011) who use a utility function that is a weighted average
of own and others’ payoffs. We adopt the utility function of the form:
ug = α ·πg +(1−α) · π̄A\g, where πg is the payoff of player g, π̄A\g is the
average payoff of player g’s other group members and α is the weight
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Taking the derivative with respect to ag and setting to zero provides
































The best response function for an individual of group B, where β is the








)2 = βNBz (4.7)
Assuming that α and β are identical within the respective groups, sub-
21Assuming symmetry within the group would reduce the formula to the individual
payoff maximization problem that was discussed in the previous subsection.
22Proof of concavity/maximum is omitted as it is analogous to equation (4.1) and α
and β are assumed to be strictly positive
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Same as in the model without social preferences, this does not imply a
unique solution in individual contributions.
4.D Equilibrium predictions with social preferences
for ingroup and outgroup
In this simple model that includes social preferences for outgroup and
ingroup, participant utility is a weighted average of their own payoff,
the payoff of the own group, and the payoff of the other group. We show
the utility function and equilibrium contributions for someone from
group A. A denotes the contributions of group A, B denotes the contri-
butions of group B. NA and NB are the group sizes of groups A and B
respectively. a is the individual contribution for a player of group A. α
is the weight on the payoff of the own group, β is the weight on the pay-
off of the other group. γ and δ are the equivalent weights for someone
from group B. For legibility, subscripts are suppressed.
















−B + 120 NB
)
23Steps are identical to the model without social preferences
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−B NA (α+ β − 1) (α (NA − 2)− β (NA + 1) + 1)−B NA (α+ β − 1)






−A NB (γ + δ − 1) (γ (NB − 2)− δ (NB + 1) + 1)−A NB (γ + δ − 1)
NB (γ + δ − 1)
Equilibrium contributions for group A:
A = − 1, 920 f (·)
2 g (·)
(f (·) +NA (α+ β − 1) g (·))2
where
f (·) = (8−NA) (γ + δ − 1) (α (NA − 2)− β (NA + 1) + 1)
g (·) = γ (6−NA)− δ (9−NA) + 1
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Conditions required for existence of internal solution (∧ for AND condi-
tions and ∨ for OR conditions):(
NA > 0
∧((
3α < 1 ∧ (α ≥ β ∨ (α > 0 ∧ (1 + (−2 +NA)α > (1 +NA)β ∧ 2α+ β < 1)
∨
(α+ β > 1 ∧ β < 1)))
)
∨(
3α > 1 ∧ (2α+ β ≤ 1 ∨ (2α ≤ 1 ∧ β < 1 ∧ α+ β > 1))
)
∨(
3α == 1 ∧ (3β < 1 ∨ 2
3
< β < 1)
)
∨(
β < 1 ∧ ((α ≤ 0 ∧ 1 + (−2 +NA)α > (1 +NA)β)
∨
(α ≤ 1 ∧ 2α > 1 ∧ α ≤ β) ∨ (α > 1 ∧ α+ β > 1
∧
(α− β)(1 + (−2 +NA)α− (1 +NA)β) < 0))
)
∨(
α ≤ 1 ∧ 2α > 1 ∧ α > β ∧ α+ β > 1 ∧ 1 + (−2 +NA)α < (1 +NA)β
)))
∨(
2α+ β > 1 ∧
((
2α > 1 ∧ α+ β < 1
∧
(α− β)(1 + (−2 +NA)α− (1 +NA)β) > 0
)
∨(
2α ≤ 1 ∧ 3α > 1 ∧ α > β ∧ 1 + (−2 +NA)α > (1 +NA)β
)))
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The following two figures illustrate the comparative statics of the model
for the simplest case in which we vary one social preference parameter
for group A, keeping the other constant, and group B consists of self-
ish individuals. Furthermore, we do not impose the budget constraint,
thus contributions are allowed to exceed the endowment. With increas-
ing weight on the payoffs of the own group (α), group contributions
increase for all groups larger than one. For increasing weight on the
other group’s payoffs (β), group contributions decrease. The same pat-
tern persists when we allow both parameters to vary and also when the
other group has social preferences, but corner solutions become more
common.
Figure 4.D.1: Group contributions with varying α (β = 0)
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Figure 4.D.2: Group contributions with varying β (α = 0)
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4.E Marginal effect of migration treatments at
































Figure 4.E.1: Marginal effect of the migration treatments at different levels of
migration with 95% CI
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4.F Comparing only the migration treatments
Table 4.F.1: Comparing Exogenous and Endogenous Migration at group-pair
level
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
Group Group Group Group Group Group
contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution
Endo 39.81 39.81 13.03* 13.35* 30.53*** 29.70***
(25.14) (24.95) (7.55) (7.15) (7.02) (8.54)
Avggroupcontributionst−1 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.75***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
#Migrationst 16.92** 9.00
(7.57) (7.93)
#Migrations× Endot −26.77*** −26.38**
(8.64) (10.63)
Constant 181.3 *** 184.6 *** 42.04*** 48.91*** 42.85*** 38.64***
(19.69) (18.94) (10.49) (13.46) (12.81) (10.13)
Group size controls No Yes No Yes Yes No
N 300 300 280 280 280 280
Exogenous migration treatment as baseline. Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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4.G What explains change in ingroup bias?
Table 4.G.1: What explains changes in ingroup bias ?
(7a)











Average own contributions −0.003
(0.003)






Note: Standard errors clustered by group pair in parentheses. Adding
additional interactions of treatment and independent variables did not
improve model performance (as judged by Akaike’s and Bayesian infor-
mation criteria). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.H The Role of Beliefs
Average beliefs about the contributions of the own and the other group
do not differ significantly between treatments (p-value = 0.545 for the
beliefs about the own group, p-value = 0.237 for beliefs about the other
group, Kruskal-Wallis test). However, on an individual level, there exist
some interesting dynamics.
Table 4.H.1 shows that participants seem to have a good understanding
of the effect that group size has on the optimal level of contributions,
as they expect smaller groups—GroupSize1 : 3t for beliefs about the
own group and GroupSize5 : 7t for beliefs about the other group—to
contribute more and larger groups to contribute less for both the
own as well as the opposing group.24 The effect of ingroup bias
(Ingroup BiasStart) on beliefs about the contributions of the other
group is weakly significant and positive (p-value = 0.05) suggesting
that more ingroup biased participants expect higher contributions
from the opposing group. However, in absolute terms this effect
is not very large as the mean ingroup bias across all treatments is
only 9.2 resulting in a increase in beliefs about the other groups
contribution by ∼0.8. Beliefs about own and other group contributions
are also strongly positively affected by how much the participant
(contributet−1), his group (owngroupcontributet−1) , and the other
group (othergroupcontributet−1) contributed in the preceding period
(all significant at 0.01% level). Interestingly, a decrease or increase of
the group (Group decrease × Endot, Group increase × Endot), com-
pared to last round, does not have an additional effect for the beliefs
about the contributions of the own group, but strongly decreases
beliefs about the contributions of the other group in the endogenous
migration treatment (Joint significance test p-value < 0.01). If the
own group size decreases and the change is exogenously caused
(Group decreaset), participants expect the other group to contribute
10.45 tokens more. However, if the own group size decreased because
someone decided to leave, this effect disappears (Group decreaset
+ Group decrease × Endot = −0, 79). If the participant decided
24Note that having a group size of two when stating your beliefs about the other group
means that the other group has a group size of six.
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to leave the group in the previous period (Leavedecisiont−1), but
was not allowed to leave, she expects the average contributions
of the own group to be lower by about 4.90 tokens and the other
groups’ contributions to be higher by 3.63 tokens. However, if the
decision to leave is in fact implemented, this effect disappears as the
combined effects of migrating 4.77 (Migration(Self)t−1) and 0.73
(Migration(Self) × Endot−1) offset the negative effect of choosing
to leave -4.90 (Joint significance test p-value < 0.01). Being forced to
leave the own group in the exogenous treatment (Migration(Self)t−1)
increases beliefs about the average contributions of the own group by
4.77 tokens. There is no effect for the number of migrations itself.
Overall, beliefs about the contributions of the own group do not vary
between treatments but beliefs about the contributions of the other
group are heterogeneous as individuals react differently to group size
changes depending on the treatment they are in.
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Table 4.H.1: Determinants of beliefs about own and other group contributions
in period t
(8a) (9a)
Beliefs about the contribution Beliefs about the contribution
of the own Group of the other Group
Endo 1.672 1.352
Exo −2.790 0.289
Ingroup BiasStart 0.0744 0.086*
GroupSize1t 2.164
GroupSize2t 12.85 * −15.28 ***
GroupSize3t 9.410*** −6.108***
GroupSize5t −5.436*** 7.983***
GroupSize6t −10.24 *** 20.97 ***





Group increaset 2.180 0.921
Group increase× Endot −4.094 −8.855**
Group decreaset 0.067 10.45 **
Group decrease× Endot 2.243 −11.24 **
Leavedecisiont−1 −4.897** 3.628***
Migration(Self)t−1 4.769*** −2.152
Migration(Self)× Endot−1 0.726 −2.199
#Migrationst−1 −0.595 −4.577
#Migrations× Endot−1 −0.041 6.238
Constant 31.99 *** 17.27 *
N 3346 3328
Standard errors clustered by group pair and suppressed for legibility.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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4.I Individual Regressions – Drivers of the
Contribution Decision
Using the data on individual level, Table 4.I.1 presents the estimates
of the treatment effects and migration dynamics on individual con-
tributions. This analysis replicates the previous findings from the
group-pair regressions, that the treatment effects of the migration
treatments on their own (10a) or with group size dummies (11a) are
not significant. While adding ingroup bias (Ingroup BiasStart) does
not change the significance (12a), controlling for differences in group
size, winning the previous round (wint−1), and initial contribution lev-
els (contributet−1, owngroupcontributet−1, othergroupcontributet−1),
similar to the group-pair regressions, turns the Endogenous treatment
dummy positive and significant (13a).
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Table 4.I.1: Individual contribution decision
(10a) (11a) (12a) (13a) (14a) (15a) (16a)
contribute contribute contribute contribute contribute contribute contribute
Endo 4.20 6.61 7.17 4.38** 4.58** 4.44** 5.02**
(4.79) (4.96) (5.09) (2.00) (2.33) (2.24) (2.34)
Exo −5.50 −3.09 −2.83 0.37 1.30 −0.83 −0.50
(5.17) (5.14) (5.06) (1.93) (2.01) (1.89) (1.90)
Ingroup BiasStart 0.15 0.09** 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
contributet−1 0.58*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.43***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
owngroupcontributet−1 0.01 −0.05*** −0.06*** −0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
othergroupcontributet−1 0.02** 0.01 0.02* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
wint−1 0.65 0.15 0.27 0.19
(0.96) (0.74) (0.85) (0.87)
Beliefgroupcontributiont 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.58***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Beliefothergroupcontributiont 0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Group increaset −6.20*** −6.19***
(2.40) (2.34)
Group increase× Endot 3.90 3.77
(4.10) (4.02)
Group decreaset 4.74** 4.36*
(2.34) (2.23)










#Migrations× Endot−1 −8.71*** −8.83***
(2.77) (2.82)
Constant 49.65*** 49.65*** 48.00*** 14.01*** 3.03 3.01 8.58
(2.53) (2.53) (2.93) (2.12) (2.15) (2.05) (7.48)
Group Size Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Controls No No No No No No Yes
N 3600 3600 3600 3360 3360 3360 3360
Overall R− squared 0.010 0.077 0.080 0.422 0.525 0.534 0.544
Standard errors clustered by group pair in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Moreover, analysing the individual level contributions also allows us
to explore the influence of group composition changes, individual mi-
gration decision, initial ingroup bias, and beliefs on the contribution
decision.
The initial ingroup bias (Ingroup BiasStart) does not influence consecu-
tive contribution decisions except in a specification in which we do not
account for participants’ beliefs about the contribution of others, mi-
gration dynamics, and survey measures (13a). Winning in the previous
period does not affect the contributions in the following round. Beliefs
about the contributions of the own group (Beliefgroupcontributiont)
have a strong positive effect and are significant in all specifications
(p-value < 0.01) whereas beliefs about the contributions of the other
group (Beliefothergroupcontributiont) do not seem to affect the contri-
bution decision.25 There are no notable differences between the specifi-
cation with (16a) and without survey controls (15a). In the full specifica-
tion (16a), we find that while being in a group that increased in size com-
pared to the previous round (Group increaset) does decrease contribu-
tions by ∼6.19 tokens, this effect is partly mitigated when the group
increase is caused by someone who intentionally joins the group in the
endogenous migration treatment (Group increase×Endot) and reduces
to−6.19 + 3.77 = −2.42. Being in a group that shrunk does also make a
difference. While a decrease already leads to a ∼4.36 token increase in
the Exogenous treatment (Group decreaset), this is further amplified in
the endogenous treatment (Group decrease×Endot) where the overall
effect is 4.36 + 8.44 = 12.8 (The interactions are jointly significant with
p<0.01). Both of these effects are in addition to the effect that being in
a small or large group has on contributions, as we already control for
the different group sizes. Players who indicate they would like to leave
their group (Leavedecisiont−1), and those who are made to migrate in
the exogenous treatment (Migration(Self)t−1) reduce their contribu-
tions by 0.50 and 3.99 tokens in the following round, but players who
wanted to migrate and got chosen to do so (Migration(Self)×Endot−1)
increase their contributions by −0.50 − 3.99 + 7.10 = 2.61 tokens (the
coefficients are jointly significant p<0.01). Looking at the pure effect
of a migration happening, assuming that group sizes stayed constant
25For a more detailed analysis of the role of beliefs, see Appendix 4.H.
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and the individual did not decide to leave or migrate previous round,
we find that migrations have a weakly significant positive effect in the
Exogenous treatment (#Migrationst−1) and increase contributions by
3.86 tokens, but have a net negative effect in the Endogenous treatment
(#Migrations×Endot−1) and decrease contributions by 3.86− 8.83 =
−4.4 tokens. Comparing (15a) and (16a) shows that the inclusion of
the demographic variables from the post-experiment survey is inconse-
quential for the analysis. As a robustness check, we also ran this regres-
sion analysis separately for each treatment to see if the independent
variables affect contributions in the different treatments in a different
way (Table 4.I.2). However, besides the already discussed differences
in reactions to group composition changes and migrations, we find no
especially notable differences.
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Table 4.I.2: Pooled and Un-pooled Treatment Analysis
(17a) (18a) (19a) (20a)
Pooled Control Endo Exo
Endo 5.024**
Exo −0.500
GroupSize1t 50.61 *** 62.81 *** 54.00 **
GroupSize2t −7.588*** −7.809 −5.662
GroupSize3t 3.350* 2.573 3.652
GroupSize5t −1.038 −0.529 −1.782
GroupSize6t −3.369** −4.155** −3.928**
GroupSize7t −1.323 −0.313 −5.596*
GroupSize8t −8.371*** −2.473 −5.967
contributet−1 0.432*** 0.507*** 0.304*** 0.409***
owngroupcontributet−1 −0.059*** −0.068** −0.050*** −0.075***
othergroupcontributet−1 0.012 0.032** 0.001 −0.009
Beliefgroupcontributiont 0.578*** 0.447*** 0.750*** 0.630***
Beliefothergroupcontributiont 0.001 −0.068 0.021** 0.041
wint−1 0.194 0.335 −2.008 2.932*
Ingroup BiasStart 0.011 0.074 0.061 −0.042
Group increaset −6.185*** −4.981** −2.287
Group increase× Endot 3.769
Group decreaset 4.361* 2.988* 12.49 ***
Group decrease× Endot 8.438***
Leavedecisiont−1 −0.497 0.181
Migration(Self)t−1 −3.991 −3.932 3.589
Migration(Self)× Endot−1 7.102
#Migrationst−1 3.863* 3.681* −4.956**
#Migrations× Endot−1 −8.826***
Age −0.293 0.251 −0.510* −0.440
Female −2.599* −2.777 −4.313* −3.536
OtherEurope 2.430 −0.276 1.703 6.499**
Asian −0.178 2.767 −0.832 −2.622
Othercountries 4.529* 0.964 5.577** 5.971
Econ −3.959** −2.540 −5.731* −6.433
Siblings −0.338 −1.495 −0.867 −0.163
Teamsports −1.357 −1.884 −1.082 −1.885
Instructions −0.083 0.995 −0.627 −0.023
RiskSeeking 1.150*** 1.357** 0.701 1.208**
Teamwork 0.102 −0.348 −0.011 0.523
Constant 8.577 −6.425 21.92 17.44
N 3,360 1,120 1,120 1,120
Standard errors suppressed for legibility.




This thesis has explored how social identity, inequality, and migration
interact with how scarce resources are distributed or fought over. We ob-
serve in Chapter 2 that experiencing a wage decrease (even if it is only
a relative one) results in more selfish choices when it comes to the dis-
tribution of resources. As the resources distributed are not Manna from
heaven but tax income that was previously taken from the earnings of
the participants, very selfish choices imply a willingness to compensate
oneself for the wage decrease at the cost of the other participant. This
effect can even be observed when a person with an absolute higher
income experiences no decrease in wage but observes that a poorer
person experiences a wage increase.
Chapter 3 suggests that conflict over resources can strengthen social
identity and lead to more ingroup bias. Alternative methods to induce
social identity in the lab were only effective when administered in com-
bination with an within-subject measurement of the strength of social
identity. This in turn suggests that within-subject measures of social
identity potentially interact with the social identity induction itself, rais-
ing concerns over the use of such designs in lab experiments that study
social identity.
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The theory underlying Chapter 4 suggests that such an increase in in-
group bias results in more wasteful conflict over resources. When we
try to mitigate this by allowing people to migrate between groups, and
thus allowing enemies to become allies and allies enemies, this ingroup
bias and overcontribution does not diminish. On the opposite: If any-
thing, the empirical results suggest that allowing people to migrate
between groups increases the amount of resources wasted on the con-
flict and does not change the bias in favor of the ingroup. However, we
also find some encouraging effects: Even though the presence of the
opportunity to migrate increases wasteful conflict expenditure, actual
migrations do decrease the contributions to the conflict.
Linking the different results suggests that decreasing absolute or rela-
tive wages can be dangerous for a society as they result in more con-
tested redistribution decisions. Olson (1982) identified that rent-seeking
efforts can result in inefficiencies if coalitions form that primarily try
to enhance the position of their own group members. In chapter 3 and
4, we have seen that this in turn has the potential to strengthen group
identities and fuel further wasteful conflict over resources, ultimately
lowering social welfare. For policymakers this suggests that it is not suf-
ficient to fix income inequalities through redistribution but that more
attention should be spent on achieving equitable growth.
More research is needed to investigate how to reduce wasteful rent-
seeking. Promising approaches that are close to our attempt of making
group boundaries permeable but in more cooperative settings were
pursued by Chen et al. (2014) and Xu et al. (2020). Chen et al. (2014)
found that priming a common group identity can lead to joint payoff
maximization in coordination games whereas having salient different
identities does not result in efficient coordination. Xu et al. (2020) show
that having cooperative experience with an outgroup member before
making an allocation decision can mitigate ingroup bias. If these ap-
proaches would work in a contest setting has not been investigated yet.
The results from chapter 3 suggest that the competition over resources
could induce a ingroup bias that could override a primed common iden-
tity or the effect of previous cooperative interactions. Future research
should try address this and look into alternative ways to mitigate the
overcontribution prevalent in group contests.
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Bellemare, C., Kröger, S., & Van Soest, A. (2008). Measuring inequity
aversion in a heterogeneous population using experimental de-
cisions and subjective probabilities. Econometrica, 76(4), 815–839.
Bénabou, R., & Ok, E. A. (2001). Social mobility and the demand for
redistribution: The POUM hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 116(2), 447–487.
172
Benjamin, D., Choi, J. Et al. (2010). Social identity and preferences.
American Economic Review, 100(4), 1913–28.
Benz, M., & Meier, S. (2008). Do people behave in experiments as in the
field?—evidence from donations. Experimental Economics, 11(3),
268–281.
Blau, F. D., & Kahn, L. M. (2017). The gender wage gap: Extent, trends,
and explanations. Journal of Economic Literature, 55(3), 789–865.
Bloch, F. (2012). Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts (M. R.
Garfinkel & S. Skaperdas, Eds.). In M. R. Garfinkel & S. Skaper-
das (Eds.), Oxford handbook of the economics of peace and conflict.
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reci-
procity, and competition. American Economic Review, 90(1), 166–
193.
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Impact Paragraph
This thesis contributes to the understanding of social identity, group
contests, inequality, and redistributive preferences. Chapter 3 advances
the understanding of social identity and minimal groups by showing
that the most consistent method to create an ingroup bias is to pit a peo-
ple against an opponent. In our experiment, it is sufficient to explain
participants that they compete against another group and to let them
decide how hard they want to compete to trigger this ingroup bias.
However, we can also show that how we measure this ingroup bias
might have an effect on what we measure. As this can confound stud-
ies of social identity, researchers should carefully consider how their
measurement method interacts with their treatment effects. Another
contribution to the social identity literature comes from chapter 4. We
show that groups that compete against each other have a persistent
ingroup bias in social preferences, even when the group composition
changes and allies of today can be enemies of tomorrow. This suggests
that the important factor for a strong social identity is not so much who
my allies are or who the enemy is, but just that there is a common enemy.
Recently, this was observable in protests against COVID regulations in
Germany. While usually these groups have very little in common, the
COVID regulations brought Hippies, Anti-Vaccers, and Neo-Nazis to-
gether to protest shoulder to shoulder against mask requirements and
other restrictions that were passed by the German government.
We also contribute to the literature on overcontribution in contests. The
literature generally shows that individuals contribute more than the
amount that would maximise their expected profit in contests. This
is even more pronounced in group contests. However, most studies
use fixed groups that repeatedly compete against each other which is
not always the case in the field. Employees change employers, foot-
ball players change teams, and soldiers can defect to the enemy. We
hypothesised that if the enemy of today can be a friend tomorrow and
vice versa, individuals would contribute less to a group contest than if
groups are fixed and the allies of today are also the allies of tomorrow.
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We show that people hardly decrease their competitive efforts when
the group composition changes. When we switch group members with
their opposition, the contest contributions only decrease slightly. When
we let group members decide for themselves if they want to go to the
opposing group, contest contributions actually increase.
Chapter 2 provides additional insights into drivers of social prefer-
ences. While it is well established that income inequality can explain
preferences for redistribution, less is known about the effect of income
changes on redistributive preferences. We investigate how wage de-
creases both in absolute terms and relative to the wage development of
another person affect redistributive preferences. We find that decreas-
ing absolute and relative wages result in more selfish redistribution
choices. This effect is particularly pronounced for individuals who have
a higher income than the person they are matched with and even holds
when their own wage is stable and the low earner has a wage increase
that puts them on an equal footing. As the pool of resources that the
participants redistribute is actually generated by taxing their wages in a
task that takes some effort to accomplish, the high earners effectively ap-
propriate resources from the low earners to compensate themselves for
the relative wage decrease. In practice this means that policies that aim
to close earnings gaps between groups—such as between minorities
and whites, and men and women—are likely to be met with resistance
by members of the traditionally better off group who are averse to in-
come trends inequality. Similarly, the decrease in generosity when faced
with an absolute wage decrease can increase the rich’s opposition to fis-
cal stimuli with redistributive aspects during economic downturns. As
economic downturns usually have a particularly strong effects on the
lower percentiles of the income distributions—and thus require even




This thesis explores how social preferences affect individuals’ behav-
ior in situations in which people fight over, or have to propose how
to distribute resources. Chapter 2 investigates the causal impact of in-
come decreases on redistribution decisions, in an environment where
the income inequality that may be created with wage changes is kept
fixed. We both look at absolute decreases in wage and relative decreases
compared to another person. We hypothesize that intra-personal and
inter-personal decreases create dissatisfaction for an individual, and
causes them to support redistribution policies that compensate them
for the situation at the cost of others. We find evidence that people
indeed propose more selfish distributions of income when they expe-
rience decreasing wages, even in cases in which the other person has
actually earned overall less income then them.
Chapter 3 explores how to study social identity in the lab. Studying
causal effects of social identity in a field setting is often not possible
because it is usually not possible to directly manipulate or observe so-
cial identity in a natural settings. This is why both in economics and in
social psychology, lab experiments have been used to create and study
social identities in a controlled environment. We propose to use social
value orientation tests as manipulation checks for social identity ex-
periments and consider two additional aspect: We compare alternative
methods to induce social identity and explore different ways to econo-
metrically measure the strength of social identity. A one-shot group con-
test game is the only method to induce social identity no matter which
measurement design is chosen. We also find that any social identity in-
duction method successfully generates ingroup bias in a within-subject
design which seem to be driven by salience effects.
Group contests, social identity, and migration are the topic of Chapter 4.
In studies researching collective rent-seeking, group conflict, and group
contests it is usually assumed that individuals belong to one group and
that this group membership will remain unchanged. In the field, group
185
Summary
boundaries are not as strict. Combatants switch sides and employees
change employers. We introduce migration to a group contest exper-
iment in the lab and investigate how it affects contest contributions
and social identity. When we provide participants with a choice to stay
or leave their group, we observe an increase in contest contributions.
Making the choice to stay or leave exogenous leads to decrease in contri-
butions, however this decrease is less pronounced. Ingroup bias in the
migration treatments is only marginally lower than in the Control treat-
ment at the start of the experiment but these treatment differences do
not persist throughout the experiment. When people decide to switch
groups, they mostly leave because of bad prospects of winning.
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